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ABSTRACT
THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS
AND THE NATURE OF GOD IN DESCARTES
SEPTEMBER 2000
DANIEL P. KAUFMAN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
Ph • D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.
Descartes held the seemingly bizarre doctrine that the
eternal truths are freely created by God. This 'Creation
Doctrine' has been the subject of great misunderstandings
and ridicule from philosophers and theologians from the
seventeenth century to the present.
This dissertation is a sympathetic interpretation of
Descartes' Creation Doctrine. After first briefly examining
some alternative views concerning the relationship between
the eternal truths and God, I argue that Descartes is
committed to the Creation Doctrine because of his acceptance
of traditional theological views concerning the nature of
God, in particular, God's simplicity and freedom. I then
argue that Descartes' Creation Doctrine, contrary to the
claims of some recent commentators, does not entail any
bizarre modal theses. For instance, the fact that God could
have willed that the eternal truths are false does not
entail that there are no necessary truths. I conclude by
offering an interpretation of Descartes' explanation of the
necessity of the eternal truths.
Vll
We will see that the Creation Doctrine (i) is
theologically well-grounded, (ii) does not affect ordinary
modal claims, and (iii)
,
in fact, guarantees the necessity
of the eternal truths.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
In a series of three letters to Mersenne in 1630,
Descartes first presented his idea that the eternal truths
are freely created by God.
The mathematical truths which you call eternal havebeen laid down by God and depend on him entirely noless than the rest of his creatures. (AT I 145; CSMK
In God willing and knowing are a single thing in such a
way that by the very fact of willing something he knows
it and it is only for this reason that such a thing is
true. (AT I 14 9; CSMK 24)
I know that God is the author of everything and that
these [eternal] truths are something and conseguently
that he is their author... [F] rom eternity he willed and
understood them to be, and by that very fact he created
them. (AT I 152; CSMK 25)
I will call this view, following Margaret Wilson and Edwin
Curley, 1 'the Creation Doctrine'. Although the Creation
Doctrine does not appear in the body of Descartes' most
famous work, the Meditations of 1641, it does appear in the
Fifth and Sixth Replies; and it was held by Descartes until
at least 1648, and perhaps after. 2
The Creation Doctrine can be characterized by three
theses, each stronger than the preceding one; and each
thesis serves to distinguish Descartes' position from an
alternative position:
Dependence Thesis: Like everything else, the
eternal truths depend on God. 3
Although Descartes employs the notion of dependence for
several purposes in his writings, most noticeably in
l
explaining degrees of reality, 4 in each case, the notion of
dependence is something like the following:
x depends on y = df it is not possible that x exists
without y, and it is possible that y exists without x.
Descartes states this in many passages in his works. 5 The
Dependence Thesis is a rather weak thesis, and one that is
not peculiar to Descartes. It simply amounts to saying: If,
per imposs i bi le
,
God did not exist, the eternal truths would
not be true. As Descartes states, "we must not say that if
God did not exist nevertheless these truths would be true"
[21 Deus not, esset
.
. nihi lominns istae veri fates
^erae] (AT I 149-50 ;CSMK 24)
Descartes' argument for the Dependence Thesis in the 27
May 1630 letter to Mersenne is quite simple:
1. The eternal truths are something. 6 AT I 152)
2. Everything depends on God.
3. Therefore, the eternal truths depend on God. (AT I
152; CSMK 25)
The Dependence Thesis serves to distinguish the Creation
Doctrine from the position of those who hold that the
eternal truths would be true even if, per i mpo.q.q-j hi 1 p
f God
did not exist. Exactly who held such a view is the subject
of the next chapter.
The Dependence Thesis entails that there is no stanHaH
of truth independent of God
. That is, the eternal truths
are true because of God; God does not will or know them
because they are true. As Descartes states: "nor did he
will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to
two right angles because he recognized that it could not be
2
otherwise, and so on. On the contrary ... it is because he
willed that the three angles of a triangle should
necessarily equal two right angles that this is true and
cannot be otherwise." (AT VII 432; CSM II 291)
Efficient Cause Thesis: God is the efficient
cause of the eternal truths.
As Descartes states in response to Mersenne : "You ask me by
what kind of causality God has established the eternal
truths. I reply: by the same kind of causality as he
created all things, that is to say, as their efficient and
total cause [af f i c i ens et totalis causa
l " (AT I 151-2; CSMK
25) An efficient cause of an effect E can be superficially
characterized as that which brings about E; it is what we
normally would think of as a cause si mpl i ci ter .
The Efficient Cause Thesis serves to distinguish the
Creation Doctrine from the view that God is the 'formal' or
'exemplar' cause of things. 8 Although exemplar causes have
a long history in the middle ages, even dating back to
Seneca's 65th Epistle, a particularly clear explanation of
them is found in the seventeenth-century writer Theophraste
Bouju
:
To these four kinds of causes we have just spoken of,
the Platonists add a fifth, which they call exemplar or
idea; for insofar as God is the universal artisan of
all things and only makes things wisely and perfectly,
understanding what he makes and why he makes it, there
must be ideas, intelligible notions or forms, in his
divine understanding, of the things he makes. This
exemplary form is also found in the understanding of
men; for in this way the natural agent has in himself
the natural form by which he produces his effect and
renders it similar; similarly the agent who acts
through the understanding has in himself the
intelligible form of what he is making resemble it.
3
Thus the doctor tries to introduce health to hispatient in accordance with the idea he has of it, andthe architect to construct a house materially similart°
g
the one^in his thought, (quoted in Ariew and Grene,
The divine idsas
,
insofar as they are considered as a
'blueprint' or model of those things that God will create,
are exemplars
.
9 Aquinas uses a human analogy to explain
this :
Thus the likeness [uimilit.ndo] of the house pre-existsm the mind of the architect. This can be called the
'idea' of the house; because the architect intends to
make the house similar to the form which was conceived
in his mind. Now since the world is not made by
chance, but is made by God acting as a intellectual
agent
. . . it is necessary that there be a form in the
divine mind to whose likeness the world is made; and in
this consists the meaning [ratio] of 'idea'. (ST la
15.1
.
res )
Descartes was certainly familiar with the concept of an
exemplar cause. Weak evidence for this is Descartes'
familiarity with the writing of Eustachius a Sancto Paulo.
Eustachius wrote of exemplars in a traditional manner: "What
the Greeks call 'Idea', the Latins call 'Exemplar', which is
nothing else but the explicit image or species of the thing
to be made in the mind of the artificer." 10 Stronger
evidence is provided by Descartes himself, in the Third
Replies: "I used the word 'idea' because it was the standard
philosophical term used to refer to the forms of perception
belonging to the divine mind..." (AT VII 181; CSM II 127)
However, there is no reason to think that Descartes intended
the Creation Doctrine to be a rejection of the exemplar-
view, although it is clearly an (unintended?) consequence of
the Creation Doctrine.
4
The Efficient Cause Thesis is stronger than the
Dependence Thesis in the sense that the former entails the
latter but not vice versa. For instance, according to
Descartes, the modes of a substance depend on the substance,
but the substance is not an efficient cause of its modes. 11
So, while the Dependence Thesis merely holds that the
eternal truths are ontologies 1
1 y dependent on God, the
Efficient Cause Thesis holds that the eternal truths are
causally dependent on God. 12
Free Creation Thesis: God freely creates the
eternal truths.
This thesis is the most characteristic thesis of the
Creation Doctrine, and the one which, to borrow a phrase
from David Lewis, has produced the most incredulous
stares. 13 The Free Creation Thesis entails that for any
eternal truth P, God could have willed that not-P. Thus, as
Descartes states, "he was free to make it not true that all
the radii of the circle are equal - just as free as he was
not to create the world." (AT I 152; CSMK 25) As we'll see
throughout this dissertation, the Free Creation Thesis of
the Creation Doctrine produces incredulous stares precisely
because it is thought to entail that the eternal truths are
not necessary truths. We'll see in Chapter Four that this
is false.
Before we continue, we should be clear about what
exactly the eternal truths are for Descartes. In the
Principles of Philosophy
,
Descartes lists "the
proposition [s] Nothing comes from nothing. . . .it is
5
imposs ib l e for the same th ing to be and not 1-0 hp ah h^ Q
aame time; Whet, is done cannot, bp u ndone whn
cannot but exi st, whil e he th i nks"
,
as examples of eternal
truths (AT VIII 23-4; CSM I 209). And in the 15 April 1630
letter to Mersenne, Descartes adds mathematical truths to
the set of eternal truths. 14 So, included in the set of
eternal truths are strictly logical truths (e.g., it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the
same time), conceptual truths (e.g., He who thinks cannot
but exist while he thinks), 'synthetic a priori truths
(e.g.. Nothing comes from nothing), and the truths of
mathematics. 15 All of these kinds of truths may be called,
to use Plantinga's locution, 'truths necessary in the
broadly logical sense'. 16
The fact that Descartes believes both that the eternal
truths are freely created by God and that the eternal truths
are necessarily true, has led to widespread criticism, and
even ridicule, of the Creation Doctrine. In the seventeenth
century, Leibniz stated that the Creation Doctrine
"unknowingly destroy [s] all of God's love and all his glory.
For why praise him for what he has done if he would be
equally praiseworthy in doing the exact opposite." (AG 36)
Moreover, Leibniz believed that the Creation Doctrine
rendered God unfree. 17 Also in the seventeenth century,
Spinoza conceded that "this opinion, which subjects all
6
things to a certain indifferent will of God," is preferable
only in relation to the view that God's will is determined
by independent factors. 18
Moreover, among the propositions condemned during the
Fifteenth General Congress of the Jesuits in 1706 was the
following Cartesian proposition: "The essence of each thing
depends upon God's free will, so that in another order of
things he was free to create, the essence and properties,
for example, of matter, mind, circle, and so on, would have
been other than they are at present." 19
In a recent paper, Jonathan Bennett has catalogued the
less-than-f lattering adjectives used by twentieth-century
scholars to characterize the Creation Doctrine. 20 Among
them are Nicholas Jolley's 'strange' and 'peculiar', Louis
Loeb's 'peculiar' and 'curious', and Edwin Curley's
'incoherent'. 21 Perhaps the most flattering thing said
about the Creation Doctrine, until now, is Alvin Plantinga's
concession that "Descartes' view is neither unintelligible
nor incoherent. The most we can fairly say... is that his
view is strongly counterintuitive." 22 So, Descartes'
Creation Doctrine has not only been thought to be silly in
some way, but also, in some cases, dangerous to theology and
philosophy
.
In this dissertation, I make a start toward an adequate
and sympathetic understanding of Descartes' Creation
Doctrine. In fact, I hope to show that the Creation
Doctrine is a plausible view of the relationship between God
7
and the eternal truths, given the theolncnr^i const™ im-o
Dascart
.es accepts . One may object that this does not amount
to showing that the Creation Doctrine is plausible
simp li ci ter because the theological constraints under which
Descartes formulates the Creation Doctrine could be crazy.
I agree, but the theological constraints Descartes accepts
are not crazy; in fact, they are traditionally-held
doctrines concerning the nature of God, his simplicity, and
freedom. What I want to suggest is that Descartes' Creation
Doctrine is a truly honest account of the eternal truths.
It is honest in that Descartes accepts a traditional view of
God as simple and free, takes it very seriously, and accepts
the consequences this view of God has for a theory of the
eternal truths.
In the first chapter, I examine alternatives to the
Creation Doctrine, in order to understand why Descartes
cannot accept any of them. In the second and third chapter,
I discuss Descartes' reasons for holding the Creation
Doctrine and rejecting the alternatives. The reasons are
the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity and Descartes
'
understanding of divine freedom. The fourth and fifth
chapters are devoted to examining the relationship between
the two following propositions, both of which were held by
Descartes
:
(1) The eternal truths are freely created by God.
(2) The eternal truths are necessary.
8
In the fourth chapter, I argue that (l) and (2) are not
incompatible despite the fact that nrim^ f^ Q d)
eliminates the possibility of (2)
. in the fifth chapter, I
examine Descartes' strategy for explaining the necessity of
the eternal truths, that is, his explanation of (2)
.
What
will emerge is a picture of the Creation Doctrine that,
despite its pr ima—
f
ac i e weirdness, is not a silly or
dangerous view. it is a view that preserves divine
simplicity and divine freedom and does not affect the modal
status of the eternal truths. In this respect, it is a
rather desirable view for traditional theists.
A note on method: Throughout this dissertation, I
compare Descartes
' thoughts with philosophers who either
held a view contrary to Descartes' view or who influenced
Descartes thought on the subject at hand. In most cases,
the philosophers with whom I compare Descartes are Christian
philosophers from the eleventh century through the sixteenth
century. Earlier this century, the claim that Descartes is
the 'father of modern philosophy' was prevalent; and
scholars placed emphasis on an alleged, radical break
between medieval scholasticism and the prominent
philosophers of the seventeenth century. There were notable
exceptions, of course, such as Etienne Gilson's Tndey
acholastico cartesien (1913) . But for the most part,
Descartes was seen as beginning fresh in philosophy. This
phenomenon is perhaps most noticeable in undergraduate
9
courses on the history of early modern philosophy, in which
Descartes is presented as a revolutionary, fighting against
the tyranny of the scholastic philosophers.
Recently, however, important scholarship has been done
emphasizing not Descartes' break with the scholastic
philosophy in which he was trained at La Fleche, but rather
his indebtedness to scholastic philosophy. Examples of this
are found in the works of Roger Ariew, Marlene Rozemond,
Norman Wells, Eileen O'Neill, Timothy Cronin, Jorge Secada,
and others
.
23
I see myself as joining these scholars'
program
.
The influence of the philosophers of the Middle Ages
and sixteenth- century scholastics such as Suarez on
Descartes is most obvious in his metaphysics and
philosophical theology. We are rightly disposed to think
that Descartes' scientific and epistemological projects are
novel. However, his metaphysics and philosophical theology
bear the unmistakable imprint of the scholastics. We need
look no further than the Third Meditation a pn.gtprinri pmnf
of the existence of God to see this. The scholastic notions
of esse object ivum
,
realitas objective
,
eminent containment,
and material falsity are prevalent in that argument. Other
examples of scholastic influence are abundant in Descartes
work: For instance, the account of error in the Fourth
Meditation in terms of privation is simply the scholastic
account of sin, applied to the problem of error . 24 And
Descartes' theory of distinctions, employed prominently in
10
his Sixth Meditation argument for the real distinction of
mind and body, is inherited directly from Suarez. As we'll
see, the influence of his predecessors is especially
noticeable in Descartes' discussion of the creation of the
eternal truths - the topic of this dissertation.
Another note on method: This dissertation, despite
employing some methods of contemporary analytic philosophy,
is an example of what Robert Sleigh has called 'exegetical
history of philosophy'
.
25 Although I believe that
Descartes Creation Doctrine is a viable strategy for
contemporary theists, my aim is not to defend the truth of
the Creation Doctrine as a philosophical position, using
Descartes merely as a guide. Rather, my aim is, as Benson
Mates puts it, "to discover and set forth, as accurately,
objectively and completely as possible, the philosophical
views" of Descartes
.
26 Sleigh recognizes that there are two
components of doing exegetical history of philosophy: (i)
the fact-finding component (what the historical figure
said)
,
and (ii) the explanatory component (why he said what
he said)
. I've already begun the fact-finding component
in the first few pages of this Introduction, and the
remaining facts will be filled out in the course of the
dissertation, especially Chapters Four and Five. Chapters
Two and Three are devoted almost exclusively to the
explanatory component
.
11
It should be said at the outset that there is very
little text in which Descartes discusses the Creation
Doctrine. However, almost every text in which it is
discussed contains a wealth of information about it. For
that reason, I will refer repeatedly to the same texts to
discuss different aspects of the Creation Doctrine.
12
Endnotes
Wilson (1978)
,
Curley (1984)
, (1998)
CSMK q?
6 2
j
JUl
^
16
1
8 letter to Arnauld (AT V 223-24;358 9)
. I say perhaps after' because there is neitherany textuai evidence to support the contention that he gaveup the Creation Doctrine after 1648, nor any textual
9
evidence to support the contrary claim.
'See AT I 145; CSMK 23, AT VII 435; CSM II 293.
4See AT VII 165-6; CSM II 117
,
and Kaufman (forthcoming)
.
AT VII 185; CSM II 130,
5See, for instance, AT I 145;
CSMK 24-5, AT VII 380; CSM II 261,
4
,
AT V 160; CSMK 343
.
CSMK 23, AT I 149-150;
AT VII 435-6; CSM II 293-
The issue of the ontological status of the eternaltruths in Descartes is controversial. For three interesting
approaches to this issue, see Chappell (1997)
,
Nolan (1997)Schmaltz (1991) .
7See also AT VII 436; CSM II 294.
Held by many medieval philosophers, including Aquinas(ST la 15) and Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta IX q. 2 B)
.
9A divine idea of something, which God could create butdoes not, is not an exemplar, according to Aquinas; rather,
it is a rat i o . The difference is explained by Aquinas in ST
la 15.3. rfis. : "Plato postulated the ideas as principles of
the knowledge of things and of their coming into existence;
and an idea as postulated in the divine mind has both
functions. As a principle of the production of things
—fact i on i s—rerum] it may be called an 'exemplar'
and belongs to practical knowledge; and as a principle of
knowing [princ ip ium cognosc i t ivnm ] , it is properly called a
rat i o
,
and can belong also to speculative knowledge. As
exemplar, it is related to all the things produced by God at
some time. As a principle of knowledge, it is related to all
the things God knows, even thought they never come into
existence." As Wippel states: "divine ideas or divine
rat iones obtain even for possibles in the purest sense, that
is, for those that will never be realized in fact. Bit
divine ideas in the sense of exemplars obtain only for those
that will indeed enjoy actual existence." (1981) p. 733.
10Summa Philosophica Ouadripart 1 ta Physica Ill.l.iii.
Quoted in Ariew and Grene (1995) p. 94
“See AT VII 165-6, 185; CSM II 117, 130.
13
12 In some
ontological ly
substances are
cases, however, an x will depend both
and causally on a y . For instance, finite
ontologically and causally dependent on God.
_
ThlS
I
(
; i}
aim was recent ly supported by direct empiricalevidence. When some of the material in this dissertationwas presented at Cornell, the audience, composed exclusivelyof medievalists, simply could not fathom that anyone couldbelieve the Free Creation Thesis.
Actually, in this letter, Descartes refers to "themathematical truths which you [i.e., Mersenne] call
eternal." There is no reason, however, to think thatDescartes would deny mathematical truths the status of
eternal truths.
15See Alanen and Knuuttila (1988) p. 14 .
Plantinga (1974) ch
. 1. An anonymous commentator
objected that many propositions that we would call necessary
are not eternal truths for Descartes. The example he or shepresents is: If Descartes i s having a h^d hair dav. fhPn
Descartes—rs
—
hav i ng a—had—hair day. Although Descartes never
mentions an example like this, he does mention another
tautology, 1 (P & P)
'
.
So, there is simply no reason to
think that he would deny ' P->P 1 the status of being an
eternal truth.
17See Theodicy §186: "But is the affirmations of
necessary truths were actions of the will of the most
perfect mind, these actions would be anything but free, for
there is nothing to choose.
. .That was preserving only the
name of freedom." At the time of the Theodicy Leibniz held
that there are three conditions (individually necessary andjointly sufficient) for free action. (1) The agent, whose
intellect is naturally prior to their will, is presented
with alternative choices, (2) the action is spontaneous,
i.e., the source of the action is within the agent, and (3)
it is not par—££. necessary that the chosen course of action
obtain. According to Leibniz, Descartes' God would not
satisfy condition (1). See Sleigh (1990) p. 80-1.
18Ethics p33s2 .
19Rochemonteix (1889) vol . 4, pp . 89-93. Quoted in
Ariew, et al (1998) p. 258-9. Descartes believed that the
essences of things are dependent on God's free will; and the
eternal truths are truths concerning essences.
20Bennett ( 1994 ) .
21See Bennett (1994) p. 639.
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22Plantinga (1980) p. 124.
23Ariew (1999)
,
Rozemond (1998)
,
Wells (1961) (1966
2000 'Th'
Nei
^
(\987) ' ?r°nin (1960) ' U966) . “ecada( ). e publication of Anew et a 1 1 a
Med i tations ; Background Source m^pH.Ic moqq), whichcontains substantial portions of the sixteenth and
seventeenth-century scholastics Francisco Suarez andEustachius a Sancto Paulo, indicates a recent scholarlyinterest m Descartes' scholastic influences.
See AT VII 53-55,
Aquinas De Main 3.1-2.
59-61; CSM II 37-39, 41-42, and
25Sleigh (1990) p. 2.
26Quoted in Sleigh (1990) p. 2.
27Sleigh (1990) p. 3-4.
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CHAPTER 1
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CREATION DOCTRINE
Introduc t ion
To fully understand Descartes' reasons for holding the
Creation Doctrine, it is helpful to have an understanding of
alternative accounts of the relation between God and the
eternal truths, accounts Descartes opposes. In the 6 May
1630 letter to Mersenne, Descartes states the view of the
eternal truths which he opposes
:
As for the eternal truths, I say again that they aretrue or possible because God knows them to be true orpossible, but not that they are known by God to be true
as if they were true independently of him... If men
really understood the sense of their words they could
never say without blasphemy that the truth of anything
is prior to the knowledge which God has of it. So, we
must not say , then , that if God did not exist,
nevertheless those truths would still be true f si Dpi id
non esset
. n i hi.lominus ista e veritates essent vprap ](AT I 149-150; CSMK 24)
The view, which Descartes is explicitly opposing, holds that
the eternal truths are true independently of God, and God
knows them because they are true. Descartes, as we know,
holds that the eternal truths are true because God wills
(and, by the real identity of God's intellect and will,
knows) them to be true. Because everything real (i.e., non-
privative) depends on God, 1 and the eternal truths are
samething, 2 according to Descartes, the eternal truths
depend on God, not only for their being but also for their
truth. That is, as we've seen, Descartes held the
'Dependence Thesis. It is important to realize that the
16
Dependence Thesis is not something peculiar to Descartes; in
fact, most philosophers from the thirteenth through the
seventeenth centuries held the Dependence Thesis in one form
or another.
However, Descartes certainly seemed to believe that
nomeonh held the view that the eternal truths are true
independently of God. What isn't clear is who Descartes
thought held this belief. Discovering who Descartes thought
held this view is difficult business. The matter is made
worse by the fact that Mersenne
' s side of the correspondence
(with respect to the Spring 1630 letters on the eternal
truths) is lost; so, we can only speculate about the person
who has come to be known as 'Descartes' Unnamed Adversary'
in these letters. 3
Three questions dictate the nature of our speculation:
(i) Who actua l ! y held the view Descartes opposes? (ii) Who
Descartes be li eve to have held the view he opposes?
( iii ) Who, if anyone, both actually held the view Descartes
opposes and was believed by Descartes to have held such a
view?. An answer to the first question will provide
Descartes' Doctr inal—Adversary . An answer to the second
question will provide Descartes' In-Mind Adversary And an
answer to the third question will provide Descartes' Preci rp
Adversary .
These questions are difficult to answer. The first
question is difficult to answer because no philosopher seems
willing to come forth and proclaim that he held the view
17
Descartes opposes; in fact, the parties typically charge
their opponents with holding this view. The second question
is difficult to answer because it involves knowing the
philosophers whose work Descartes would have known at the
time of the 1630 letters to Mersenne
. Despite our
knowledge of the works Descartes read at La Fleche,
Descartes constantly downplays his familiarity with the
works of his philosophical predecessors. Thus, we can be
reasonably confident of Descartes' familiarity with only a
few explicitly mentioned philosophers: Eustachius a Sancto
Paulo (AT III 232; CSMK 156), 4 Augustine (AT VII 219; CSM
II 154), 5 Aquinas (AT III 274; CSMK 166, AT III 360; CSMK
179), Duns Scotus (AT VII 120-1; CSM II 85-6), Suarez (AT
VII 235; CSM II 164), Toletus (AT III 185; CSMK 154), Rubius
(AT III 185; CSMK 154)
. But in most of these cases, the
depth of Descartes' familiarity with these philosophers is
not certain, nor is is clear whether Descartes was familiar
with these philosophers (with the exception of Aquinas and
Suarez) at the time of the 1630 letters to Mersenne. 6 The
third question inherits and compounds the difficulties of
the first two.
For my part, I am not particularly interested in the
answer to the first question for its own sake. This is why
I don't take Wells' contention that Descartes' unnamed
adversary could be one of several Thomists (John Capreolus,
St. Cajetan, Henry of Ghent) seriously. 7 After all, if the
point of examining the position that Descartes opposes is to
18
as I am
shed light on the Creation Doctrine (and, as far
concerned, it is), then it is not helpful to find someone,
possibly unfamiliar to Descartes, who held the alternative
view. I will be satisfied to find a candidate for
Descartes' In-Mind Adversary as long as he is also a prim^
Doctrinal Adversary. That is, the candidate for being
the In-Mind Adversary must at least seem to hold the
position Descartes opposes. The minimal condition for being
the In-Mind Adversary is simply that Descartes was familiar
with him; and the minimal condition for being familiar to
Descartes is that the philosopher is mentioned by Descartes.
If somone satisfies these conditions, then he will be a
cand i date for being Descartes' In-Mind Adversary. I think
that this is all we are likely to get.
In the first section of this chapter, I examine two
likely candidates for Descartes' unnamed adversary, based on
my criteria. In the second section, I will examine a
moderate, alternative account of the eternal truths and
their relation to God, one which is not explicitly denied by
Descartes
.
Descartes Unnamed Adversary: The Usual Suspects
The path to Descartes' Unnamed Adversay is well-worn
ground. Starting in the early twentieth century with Gilson
and other French scholars, and continuing to the late
twentieth century with Cronin, Curley, Frankfurt, and Wells,
scholars have attempted ad nauseam to locate the historical
19
source of the position Descartes opposes. Given the fact
that almost every paper on Descartes on the eternal truths
deals in one way or another with the question of the unnamed
adversary, I don't wish to rehash the issue in any great
detail. Thus, my discussion will be brief.
Descartes, as we have seen, explicitly contrasts his
Creation Doctrine with the view expressed by (b)
:
(b) The eternal truths are true independently of Godm such a way that if, per impossi hi 1
e
,
God were
not to exist, the eternal truths would still betrue
.
Descartes, of course, rejects (b) because it violates the
Dependence Thesis. Although there are several philosophers
who appear to have held (b)
,
I am only interested in those
philosophers who prima—
f
ac i e held (b) with whom Desr^rte.q
-i c;
known to have been familiar
Before looking at the usual suspects, it is crucial to
notice that Descartes' Creation Doctrine concerns the truth
of the eternal truths; it does not concern the type of pssp
they have. This fact is commonly overlooked, particularly
by those interested in locating Descartes within a
tradition, stemming from the middles ages through Suarez,
concerned with the ontological status of the essences of
creatures (and the eternal truths concerning those essences)
prior to their 'creaturely actualization' by God. Although
the Creation Doctrine will have some consequences for the
ontological status of eternal truths and essences, this is
not Descartes' primary concern when he discusses the
Creation Doctrine and the eternal truths. Descartes is
20
concerned with answering the question: 'What makes the
eternal truths (necessarily) true? Given the scarcity of
texts in which he even comes close to addressing it, it is
clear that Descartes is much less interested in the
question: 'What type of £sse do the eternal truths have? 8
This distinction between the truth and esse of an eternal
truth is important because, as we'll see, there are
philosophers who held that the eternal truths are true
independently of God; but these same philosophers held that
the of an eternal truth is dependent on God.
Suarez
We know that Descartes was familiar with Suarez because
he makes reference to Suarez in the Fourth Replies when
justifying his use of the term 'material falsity' : "I found
the word 'materially' used in an identical sense to my own
in the first philosophical author I came across, namely
Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations part IX, section 2,
number 4." (AT VII 235; CSM II 164) We also know that
Descartes would have been familiar with Suarez from his days
at La Fleche, 9 and it is widely thought that Descartes'
central concepts of e_sse objectivnm and eminent and formal
causation in the Third Meditation were inherited from
Suarez. 10 Moreover, Descartes' theory of distinctions bears
too strong a resemblance to Suarez's to deny the influence
of the latter on the former.
21
It is most commonly believed that Suarez is the
philosopher whom Descartes opposed for holding (b)
.
11 if
there is a 'smoking gun' text in Suarez, it is the
following
:
A9ain, those sminc i at. ions H.p trntfa] ^
nQt
[
1Prpluse thpy known by And , bur rat-h^r
are thus known because They nro I-,-..* f Rnrtis
rll ae ennnt j ariones snnt verae quia mirnnaniTifiii- aS£Q PQt l UF!—
i
deQ—
c
ognoscuntur
.
qu ia verse .qnnl-
]
•
otherwise no reason could be given why God would
necessarily know them to be true. For if their truthcame forth from God Himself, that would take place bvmeans of God's will; hence it would not come forth of
necessity, but . voluntarily
. Also, because in regard tothese enunciations, the divine intellect is related aspurely speculative, not as operative. But the
speculative intellect supposes the truth of its objectit does not produce it. Therefore, enunciations like
'
this... have eternal truth, not only as they are in thedivine intellect but also in themselves and prescinding
from it. (DM XXXI
. xii
. 4 0
,
emphasis mine)
The contrast between the first line of this quotation and
Descartes statements in his 6 May 1630 letter to Mersenne
is striking. Suarez's statement in the first line of the
guoted passage is in direct opposition to Descartes
'
statement that "they [i.e., the eternal truths] are true or
possible because God knows them to be true or possible.
" (AT
I 149; CSMK 24) And Suarez's statement that the eternal
truths "have eternal truth, not only as they are in the
divine intellect, but also in themselves and prescinding
from it," is in direct opposition to Descartes' insistence
that the eternal truths are not "known by God to be true as
if they were true independently of him." (AT I 149; CSMK 24)
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In the passage above, Suarez is arguing against two
parties, (i) those who think that the necessary truth of the
eternal truths depends on the divine will and (ii) those who
think it depends on the divine understanding. According to
Suarez, the eternal truths cannot proceed from God's will
because they would then not be necessary, but contingent, as
the effect of a voluntary act. On the other hand, the
eternal truths cannot be true merely because they are in the
divine intellect for two reasons: (i) Because the divine
intellect, in this case, presupposes the truth of its
objects, i . e
. ,
it is 'speculative'. (ii) in criticizing the
view that the eternal truths are true because they are the
objects of the divine intellect, Suarez argues that this
view doesn't sufficiently explain the difference between
eternal truths and those truths that are merely contingent.
As Suarez states:
Nor is it enough, were someone to answer with St.
Thomas ... that
,
with the destruction of the existence
of creatures, these enunciations are true, not in
themselves, but in the divine intellect. For, in this
way, not only enunciations of the type wherein
essential properties are predicated have eternal truth
in the divine intellect, but also all accidental or
contingent ones which are true. (DM XXXI
. xii . 4 0 ) 12
Suarez here levels a powerful criticism: If being an object
of the divine intellect were sufficient to make something an
eternal truth, then every object of the divine intellect
would be an eternal truth. However, God has understanding
of all things, including contingent things. Therefore,
being an object of the divine intellect is not suffcient to
make something an eternal truth.
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In order to avoid these difficulties, Suarez puts forth
the view that the eternal truths are in the divine
intellect, but they do not depend on God for their necessary
truth. That is, Suarez's own view of the eternal truths
seems to me to be that the esse of the eternal truths (and
the essences they concern) depend on God. Before the
creation of creatures, their essences have no real essp in
themselves. 13 Here Suarez disagrees with Henry of Ghent (d.
1293)
,
Master in Theology at Paris shortly after Aquinas,
who famously held that prior to the creation of creatures in
—exi stent i ae
,
their essences had a diminished but real
esse called ' esse essent. iae 1 . Henry argued that unless the
essence of creatures had esse essentiae
,
they would be no
different than impossibles and chimeras. 14 If, Suarez
argues, the eternal truths had some kind of esse in
themselves, then God's creation would not be ex ni hi 1
n
i n
an objection to the Thomist John Capreolus (c. 1380-1444),
Suarez states: "God would not have created all things from
nothing but would have transferred them from one (kind of)
esse to another (kind of) esse .
" (DM XXXI. ii. 3, my gloss) 15
So, the essences and eternal truths have no esse in rp p-r-io-r
to the actualization of creatures, according to Suarez. The
only type of they have is esse potentiale in causa in
God; but this is not any kind of esse in se . 16 It has also
been suggested by Norman Wells that Suarez thinks that
eternal truths have esse objectivum in the divine intellect,
but this kind of esse is not something had intrinsically by
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the thing itself; rather, it is an 'extrinsic
denomination'. 1 ’ In any case, the eternal truths have no
esse ln themselves, but only in the divine intellect and in
the divine power to cause them. That is, this extrinsic
esse does depend on God.
But Suarez doesn't think that the hxuth of the eternal
truths depends on God. Take the eternal truth expressed by
(A) :
(A) Man is an animal
.
According to Suarez, the copula 'is' can be understood in
two ways: call them 'the existential sense' and 'the
essential sense'. If the copula is being understood in its
existential sense, then (A)
,
if true, entails the existence
of its terms; hence, because the referents of the terms
require an efficient cause of their existence, (A) is not
eternally true in the existential sense, but only true when
the referents of the terms are caused to exist. However, if
the copula is being understood in its essential sense, (A)
doesn't entail the existence of its terms. When understood
in the essential sense, (A) is really a disguised
conditional
:
(A*) If man exists, then he is an animal.
(A*) entails nothing about the actual existence of its
terms; thus, the truth of (A*) (which is an interpretation
of (A)) does not depend on any efficient cause. It is in
this sense that (A) is necessarily true, even if no man
exists, and even if there is no efficient cause able to
25
produce man (i.e., God)." Thus, there are eternal truths
which do not depend on God for their truth
.
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Norman Wells has argued that the common opinion that
Suarez is Descartes' unnamed adversary is false. Wells
points out that the the complex structure of DM XXXI can
easily mislead one into thinking that Suarez holds (b)
, when
in fact, it is certain Thomists (Henry of Ghent, Paulus
Socinas, John Capreolus) who hold (b )
.
20 He argues that the
widespread misreading of Suarez as a Doctrinal Adversary of
Descartes has arisen from the fact that, in much of DM XXXI,
Suarez is playing certain positions concerning essences off
of one another; so, it isn't clear when he is presenting his
own positive views on the subject. Although I believe
Wells is mistaken about Suarez's views, even if we grant his
point, it is irrelevant to the present inquiry. Let us
grant, for the moment, Wells' point that Suarez is not a
Doctrinal Adversary of Descartes, but the manner in which
Suarez presents his own views allows for a natural
misreading. In that case, it would not be shocking to think
that Descartes himself could have been misled by Suarez.
Hence, Suarez could be Descartes' In-Mind Adversary.
Moreoever, even if Wells' is correct, Suarez is a pri m^
Doctrinal Adversary. In any case, the texts from
Suarez which I quoted above are as close as we'll get to a
smoking gun, i.e., someone with whom Descartes was familiar
and who seemingly held (b)
.
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Duns Scotus
A position similar to Suarez's concerning the es SP and
the truth of the eternal truths is held by Duns Scotus: the
of the eternal truths is dependent on God, but their
necessary truth does not depend on God. 21 We know that
Descartes was (at least a little) familiar with Duns Scotus,
although the extent to which he knew Scotus' works is
unclear. In fact, the only mention Descartes makes of
Scotus is in reply to Caterus concerning Scotus' famous
'formal distinction'. (AT VII 100, 120-21; CSM II 72-3, 85-
6) Given that Caterus provides Descartes with an account of
Scotus' formal distinction in the First Objections, it isn't
clear that Descartes was familiar with Scotus' ideas on
anyth i ng before Caterus brought them to his attention. On
the other hand, Roger Ariew has made a convincing case that
Scotistic thought was prevalent in Paris during Descartes'
life. 22 The prevalence of Scotism doesn't entail, however,
that Descartes knew Scotus' work.
Regardless of the depth of Descartes' familiarity with
Scotus, there are passages in which Scotus clearly holds
something like (b). 23 The following are smoking-gun texts:
The man is a possible being by logical potency, because
it is not repugnant and the chimera is an impossible
being by opposite impossibility because it is
repugnant ... This logical possibility could remain
separately in power by its own nature even if there
were, per impossible
,
no omnipotence to which it would
be an object. 24
[Tjherefore, that is simply impossible with which esse
is incompatible per se
,
and which is initially of
itself such that it is incompatible with esse
,
and
27
not due to some relationship to God, affirmative or
negative; instead, esse would be incompatible with itif per—
l
mposs ib il e God were not to exist. ( Qrd i43
.
q . un . 7)
Much of Scotus 1 view of modality and its relation to
God occurs in his criticism of Henry of Ghent. In his
Quodlibeta l Quest ions
,
Henry argued that God's ability to do
x is prior to the possibility of x (i.e.
,
x is possible
because God can do/make x) ; but the impossibility of x is
prior to God's inability to do/make x (i.e., for any x that
God cannot do, God cannot do x because x is impossible.). 25
Scotus takes the opportunity to tease apart the issues of
what God can do and what is possible. Scotus' view is that
qua—something that God can actually produce, an essence is
first (i.e., in the first instant of nature) produced in
esse inte llig ib i 1
e
as an object of the divine intellect and
then (in the second instant of nature) in prsp pn.gsi hi 1 ^ as
something able to to be actually created by God. 26 That is,
in order to be a possible object of God's omnipotent will,
something must be produced in esse intel 1
i
gi hi 1
p
and esse
possibile in God's intellect. 27 But the logical possibility
of a thing does not depend on this production in God's
intellect, but only on non repugnantia terminorum , 28 This
non repugnant ia terminorum is precisely the logical
possibility of the thing regardless of its being produced in
esse intelligibile by God. 29 So, although the esse of the
eternal truths depends on God, their logically necessary or
possible truth does not. In fact, Scotus thinks that it is
precisely this logically necessary or possible truth which
28
enables God to produce them in esse i
n
tel 1 i gi hi 1 ^ essp
pQss i bi lp and Perhaps in esse actual e. As Scotus states:
From all this it is apparent that God's potency is notthe precise reason why something is makeable andproducible, but along with it is required that there beno formal incompatibility among its parts. (Lect I d 4 "?q.un.n. 17) J
Admittedly, this account of Scotus is contentious. 30
However, it seems to be the only plausible way to make sense
of the 'smoking gun' texts quoted above in which he states
that modal truths would be true even if, per impn.q.gihi Ip
God did not exist. That is, the truth of the eternal truths
are independent of God's production of their being; and it
is their truth which makes them able to be produced by God
(although it is their production in the divine intellect
which makes them able to be actually created by God)
In addition to Suarez, Scotus is a figure with whom
Descartes was (at least a little) familiar and who is at
least a prima—facie Doctrinal adversary. 31 So, we can feel
fairly confident in saying that these two philosophers
represent the best candidates for being Descartes' unnamed
adversary
.
Given that Descartes holds the Dependence Thesis, he
obviously cannot accept the position expressed by (b)
.
However, we cannot conclude, that Descartes is therefore
committed to the Creation Doctrine. In fact, the great
majority of philosophers and theologians, from the
thirteenth centure through the seventeenth century, opposed
the position expressed by (b)
;
this does not entail that the
29
majority of philosophers and theologians held the Creation
Doctrine. As Curley (1984) points out, (b) and the Creation
Doctrine do not seem to exhaust the alternatives open to
Descartes. For instance, it may be suggested that Descartes
could hold the Dependence Thesis without holding that the
eternal truths depend on God's will and are freely created.
Moreover, the fact that Descartes exp] iriMy contrasts the
Creation Doctrine with (b)
,
a view that denies only the
Dependence Thesis, would seem to indicate that Descartes
could have helped himself to any position on the matter that
did not deny the Dependence Thesis. And in fact, there in a
moderate position situated somewhere between the Creation
Doctrine and (b) that was widely held in the centuries
before Descartes and even later in the seventeenth century
by Leibniz. This view holds, with Descartes, that the
Dependence Thesis is true, but it differs from Descartes
precisely in denying that the eternal truths depend on God's
will and are freely created. This moderate alternative
holds that the eternal truths are dependent on God, but not
on God's will, but rather his intellect. This view was so
widely held that Leibniz states that "the eternal truths,
which until the time of Descartes had been named an object
of the divine understanding, suddenly became an object of
the will." (Theodicy § 186) So, in order to understand why
Descartes accepts the Creation Doctrine despite the
availability of a moderate alternative, we must understand
30
why Descartes cannot accept the moderate alternative. The
locus classics ft of this moderate position is found in
^c[uln.aS/ so, that is where we will tiepin.
A Moderate Alternative; Aquinas and Leibniz
Aquinas held the Dependence Thesis concerning the
eternal truths, but he spelled it out differently from how
Descartes did. 32 He held that it amounted to (c)
:
(c) The eternal truths depend on God's understanding
(but not his will) in such a way that if, per
umpossi bile
,
God did not exist, the eternal truths
would not be true.
Aquinas presents his statement of (c) when considering a
point made by Augustine:
It would seem that created truth is eternal. For
Augustine says that nothing is more eternal than the
rat i o of circularity and that two and three are five.
But the truth of these things is created truth.
Therefore created truth is eternal. (ST la 16.7)
Aquinas replies that "God alone is eternal"; thus, either
truths about things other than God are not eternal or they
are eternally true in God. Because truth is essentially
mind-dependent, according to Aquinas, insofar as truth
involves the conformity of what is in the mind to the thing
being understood (ST la 16.1), the truth of a proposition
can be eternal only if there is an eternal mind. As Aquinas
states
:
If no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. But since the divine intellect is eternal,
truth has eternity in it alone. Nor does it follow
from this that anything other than God is eternal;
because truth in the divine intellect is God himself.
(ST la. 16.7. res)
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From this is it clear that Aquinas thinks that eternal
truths have some sort of being in the divine intellect; and
in virtue of being in the divine intellect and being
understood by God, the eternal truths are true. As Aquinas
states in reply to Augustine's point: "the ret i
n
of
circularity and that two and three are five possess eternity
in the divine mind." (ST la 16.7. ad 1)
This account raises a worry expressed by Suarez:
Eternal truths are necessarily true, but being in the divine
mind cannot be sufficient, for the necessity of the eternal
truths; after all, God understands contingent truths as
well, i.e., they are in the divine mind as well. 33 So, it
seems that Aquinas must either hold that merely being in the
divine mind is not sufficient for the necessity of a truth,
or he must hold that there is no difference in the modal
status between an eternal truth and a (so-called) contingent
truth
.
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Aquinas does provide an account of how necessary truths
differ from contingent truths, although it is not explicitly
stated. In SCG 1.67, he states the what differentiates
necessary truths from contingent truths is that God knows
the former to be necessary and the latter to be contingent.
However, the context in which this explanation is found
concerns causal necessity and not logical or metaphysical
necessity. 35 Thus, this answer is not particularly helpful
in differentiating the logically or metaphysically necessary
from the logically or metaphysically contingent.
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Later, in the seventeenth century and into the
eighteenth century, Leibniz argued that the eternal truths
depend on the divine understanding. In the MnnaHninT/ i he
states
:
It is also true that God is not only the source of
existences, but also that of essences insofar as theyare real, that is, or the source of that which is realin possibility. This is because God's understanding isthe realm of the eternal truths or that of the ideas
on which they depend; without him there would be
nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing
exist, but also nothing would be possible. (§43, AG 218)
Thus, Leibniz also holds the Dependence Thesis. However,
just as Aquinas does, Leibniz understands it in the sense
given by (c)
.
This is also clear in Theodicy §184, in which
Leibniz writes that
one must not say with some Scotists, that the eternal
truths would exist even though there were no
understanding, not even that of God. For it is, in myjudgement, the divine understanding which gives reality
to the eternal truths, albeit God's will have no part
there i n
.
(emphasis mine)
It should be noted that Leibniz is here discussing the esse
of the eternal truths, not their truth. The kind of esse
that the eternal truths have is esse -in-the-H-ivine-
understanding; and they have because they are in the
divine intellect. The eternal truths are not true, because
they are in the divine intellect; rather, they are true
because of the essences of the things contained as ideas in
the divine understanding, although these ideas could not
exist without God 36 What is clear is that Leibniz certainly
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thought that the eternal truths depend on God with regard to
their ease and their truth; and God's will has no role with
regard to either.
The advantages that Leibniz thinks he gains from such a
view are
: (i) the Dependence Thesis remains intact, (ii) it
preserves his account of freedom, both human and divine, in
which one of the necessary conditions for freedom is that
the action performed is chosen from among given
possibilities. And (iii), because God's will plays no part
in determining which truths are necessary, there is no way
an eternal truth can be false; the eternal truths are simply
'given' in the divine intellect.
So, given that (c) is an alternative available to those
accepting the Dependence Thesis, why can't Descartes hold
the moderate view expressed by (c)
?
In the 3 June 1630
letter to Mersenne, after stating the Creation Doctrine,
Descartes explicitly mentions two reasons for the Creation
Doctrine, reasons which eliminate the possibility of
accepting (c)
:
You ask also what necessitated God to create these
truths; and I reply that he was free to make it not
true that all the radii of the circle are equal
- just
as free as he was not to create the world.
. .You ask
what God did in order to produce them. I reply that
from all eternity he willed and understood them to be,
and by that very fact he created them... In God,
willing, understanding and creating are all the same
thing without one being prior to the other even
conceptually. (AT I 152-3; CSMK 26)
In this explanation, we get a statement of Descartes'
reasons for the Creation Doctrine: First, God's freedom
requires that the Creation Doctrine is true, and second, the
34
Doctrine of Divine Simplicity requires that the Creation is
true. What isn't clear at this point is exactly how divine
freedom and divine simplicity eliminate the moderate
alternative, (c)
,
from Descartes
' consideration, and how
they require that the Creation Doctrine is true. To this,
we now turn in the next two chapters
35
Endnotes
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CHAPTER 2
THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY IN DESCARTES
Introduction
As we have seen in the end of Chapter One, one of
Descartes' explicitly mentioned reasons for holding the
Creation Doctrine is his understanding of the Doctrine of
Divine Simplicity (DDS)
. Stated in its simplest form, DDS
is the thesis that God is absolutely simple, i.e., there are
no parts and no composition in God. Descartes mentions DDS
in connection with the Creation Doctrine in several texts. 1
For instance, in the 6 May 1630 letter to Mersenne,
Descartes writes:
In God, willing and knowing are a single thing in such
a way that by the very fact of willing something heknows it, and it is only for this reason that such athing is true. (AT I 149; CSMK 24)
DDS was unquestionably held by most philosophers and
theologians in the seventeenth century. Descartes inherits
DDS from a long line of philosophical and theological
predecessors including Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas; and
his account does not differ dramatically from their
accounts, although the consequences Descartes deduces from
DDS differ greatly from those of his philosophical
predecessors. In fact, Descartes takes DDS seriously enough
to deduce exactly what honestly ought to be deduced from it.
40
as a reason for
In this chapter, I examine DDS
Descartes- Creation Doctrine. I will argue that Descartes
must reject the moderate alternative, (c)
,
because of his
acceptance of DDS. (I will argue, in the next chapter, that
the issue of Divine Freedom also (partly) explains
Descartes' commitment to the Creation Doctrine
.)
2 in the
first part, I will examine Descartes' motivations for
holding DDS. I do this by comparing Descartes' motivations
with those of Saint Thomas Aquinas. I do this for two
reasons: first, Aquinas' account of DDS is bhe_classic
statement of the doctrine; and second, Descartes' reasons
for holding DDS form a subset of Aquinas' reasons. In the
second part, I examine Descartes' theory of distinctions. A
good understanding of Descartes' theory of distinctions is
necessary for understanding his version of DDS; we must know
how things can be distinct in order to know how something
(e.g., God) can be simple. In the third part, I give an
account of Descartes' version of DDS. The account I give
may initially strike some as contentious, because it is
commonly thought that Descartes introduces a radical and
strict notion of divine simplicity, such that there are not
even conceptual distinctions in God. I will show that
Descartes' texts simply do not support such a radical
version of DDS. Finally, I will show that DDS eliminates
(c) as a reasonable alternative to the Creation Doctrine.
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Reasons for DPS : Aquinas
Descartes' reasons for holding DDS will become clearer
upon consideration of a classic statement of DDS and its
motivations. The classic statement I speak of is that of
Thomas Aquinas in Gumma theo l ogize la 3. 7 and Snmma rnnrrn
Gent il es 1.18. Although Augustine ( De Civitate XI. 10),
Anselm (£ros]oginn XVIII and Mono] ogi on XVI and XVII), and
others prior to Aquinas present DDS, Aquinas- statement of
DDS seems to me to be the most fully developed account of
DDS in Descartes' predecessors.
In the Summa—
t
heol og i ae , Aquinas presents his main
argument that God must be simple because he cannot satisfy
the conditions for being composite. There are several ways
in which something may be composite according to Aquinas:
or
For
(a)
(b)
any x, x is composite iff
x is composed of extended parts (ST la 3.1),
x is composed of form and matter (ST la 3.2),
or (c) x differs from x's nature (ST la 3.3),
or (d) x's essence differs from x's existence (ST la
3 4
)
or (e) there is a difference between x's genus and
or (f)
differentia (ST la 3.5)
x is composed of substance and accidents (ST
Without going
la 3 . 6
)
3
into the details of Aquinas' position, it is
sufficient to note that he argues that God is not such that
he can satisfy any of (a) through (f) , 4 We may present
Aquinas' initial reasoning as follows:
1. For any x, x can be composite iff x satisfies (a)
or (b) or (c) . . .or (f)
.
2. God does not satisfy (a) or (b) or (c) ...or (f)
.
3. Therefore, God is not composite.
And with the additional premise:
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4
- x ca*not be composite, then x is simple. (ST la
• /
, JT.0 S /
we arrive at Aquinas' conclusion:
5. Therefore, God is simple. 5
In addition to this reasoning, Aquinas provides several
other reasons in favor of DDS
. In the interest of brevity
and relevance, I present only three of them:
Reason 1 : God's aseity requires that he be absolutely
independent of everything non- identical with himself (i.e.,
nothing else is required for God to exist), and everything
non-identical with God is dependent on him (i.e., everything
besides God requires him for their existence)
. But Aquinas
thinks that the following principle is true:
S2
. A composite is dependent on, or posterior to its
parts. (ST la 3.7. rps l 6
A brief word on S2 is in order. As Christopher Hughes
notes, Aquinas employed several different, extensionally
non-equivalent senses of dependence and the closely related
concept of prior i ty . However, it seems to me that the
notion of priority employed by Aquinas in the present
argument against divine composition is what Hughes calls
'ontological priority'. We may define it as follows:
x is ontological ly prior to y =df it is impossible for y
to exist without x but it is possible for x is exist
without y.
Ontological priority is closely related to ontological
dependence in the following manner:
x is ontologically dependent on y iff y is
ontologically prior to x.
Moreover, Aquinas argues for the following:
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S3: If some thing C is composed of parts Pl and p2;then C * Pl and C * p 2 . (ST la 3.7.res)
If S2 and S3 are true, then God cannot be composite because
he would then be ontologically dependent on something non-
ldentical with himself. Because it is metaphysically
impossible for God to depend on anything non- identical with
himself, he cannot be a composite. 8 As Aquinas states,
"Every composite, moreover, is subsequent to its components.
The first being, therefore, which is God, has no
components." (SCG I 18) Thus, God is simple. 9
Reason 2 : Aquinas thinks that if some thing is a
composite of parts p x and p 2 , then there is a cause which is
responsible for p x and p 2 composing C. That is to say, a
plurality of things will remain a plurality unless caused by
something else to form a composite. So, if God is
composite, then there is a cause of his composition.
However, God, as the first cause, is essentially uncaused.
Therefore, he is not composite. 10
Reason
.3 : Every composite is potentially dissoluble or
separable. But it is absurd to suppose that God can be
separated into constituent parts. As Aquinas states:
Every composite, furthermore, is potentially
dissoluble. This arises from the nature of
composition.
. .Now, what is dissoluble can not-be. This
does not befit God, since he is through himself the
necessary being. There is, therefore, no composition
in God. (SCG I 18) 11
Aquinas is implicitly employing S3 here. He thinks that it
belongs to the nature of a composite to be potentially
dissoluble. 12 But if God is composite, he is dissoluble;
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that is, if God is a composite C, composed of parts Pl ,
p2 ,...pn , then C can be separated into its constituent parts
Pi, p2 ,-..pn . But, according to S3, none of the parts ara
God; so, if he is separable into parts that are not him,
then he can fail to exist, even if the parts exist. But God
is a necessary being. Therefore, God cannot fail to exist;
hence, he cannot be composite, if S3 is true.
Each of these reasons, as well as the others I have
omitted, is sufficient, according to Aquinas, to show that
God is not composite, and hence he is simple. 13
Reasons for DPS : Descartes
Although it is clear from many texts that Descartes
held a version of DDS
,
the reasons why he held it are not as
explicitly and systematically stated as Aquinas' reasons
are. However, Descartes does present some reasons for
holding DDS, and, perhaps not surprisingly, they are all
reasons that Aquinas provides.
Descartes presents a reason for DDS not interestingly
different from Aquinas' Reason 1. For instance, in the
Discourse—on Method, Descartes states:
And as I observed that all composition is evidence of
dependence and that dependence is manifestly a defect,
I concluded that it could not be a perfection in God to
be composed of two natures and consequently that he was
not composed of them. (AT VI 35; CSM I 128-9, emphasis
mine)
Although Descartes does not explicitly state that a
composite is dependent on its parts in the manner stated by
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Aquinas, he does tell us that it belongs to the nature of a
composite to be dependent, either on its parts or on an
efficient cause. 14 If the former, then he is explicitly
stating Aquinas' Reason 1 ; if the latter, then he is stating
something similar to Aquinas' Reason 2: All composites are
causally dependent on something else. But Descartes states
that "if God exists, it is a contradiction that anything
else should exist which was not created by him." (AT VII
188; CSM II 132) Thus, God cannot be dependent either on
parts or on an efficient cause distinct from himself. 15
In many texts, Descartes presents a reason for DDS no
different from Aquinas' Reason—3.: Composites are dissoluble
or separable. For instance, in a passage from the Second
Replies, which may remind us as much of Anselm as of
Aquinas, Descartes states:
The very nature of a body implies many imperfections,
such as its divisibility into p^rtQ the fact that each
of its parts is different and so on; for it is self-
evident that it is a greater perfection to be undivided
than to be divided, and so on. (AT VII 138; CSM II
99, emphasis mine)
Descartes reiterates this type of thinking in Princ-iplp.g t §
23, where he states:
There are many things such that, although we recognize
some perfection in them, we also find in them some
imperfection or limitation, and these therefore cannot
belong to God. For example, the nature of body
includes divisibility along with extension in space,
and since being divisible is a n imperfection
,
it is
certain that God is not a body. (AT VIII 13;CSM I 200-
1, emphasis mine)
Although these passages only claim that God is not a body
because bodies are divisible, we can easily see that the
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same will hold for other composites. 16 That is, God cannot
be a composite because composites are divisible; and
Descartes believes that "the inseparabi 1 i ty of all the
attributes of God is one of the most important perfections
which I understand him to have." (AT VII 50 ; CSM II 34
emphasis mine) Thus, so far, we have a Descartes who
presents quite traditional reasons for holding DDS
.
^l n<^s °f Distinctions in Descartes
As is well-established, Descartes was heavily
influenced by his education by the Jesuit scholastics at La
Fleche, particularly with respect to his metaphysics and
philosophical theology. 17 This is especially apparent in
his discussion of the different types of distinctions. 18
Although Descartes follows the scholastic tradition (from
Suarez) in holding that there are three types of
distinction, he, as usual, puts his own spin on things. 19
Descartes holds, as do Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez, that the
three types of distinction are real, of reason r ratinnis
] or
conceptua l , and an intermediate distinction, which Descartes
calls, following Suarez, a modal distinction. 20
The following is not intended to be an exhaustive
account of Descartes' theory of distinctions; that is well-
beyond the scope of this project. I simply wish to give
enough details about the theory to enable us to address the
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issue of DDS.
The Real Distinction
Although the most famous application and discussion of
the real distinction in Descartes is found in the well-known
argument for mind-body distinctness in the Sixth Meditation,
Descartes presents his most fully-developed account of the
real distinction in Principles 1.60. He begins by
explaining which kind of things are really distinct:
Strictly speaking, a real distinct-inn exists onlybetween two or more substances; and we can perceivethat two substances are really distinct simply from thefact that we can clearly and distinctly understand
[ .Inte l ligere ] one apart from the other (AT VIII
CSM I 213) '
As with all of Descartes' characterizations of distinctions,
he provides a 'metaphysical' characterization and an
'epistemological guide' to the distinctions via clear and
distinct perception (or, in some cases, the lack of clear
and distinct perception) .‘‘ 1 On the metaphysical side, we
have
RD1 : There is a real
—
dist 1 net i on between x and y iff x
and y are different substances. 22
RD1 is not part iculary informative because it doesn't
provide a deep analysis of the real distinction; it merely
tells us which type of things are really distinct.
Moreover, RD1 is not helpful unless we know what Descartes
means by 'substance'. Fortunately, Descartes tells us that
"by substance we can understand nothing other than a thing
which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing
for its existence." (AT VIII 24; CSM I 210) Spinoza would
later famously exploit this cartesian notion of substance to
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arrive at his substance monism. 23 Descartes immediately-
recognizes such a worry; after all, this definition of
-substance' would entail that there is only one substance,
namely God. 24 But Descartes allows a looser sense of
-substance' in which there can be finite, created
substances. 25 Thus
X is a substance =„
;
either (i) x does not depend onanything else, or (ii) x depends only on God.
Descartes constrasts substances with modes or accidents and
attributes, each of which depends on something besides God,
namely a substance in which to 'inhere'. Though substances
have a causal dependence on God, they are independent of
modes or accidents. Modes, on the other hand, are not only
causally dependent on God, they are also 'substantially
dependent
' in that they depend on the substance in which
they inhere. 26
The manner in which we know that x is really distinct
from y is through clear and distinct perception of x apart
from y and vice versa, according to Descartes. The fact
that we can clearly and distinctly perceive x and y apart
entails, via the Second Meditation 'truth rule' (i.e.,
whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true)
,
that x
and y can exist apart from each other. This is raised
explicitly in the Sixth Meditation argument for mind-body
distinctness :
The fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand
one thing apart from another is enough to make me
certain that the two things are distinct, since they
are capable of being separated
,
at least by God (AT VII
78;CSM II 54, emphasis mine) 27
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The sgparabi 1 i ry of really distinct things is reiterated in
the Princi pi e.g •
or no matter how closely God may have united themU.e mind and body], the power which he previously
f ° sePa ba t i ng them or keeping one in being withoutthe other, is something he could not lay aside; and
.
1
PgS whlch God has the power to separate . or to keepm being separate ly , are really distinct. (AT VIIT
2 9 ; CSM I 213, emphasis mine)
Thus, Descartes holds RD2 and RD3
,
RD2
. There is a rea l—dist i net i on between x and y iff xis separable from y and y is separable from x.
where 'separability' is analyzed as follows:
RD3: x is sparab l e from y iff x can really exist
without y. 28
That is, in the case of a real distinction between x and y,
there is a mutual—separabi 1 j ty between x and y. 29 in the
case of the real distinction between mind and body, both the
mind and body would remain complete substances even if they
were separated. 30
However, there is a slight problem with RD2 : If RD2 is
true, then Descartes is committed to the thesis that there
is no real distinction between God and his creatures.
Because God is a necessary being and is the efficient cause
and conserver of all things, nothing can be separated from
God or exist independently. 31 So, in the interest of
charity, we should not attribute RD2 to Descartes, but
rather RD2 * and RD2 * *
:
RD2 * : There is a real distinction between a creatpd
x and a created y iff x is separable from y and y
is separable from x.
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RD2 * * : There is a real distinction between God and
created x iff God is separable from x, and x
separable from all created things. 32
a
is
The Modal Distinction
The role played by separability is just as pronounced
and important in Descartes' explication of the intermediate
distinction, the modal distinction. However, unlike the
real distinction, in which there is mutual separability of
substances, in the case of the modal distinction, there is
separability, but it is not mutual, nor is it between
substances. As Descartes states:
^ 1—di st inct ion can be taken in two ways: Firstly,
as a distinction between a mode, properly so-called,
and the substance of which it is a mode; and secondly,
as a distinction between two modes of the same
substance. (AT VIII 29;CSM I 213-14)
The following (uninformatively) captures the two types of
modal distinction:
MD1 : There is a modal
—
distinction between x and y iff
(i) x is a substance and y is a mode of x or vice
versa, or (ii) x and y are two modes of the same
substance
.
Once again, Descartes gives us an epistemic guide to
recognizing the distinction in question. We can clearly and
distinctly perceive a substance apart from a mode but not
vice versa, and we can understand one mode apart from
another mode (of the same substance)
,
but we can understand
neither without the substance of which they are both
modes. 33 As Descartes states:
[The modal distinction] applies only to incomplete
ent ities . . . It is sufficient for this kind of
distinction that one thing be conceived distinctly and
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separately from another by an abstraction of the
V^Lo'cSM lf8 5-6)
eiVeS the thin9 inadeqUate1^
That is, the mode which is only modally distinction from its
substance will not be conceived adequately precisely because
an adequate conception of a mode necessarily involves the
substance of which it is a mode. 34
What is important to notice about Descartes'
characterization of the modal distinction is the work being
done, once again, by the notion of separability: While the
substance is separable from its modes, a mode is not
separable from the substance of which it is a mode. In the
example used by Descartes, although we can understand a body
(corporeal substance) existing apart from its shape and
motion, we cannot understand its shape or motion existing
apart from the body. 35
We can now give a deeper analysis of the two types of
modal distinction for Descartes:
MD2 : There is a modal distinction between x and y iff
x is separable from y but y is not separable from
x (or vice versa)
.
MD3 : There is a modal distinction between x and y iff
(i) there is a substance S, of which x and y are
modes, (ii) x is not separable from S and y is not
separable from S, but S is separable from x and
S is separable from y, and (iii) S-with-x is
separable from S-with-y(and vice versa)
.
36
Modal distinctions, unlike real distinctions, merely require
a n.Qn-mutua]
—
separabi 1 i tv 37 between substance and mode .
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The Conceptual Distinction
Descartes introduces the conceptual distinction as
follows
:
[A] conceptual distinction is a distinction between a
?,^
8
£
a
?£
e ^ S°me attribute of that substance withouthich the substance is unintelligible; alternatively,it is a distinction between two such attributes of a'single substance. (AT VIII 30;CSM I 214 )
Descartes distinguishes attribnt ps from modes and accidents
The latter are inessential properties of a substance, and
the former are essential properties of a substance. 38 When
speaking strictly, Descartes states that among creatures
there are only two ('principal', as he calls them)
attributes: thought and extension, which constitute the
essence of mind and body, respectively. 39 But when speaking
more loosely, he states that other essential properties are
attributes
.
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Thus
,
GDI: There is a conceptual distinction hetw^n x and yiff (i) x is a substance and y is an essential
property of x (or vice versa) or (ii) x and y are
essential properties of the same substance.
CD2 : If substance S cannot exist without attributes a
1
and a 2 , and a, cannot exist without S or a 2 , and a,
cannot exist without S or a
x
,then there is a
conceptual distinction between S and a
x
and a 2 andbetween a 1 and a 2 .
Unlike the real and modal distinction, in which there is
some degree of separability involved, in a conceptual
distinction this feature is lacking. That is,
CD3 : x and y are conceptually distinct only if x and y
are mutually- inseparable
.
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It is important to note that a conceptual distinction
between x and y is one that is, in some sense, created by
the mind. 41
Descartes' inherits his understanding of the modal and
conceptual distinctions is large part from Suarez. This is
apparent from the fact that in one of Descartes' most
sustained discussions of the modal and conceptual
distinction, he basically repeats Suarez's account from the
Seventh Metaphys i cal D i sputation
. Suarez states his account
as follows:
Conceptual distinctions are usually considered to be oftwo kinds. One, which has no foundation in reality is
called 'di st i nct io rat
. ion i s rat i oci nant i
J
because it
arises exc lus ive ly from the reflection and activity ofthe intellect. The other which has a founda t
i
on i n
rea li ty is called by many ' distinctio raHnnia
ra.t iQc inat. ae ' . . .For this type of conceptual distinction
can be understood as pre-existing in reality prior to
the discriminating operation of the mind, so as to be
thought of as imposing itself, as it were, on the
intellect, and to require the intellect only to
recognize it, but not to constitute it. (DM VII. 1.4,
emphasis mine)
Descartes also affirms that there are these two general
types of conceptual distinction. He writes of "a conceptual
distinction - that is, a distinction made by reason
rat ioc inatae . I do not recognize any distinction made by
reason ratiocinant is - that is, one which has no foundation
in reality." (AT IV 349;CSMK 280) Unfortunately, Descartes
does not explain what he means by a conceptual distinction
having a foundation or lacking one; in fact, his entire
discussion of the conceptual distinction is grossly
underdeveloped. However, if we can assume, as I do, that
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Descartes' account of distinctions bears much similarity to
Suarez's account, then we can catch a glimpse of what
Descartes means by a 'foundation in reality' by looking at
Suarez's explanation. Suarez explains what he means when he
says that a dist inct
, io rat
. i onis raHnnrin.f^ has a
foundation in reality as follows:
^ di stinct i o rat i on i s—rat i ocmatae
, because it arises
not entirely from the sheer operation of the intellectbut from an occasion offered by the thing itself on
which the mind is
. ref lecting
. Hence the foundation thatis held to exist in nature for this distinction is not
a true and actual distinction between things regarded
as distinct; for then not the foundation nf thedistinction but the dis tinction itself would precede
mental operation
. Rather the foundation must be eitherthe eminence of the object which the mind thus
distinguishes
. . .or at any rate, it must be some
reference to other things which are truly distinct in
the real order
,
and with respect to which such a
connection is excogitated or conceived. (DM VII. 1.4,
emphasis mine)
That is, this type of distinction is not something that
obtains in the world, but there is something in the world
which allows us to make a distinction. According to Suarez,
in the case of conceptual distinctions in God, "we partition
into concepts in line with the various effects of which that
eminent virtue is the principle, or by analogy with various
virtues which we find distinct in man, but which in an
ineffably eminent manner are found united in the absolutely
simple virtue of God." (DM VII. 1.5) Take, for instance, the
latter foundation for the conceptual distinction. What
Suarez means is that there is a conceptual distinction with
a foundation (i.e., rationis rat iocinatae ) if the following
obtains: there are properties or faculties, p : , p 2 , . . .pn ,
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which are distinct in man (for instance), but which in God
are identical. For instance, man's goodness, intellect,
power, etc., are distinct, but in God, all of these are
identical. However, we can come to have different concepts
of God's goodness, intellect, power, etc., by considering
their distinctness in man. In this way, the conceptual
distinction between God's intellect and power has a
foundat. i on in reality because there are some things in which
these faculties are not identical. In spite of Descartes'
silence on this matter, he certainly does recognize the
difference between a dist inct i o rationis ratiocinatae and a
di s t met i o—rat i on i s—ratiocmantis (al thnngh be rejects the
usefulness of the latter); as such, Suarez's explanation is
certainly open to him
.
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What goes completely unnoticed is that not only does
Descartes distinguish between a distinctio rationis
rat iocinate and rationi s rati ocinant i s
f but he also
implicitly distinguishes two types of the distinctio
rat ion i s—rat ioc inatae : (i) those that hold between two
things that are essentially connected, such as body and
endurance (i.e., there is no possible state of affairs in
which a body exists without enduring)
; and (ii) those that
hold between two things that are identical
,
such as a body
and its extension or a rational animal and a man . 43 A
distinctio rationis ratiocinatae nf type (i) is, so to
speak, a 'greater' distinction, because a body is not
identical to its endurance even though it is a necessary
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truth that every body has endurance. A distinct io
rat i oci natae of type (ii) is a case in which there is a real
identity between body and extension, but a conceptual
distinction between them. There must be a conceptual
distinction between body and extension in order to account
for the fact that 'body has extension' makes sense, but
extension has body' does not, even though body and
extension are identical and the identity relation is
symmetrical (i.e., if x = y, then xRy <-» yRx) . To reflect
the difference between these two types of conceptual
distinction, let us call conceptual distinctions that hold
between essentially connected things 'conceptual
distinct ionSi,
,
snd those that hold between identical things
'conceptual distinctions.,'.
Descartes' Account of DPS
Now that we have both Descartes' reasons for DDS and his
theory of distinctions in hand, we are in a position to see
what exactly Descartes' version of DDS amounts to. In his
book, Descartes—and Augustine, Stephen Menn states it is
commonly thought that Descartes is "proclaiming a new and
radical doctrine of God's simplicity." 44 This initially
seems to be the case, especially in the following passages:
In God willing, understanding and creating are all the
same thing without one being prior to fprecede l the
other even conceptually fne quidem rati one !
.
(AT I
153/CSMK 25-6)
It is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of
in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of
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or acta°n or omission, prior to the decision ofthe divine will to make it so. I am not speaking hereof temporal priority: I mean that there is not even anvpriority of order, or nature or rations ,n a g
Y
they call it. (AT VII 432; CSM II 291)
From these, we may think that Descartes thought that DDS
amounts to the following:
DDS1 : God is simple = df God is such that there are
no distinctions of any kind (real, modal or
conceptual) in God.
Many scholars have thought that Descartes held something
like DDS1
.
45 And the passages quoted above lend f
^
0
support to such a reading of Descartes.
However, there are three good reasons to reject DDS1 as
an interpretation of Descartes' account of DDS: First,
despite initial appearances, there is no textual evidence to
support DDS1 as an interpretation of Descartes on DDS. In
neither of the passages quoted above does Descartes state
that there are no conceptual distinctions in God. He merely
states that there is no conceptual pri ori ty f fnit- p-Hng ]
between God's intellect and will. 46 But certainly x and y
can be conceptually distinct without one being conceptually
pr ior to the other. For example, take two of a triangle's
essential properties: triangularity and trilaterality. It
is reasonable to suppose that even if these properties are
really identical, as those who hold that necessarily co-
extensive properties are identical would say, 47 they are
conceptually distinct. However, what isn't clear is whether
there is any conceptual priority of one over the other. It
seems to me that no non-question-begging definition of
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triangularity'conceptual priority' can be given such that
is conceptually prior to trilaterality (or vice versa)
,
despite the fact that they are conceptually distinct. So,
not only does DDS1 lack direct textual evidence, but also we
cannot even ind irectly infer that Descartes held DDS1
because 'no conceptual priority' does not entail
-no
conceptual distinction'
.
Second, Descartes repeatedly predicates a plurality of
attributes of God. Descartes states that God is 'perfect'
(AT VIII 10/CSM I 197), 'omniscient' (AT VI 35/CSM I 128),
'omnipotent' (AT VII 21;CSM II 14, AT VI 35;CSM I 128, AT
VIII 1 0 ; CSM I 197), 'supremely good' (AT VII 45;CSM II 35,
AT VI 35; CSM I 128), 'infinite' (AT VII 45;CSM II 35, AT VI
3 5,-CSM I 128), 'independent' (AT VII 45; CSM II 35),
'eternal' (AT VI 35; CSM I 128), 'immutable' (AT I 146;CSMK
215, AT VI 3 5 ; CSM I 128), and that he has will and
understanding (AT I 149, 153;CSMK 24,26). How are we to
understand the plurality of attributes predicated of God if
there are no distinctions of any kind in God? It would be
very difficult.
Third, whenever Descartes characterizes his version of
DDS
,
he explicitly raises the issue of separability; that
is, God is such that he does not have parts that are
separable . The following passages are representative of
Descartes' thinking on DDS. In the Third Meditation, he
states :
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the unity, simplici
all the attributes
of the perfections
surely the idea of
could not have been
not also provide me
perfections; for no
the interconnection
perfections without
recognize what they
emphasis mine)
ty, or [ s ive ] the inspp^-rabi 1 j t-y Q f
of God is one of the most important
which I understand him to have. Andthe unity of all his perfections
placed in me by any cause which did
with the ideas of the other
cause could have made me understand
and insenarabi 1 i ty of the
at the same time making me
were. (AT VII 50;CSM II 34
,
And in the Conversation with Rnrman
,
he states:
Whatever is in God is not in real i ty separate from Godhimself; rather it is identical with God himself M mo
Dens
.] . . . [T] he distinction between God himself
and his decrees is a mental one, not a real one In
reaiity the decrees could not have been separated fromGod: he is not prior to them or distinct from them, norcould he have existed without them. (AT V 166;CSMK 348
emphasis mine) '
In the Third Meditation passage, Descartes is identifying
the simplicity of God with the inseparability of his
attributes. This is clear from the fact that Descartes
states that unity, simplicity and inseparability are said to
be onn perfection. 48 And in the Burman passage, Descartes is
stating that there cannot be any real distinctions in God,
but only mental distinctions, i.e., those created by the
mind, i.e. conceptual distinctions. That this is what
Descartes means here is clear from what follows in that
passage. He states that there is a mental distinction
between God and his decrees, but that there is mutual
-
inseparability between God and his decrees. As we've seen,
this is precisely what characterizes a conceptual
distinction. Thus, Descartes holds that God is simple in
the sense of having only conceptual distinctions.
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Remember that there are two types of di st -i rw-t- -i o
rat ion i s rat ionci natae : those that hold between essentially
connected things (i.e., conceptual distinction,), and those
that hold between identical things (i.e., conceptual
distinction.,)
. In the passage above (AT VII 50;CSM II 34),
Descartes states two things: first, willing and
understanding are the same thing. I take this to mean
uncontroversially that they are really identical. Second,
that neither will nor understanding is conceptually prior to
the other. I'll return to this issue shortly. What we can
see here is that the type of conceptual distinction that
holds between God's will and his understanding is what I've
called a 'conceptual distinction^; that is, one that holds
between two things which are not merely essentially
connected, but are identical. However, it is consistent
with what is said in the Burman passage that there is a
conceptual distinction, between God and his decrees. 49
So, Descartes does not hold DDS1, but DDS2
:
DDS2:God is simple = df . God is such that there are no
modal or real distinctions in God.
That there cannot be modal distinctions in God follows
trivially from Descartes' insistence that God has no modes
(i.e., inessential properties), but only attri hnfp.q . 50 if
God has only attributes, then by Descartes' definition of a
modal distinction, God cannot have any modal distinctions in
him. So, God either has real distinctions, conceptual
distinctions or no distinctions at all. As we have seen
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Descartes cannot hold that there are real distinctions in
God, because there is no separability in God. Yet because
Descartes allows that something may be conceptually distinct
from its attributes and that two attributes of the same
thing may be conceptually distinct, it is open to Descartes
to hold that there are conceptual distinctions, in God
.
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Moreover, the fact that DDS2 is consistent with there
being conceptual distinctions in God helps make some sense
of the 'plurality' of attributes Descartes predicates of
God. In fact, this was one of the standard medieval uses of
the conceptual distinction. 52 While the divine attributes
are rea l ^ y identical with each other and with God, they are
conceptually distinct,. 53 This is why Menn writes that "in
fact Descartes holds that traditional position (with St.
Thomas and many others) that there are rational distinctions
in God, but no rea l distinctions or real multiplicity." 54
Because (i) the texts support a reading of DDS in which
there is nothing separable in God, and (ii) a general
consideration of the nature of Descartes' God as not having
modes eliminates the possibility of modal distinctions in
God, and (iii) allowing conceptual distinctions in God
allows Descartes to predicate many things of God, DDS2 is
the correct account of Descartes' version of DDS. A problem
remains: How then are we to understand Descartes' statements
from the 27 May 1630 letter to Mersenne (AT I 153;CSMK 25-
6)
,
the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland (AT IV 119,-CSMK 235)
,
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and the Sixth Replies (AT VII 432;CSM II 291), in which he
states that God's intellect does not have conceptual
priority over God's will? That is, if Descartes is willing
t0 allow conceptual distinction^ in God, why does he not
allow conceptual priority of intellect over will in God?
Stephen Menn makes an interesting suggestion on this
point. He states:
When Descartes infers that God's act of understanding
s no precede his act of willing even rati one t-w-jr.
-LS not because there is no distinction or^lSy inGod: Descartes would grant that God's essence precedesany aCt ° f God ' s and that God's knowledgeof his own essence precedes ratione his knowing andllling things other than himself. Descartes' pointere is that God’s act of understanding things otherthan himself cannot precede his act of willing andcreating things other than himself, since prior to thisthere would be nothing for God to understand except hisown essence. 55 ^
On Menn's reading, God's essence has conceptual priority
over his will and his understanding only of things other
than God because God's understanding and willing of things
other than himself presupposes things other than God. But
'prior' (there is only conceptual priority because the
eternal truths, for instance, while other than God (see AT I
152/CSMK 25), are eternal as well, i.e., there is no time at
which they are not true) to God's willing them, there is
noth i ng (other than God) for him to understand. So, with
respect to the eternal truths, there cannot be even a
conceptual priority of God's understanding of them because
there are simply no eternal truths for him to understand. 56
At the very least, there are no eternal truths about
creatures for God to understand prior to his creation of
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them. This, I believe, Menn thinks is the point of the
passage from the 27 May !630 letter to Mersenne, in which
Descartes states: "In God, willing, understanding and
creating are all the same thing without one being prior to
the other even conceptually [rational . " The inclusion of
'creating' here indicates that the 'willing' and
'understanding' are intended to be understood with respect
to things other than God, i.e., creatures. On the present
interpretation, the other problematic passage from the Sixth
Replies (AT VII 432; CSM II 291) should be read as follows:
lmP°ssidle to imagine that anything [other thanGod] is thought of m the divine intellect as good ort0 the decision of the divine will to make
...there is not even any prioritv.
. . rat i nnprationnaf^ ^ y .-L.rtL j. w e
So, Descartes believes that there are conceptual
distinctions in God, but that there is no conceptual
priority between his intellect and will with respect to his
creation
.
DPS and the Rejection of the Moderate Alternative
Because a conceptual distinction between x and y is a
creation of the mind, indicating only that the manner in
which we understand x is different from the manner in which
we understand y, 57 despite the identity of x and y,
Descartes still holds that whatever is real ly true of one
conceptually distinct., thing is really true of the other. 58
For instance, whatever is really true of a body is true of
its extension and vice versa. So, even though Descartes
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holds DDS2, whatever is really true of God's intellect is
also really true of God's will because they are really
Identical
, though conceptually distinct
2 .
We can now see exactly why Descartes cannot accept the
Thomist ic or Leibnizian account of the eternal truths. On
these accounts, the eternal truths are not objects of God's
will. Thus,
(1)
The eternal truths do not depend on God's will.
But Descartes holds DDS2 ; thus,
(2)
Despite the conceptual distinction
will and intellect, God's will =
God
.
2 between God's
God's intellect =
So, from (1), and (2), by the transitivity of identity:
(3)
The eternal truths do not depend on God.
Therefore
:
(4)
The Dependence Thesis is false.
Descartes could not accept the moderate alternative, (c)
,
precisely because, when conjoined with DDS
,
it entails the
denial of the Dependence Thesis. A denial of this thesis
is, as we've seen, exactly why he cannot accept the position
of Suarez and Scotus
. The moderate alternative apparently
does not fare any better. Although Descartes does not
explicitly state this reasoning, there is nothing contained
in the argument that Descartes would not accept.
Or we can go another way. Because Descartes holds that
God s intellect and will are identical, and neither is
conceptually prior to the other, he holds the following:
(5)
x is an object of the divine intellect iff x is an
object of the divine will.
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From (5) and (c) we can deduce (6)
:
(6) The eternal truths are objects of the divine will.
So, <and here is the rub) either (c) entails a denial of the
Dependence Thesis or it entails that the eternal truths
depend on God's will (by the identity of God's intellect and
will)
. If the former, then it is clear why Descartes
rejects (c)
,
if the latter, Descartes gets exactly what he
wants, and (c) doesn't fundamentally differ from the
Creation Doctrine.
Consideration of DDS by itself, however, does not
entail the Creation Doctrine. Although DDS entails that the
eternal truths depend on God will (and intellect)
,
it does
not enable Descartes to move from this to the Free Creation
Thesis. That is to say, it is conceivable that the eternal
truths depend on God's will, but he is not free with respect
to their creation. Thus, to make the move from the
dependence of the eternal truths on God's will to their free
creation, we must now examine Descartes' account of God's
freedom with respect to the creation of the eternal truths.
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48The Latin reads: " Nam contra, unitas. simpl 1 ci tss
f
s ive inseparabili tas eorum omnium quae in Deo sunt, nna
ex praecioui perfectionibus quas in eo esse intelligo .
"
49The Butman passage is problematic because it later
asserts that "although [God's] actions were completely
indifferent, they were also completely necessary." This
seems to contradict the spirit of the Creation Doctrine.
For instance, in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes
states: "And even though [ encore que l God has willed that
some truths should be necessary, this does not mean that he
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willed them necessarily." (AT IV 118) Without simolvdismissing the Burma
n
passage, as I'm tempted to do *1
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a
the BuoHn passage has nothing to do with
9
i dependent determinations of God's will the CreationDoctrine is unscathed. (2) Descartes »y „pt °“committing a fallacy. Earlier in the RnrLn passageStates: "he necessarily made the decrees^ didsince he necessarily willed what was best, even thouqh it'
CSMK°348)
S
?fVin ^ What W3S beSt ' " (AT f166;L 3 if Descartes does think that God wills
necessarily, then he is reasoningly fallaciously fromnecessarily, if God wills x, then x is the best' and 'x isbest to 'necessarily, God wills x'. m any case DescartP^probably. should not have said what he did, or perhaps Burmanmerely misreported Descartes' statements.
On a different note, the Burman passage also
contradicts Descartes' early statement that the eternaltruths are not connected to God's essence. (AT I 152; CSMK2 5)
AT VIII 26; CSM I 211. This seems to commitDescartes to the view that God has no properties
contingently. So, even the property of creating Adam wouldbe. essential to God, i.e., it is not possible for God to
exist . without creating Adam. This is problematic. The
solution is to distinguish between God's intrinsic
properties, all of which are essential properties (i.e.,
attributes)
,
and his relational properties, some of which
are inessential.
,
Cf AT VII 383 ; CSM II 263. Interestingly enough
this is the account given by Spinoza in his Cogi t-at-a
Metaphysi ca
,
appendices to his Renat i nps Cp-m-pc
Pr incrp iorum—Philosophiae . There Spinoza states that
it is self-evident that component parts are prior at
least by nature to the composite whole, then of
necessity those substances from whose coalescence and
union God is composed will be prior by nature, and each
can be conceived through itself without being
attributed to God. Again, because they are necessarily
distinct from one another in reality, then necessarily
each of them can exist through itself without the help
of the others ... Hence we can clearly conclude that all
the distinctions we make between God's attributes are
nothing other than distinctions of reason, and that
they are not distinct from one another in reality (CM
II 5)
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52See Adams (1987) p. 19 .
(
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S contrary to the interpretations of Cronin1960) and Alanen (1985) p. 183.
54Menn (1998) p. 348.
55.Menn (1998) p. 348-9.
Except perhaps eternal truths such as 'God exists'
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57See Adams (1987) p. 19 .
__ J
hat is
'
in extensional contexts, if x and y are onlvconceptually distinct,, then Fx is true iff Fy is true
Y
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CHAPTER 3
DIVINE FREEDOM OF INDIFFERENCE AND THE ETERNAL TRUTHS
Introduction
From even a superficial examination of Descartes'
discussion of the eternal truths we can see that Descartes
thought that God's freedom and the Creation Doctrine are
intimately related. For instance, in 3 June 1630 letter to
Mersenne, Descartes writes that "[God] was free to make it
not true that all the radii of the circle are equal
- just
as free as he was not to create the world." (AT I 152-3;
CSMK 26) And in the Sixth Replies, he states:
It is self
-contradictory to suppose that the will ofGod was not indifferent from eternity with respect to
everything.
. .because [quia] it is impossible to imagine
that anything is thought of in the divine intellect asgood or true, or worthy or belief or action or
omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to
make it so. (AT VII 431-32/CSM II 291)
Descartes also discusses divine freedom and the eternal
truths in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland, in which he
states
:
[T] he power of God cannot have any limits ... [this]
shows us that God cannot have been determined to make
it true that contradictories cannot be true together,
and therefore that he could have done the opposite (AT
IV 118; CSMK 235)
Although Descartes does not as say much about divine freedom
as one would like, it is quite clear that he believes that
God's freedom consists in a liberty of i ndi ffprpnrp 1 This
account raises problems for any interpreter of Descartes,
most obviously because Descartes simply does not provide any
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explicit, sustained, or detailed account of divine
indifference. Moreover, another problem arises: Descartes
insistence that God's freedom consists in indifference is
prima facie peculiar because it seems to be at odds with
Descartes' statements about human freedom in the Fourth
Meditation
:
There is no need for me to be impelled both ways inorder to be free... [T] he indifference I feel when thereis no reason impelling [impel] it] me in one direction
rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom[inf imas gradns libert
. atis ] ; it is evidence not of anyperfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in
Y
knowledge or a kind of negation. (AT VII 57-8 ; CSM II
Even leaving aside the oddness of this passage with respect
to Descartes' account of divine freedom, this passage is at
odds with Descartes' insistence, in places, that
indifference belongs to human freedom. 2 How can Descartes
consistently hold FI, F2 and F3?:
FI Indifference is not required for human freedom,
and, in fact, indifference is the lowest grade ofhuman freedom.
F2 Indifference belongs to human freedom.
F3 Indifference is the essence of divine freedom.
How can Descartes hold that something deficient for us both
sometimes belongs to our freedom and is the essence of the
freedom of the most perfect being?
In this chapter, I will do two things: (i) I will show
why Descartes holds FI, F2
,
and F3
,
and how he reconciles
each with the others. And (ii)
,
I will argue that
Descartes believes that a proper understanding of divine
freedom entails the Creation Doctrine. In the first part, I
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Will discuss two different senses of 'indifference- found in
Descartes' writings: The Scholastic Sense and another sense
introduced by, and peculiar to, Descartes. We shall see
that the term 'indifference' in FI has a different sense
from the sense it has in F2
. in the second part, I will
address the issue of why Descartes thinks that F3 is true
despite the fact that human indifference is 'the lowest
grade of freedom'. Finally, I will show how the Creation
Doctrine is entailed by Descartes' account of divine
freedom
.
Different Senses of 'Indifference 1
The first step in a solution to the problem generated
by Descartes' acceptance of FI, F2
,
and F3
,
is to notice
that there are different senses of indifference in play in
Descartes' writings. Because Descartes, as we know, was
anxious to find favor with the Jesuits, he sometimes
employed the scholastic notion of indifference, accepted by
the Jesuits. This sense of indifference is particularly
prevalent in 16th-century scholastics like Luis de Molina,
in his Concord i a
,
Molina defined freedom in terms of
indifference. He states:
That agent is said to be free who, all the requisites
for acting having been posited, can act or not act, or
so perform one action that he is still able to do the
contrary. ( Concord i
a
f Dis 2)
Let us call this
' scholastic- indifference
'
(
' s-indif ference,
for short) and define it as follows:
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SI: An agent A is s- indifferent with respect to an action
a
-d f . given all the requisites for doing a, A could
have done a and A could have refrained from doing a,
and A could have done some other action beside a.
And, as I've stated, Molina defined freedom in terms of s-
indifference. Thus, on his account
An agent A is free with respect to an action a = df a is
s - indi f ferent with respect to a.
It is s-indif ference, "given currency for the first
time by later Scholastics," 4 that Leibniz would later oppose
in the 'Conversation with Steno' (1677). As Leibniz states:
This notion of freedom - that is, the power of acting
or not acting, all the requisites for acting havingbeen posited, and all things being equal both in the
object and in the agent, is an impossible chimera,
which is contrary to the first principle that I stated(VE II. p. 302)
Not only does Leibniz think that s- indifference never
actually occurs in human free actions, he thinks that it is
iiriposs i b] e that any free action feature s-indif ference
. For
an agent to be s- indifferent with respect to an action a,
according to Leibniz, would require a violation of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason. The sufficient reason for
an action would be contained in 'all the requisites for
acting', and given that there is a sufficient reason
contained in 'all the requisites for acting' the action
follows. Because the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a
necessary truth, an action cannot be s-indif ferent
.
5
Descartes discusses s- indifference in several texts,
most noticeably in the 9 February 1645 letter to Mesland, in
which he states: "Perhaps others mean by 'indifference' a
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one or other of
positive faculty of determining oneself to
two contraries.
.. I do not deny that the will has this
positive faculty." (AT IV 173;CSMK 245) 6 It should come as
no supnse that this is stated in a letter to a Jesuit,
Mesland
. S- indifference
,
as opposed to the other sense of
indifference, to be discussed shortly, is a positive power
or ability belonging to the will; it is the ability to
determine oneself to an action.
Sometimes, however, Descartes introduces his own sense
of indifference. In the Fourth Meditation, he writes of
the indifference I feel when there is hq reason impelling
[impe
H
i t ] me in one direction rather than another,
" (AT VII
5 8 ; CSM II 40, emphasis mine), and states that in some cases
"my intellect has not come upon any persuasive reason in
favor of one alternative rather than the other. This
obviously implies that I am indifferent as to whether I
should assent or deny either alternative." (AT VII 59;CSM II
41, emphasis mine) And, in the Sixth Replies, he states:
"He is never indifferent except when he does not know which
of the two alternatives is the better or truer." (AT VII
432-3 ; CSM II 291-92) Finally, in the 9 February 1645
letter to Mesland, he states: indifference
' seems to me
strictly to mean that state of the will when it is not
impelled [impellitur] one way rather than another by any
perception of truth or goodness." (AT IV 173,-CSMK 245) I
take it that Descartes here means that an agent is
indifferent in his peculiar sense when their will is not
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impelled by any reason for acting. Let us call this type of
indifference
' cartesian- indifference
'
(or 1 c- indifference
'
)
and define it as follows:
Cl: An agent A is c-indif ferent with respect to an action
a = df . (i) It is not the case that A has any reason to
do a or any alternatives to a, or (ii) the reasons for
and against doing a are evenly balanced. 8
In contrast to s - indifference
,
which is a power, c-
indifference is a state in which an agent is not impelled by
any reason to perform an action; it is, as Beyssade states,
"the state of hesitation or wavering because of ignorance or
insufficient knowledge." 9 In fact, Descartes explicitly
contrasts c- indifference with s-indif ference
.
10 And it is
c-indif ference which Descartes characterizes as the lowest
grade of freedom. 11 As Descartes states in the 9 February
1645 letter to Mesland:
[I] ndif ference
' in this context seems to me strictly
to mean that state of the will when it is not impelled
one way rather than another by any peception of truth
or goodness. This is the sense in which I took it when
I said that the lowest grade of freedom is that by
which we determine ourselves to things to which we are
indifferent. (AT IV 173/CSMK 245)
So, differentiating between s-indif ference and c-
indifference shows how Descartes can hold that there is a
sense in which indifference may be present in human free
actions although there is a sense in which it is the lowest
grade of human freedom. 12 C- indifference is the lowest
grade of human freedom precisely because it is contrary to
the highest grade of human freedom, i.e., spontaneous assent
to a clear and distinct perception. As Descartes states:
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[T] he more I am inclined (properdin) in onedirection.
. .so much more freely do I choose that.. Forif I always saw clearly what was true and good... inthat case, although I would be completely free vet Icould never be indif ferent
.
(AT VII 57-8/CSM II^O)
Although this text seems to decide the matter whether
s-mdifference is required for human freedom, exactly what
Descartes' view of human freedom is depends greatly on the
interpretation of a sentence from the Fourth Meditation
immediately preceding the quotation above. This is
difficult business, to say the least. In particular, the
passage, "Neque en i m opus est me in utramque partem
posse
,
Hi- s im liber ," (AT VII 57;CSM II 40) does not admit
of an easy translation into English. It may be translated as
(1) There is no need for me to be able to go both waysin order to be free.
In this case, Descartes is denying that s-indif ference is
essential to human freedom. 13 On the other hand,
Cottingham, et al
. translated this sentence as:
(2) In order to be free, there is no need for me to be
incl i ned both ways
.
^ that another reasonable translation, and one very
similar to (2 ) , is
:
(3)
There is no need for me to be impel 1 ed both ways,
in order to be free. 14
We can see that much rests on the translation: If (2) or (3)
are accurate translations, then Descartes is denying that c-
indifference is essential to human freedom, while remaining
silent about whether s-indif ference is essential. 15 If (1)
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is accurate, then Descartes is denying that s- indifference
is essential, while remaining silent about whether c-
indifference is essential.
Despite the difficulty in translating this sentence, I
believe that (2) and (3) are more plausible translations
than (1)
,
which has Descartes denying that s-indif ference
(a positive power) is essential to human freedom, precisely
because (2) and (3) make Descartes' view in the Fourth
Meditation consistent with what he states in the 9 February
1645 letter to Mesland, namely that c- indifference is the
lowest grade of freedom. On translations (2) and (3)
,
the
reference to indifference (i.e., c-indif ference) as the
lowest grade of freedom in 1645 simply reiterates what is
already Descartes' stated view in the Med i t a t i on .q of 1641
Translations (2) and (3) also make the 1641 Latin text
consistent with the 1647 French text (the latter includes
reference to 'indifference' in its 'counterpart' to the
sentence from the Latin text, whereas the Latin does not)
.
16
Contrary to the interpretation of Beyssade, 17 the insertion
°f
'
i
ndi fferent ' in 1647 does not provide evidence that
Descartes' views concerning freedom changed between 1641 and
1647; it is quite reasonable to think that Descartes
introduces the term ' indifferent ' in the French edition
simply to make "his thoughts clearer" (AT IX 3) about the
fact that it is indifference (i.e., c-indif ference) under
discussion, as is stated later in that same passage. Later
in the passage, Descartes discusses the " indifference ... when
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I'm not impelled by any reason is the lowest grade of
freedom," and earlier he states that "there is no need for
me to be impelled both ways, in order to be free."
I agree with Beyssade that neither s- indifference nor
c- indifference is essential to human freedom according to
Descartes; but I disagree that in the Latin text it is s-
mdif ference that Descartes is denying is essential to human
freedom, whereas in the French it is c- indifference that
Descartes is denying is required for human freedom. 18
We should notice at this point what differentiating
between s-indif ference and c-indifference actually
accomplishes: Differentiating between the two is quite
helpful in reconciling FI and F2
. That is, there is no
inconsistency in Descartes holding FI* and F2*:
FI* C-indif ference is not required for human freedom.
F2 * S-indifference belongs to human freedom. 19
However, distinguishing s-indifference and c- indifference
does nothing to help the situation between FI and F3
,
because the sense of indifference involved with both is c-
indif ference
. So, we'll have to look elsewhere to settle
this issue.
Why C-indifference is Not Essential to Human Freedom
In the 21 April 1641 letter to Mersenne, Descartes
writes, "I wrote that indifference in our ca.qp is rather a
defect than a perfection of freedom; but it does not follow
that the same is the case with God." (AT III 360;CSMK 179,
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emphasis mine) Unfortunately, Descartes doesn't eypu.u 1y
tell us why this is the case. However, there are some
implicitly stated reasons, as we'll now see.
The authors of the Sixth Objections objected that
it is an article of faith [da fide] that God was frometernity indifferent as to whether he should create oneworld, or innumerable worlds, or none at all and ifmdifferonce cannot be a proper part of human freedom
neither will it find a place in divine freedom, since'the essences of things are ... indivisible and immutable.Therefore indifference is involved in God's freedom of'choice no less than it is in the case of human freedom
of choice. (AT VII 417;CSM II 281)
Descartes' reply indicates many things about his strategy
for reconciliation of FI and F3
. I quote the reply to this
particular objection at length, and I number the sections in
order to make reference easier.
[l] As for the freedom of the will, the way in which it
exists in God is quite different from the way in which
it exists in us. [2] It is self
-contradictory to
suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from
eternity with respect to everything which has happened
or will ever happen; for it is impossible to imagine
that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as
good or true... prior to the decision of the divine will
to make it so. .
.
[3] But as for man.
. . it is evident that
he will embrace what is good and true all the more
willingly
,
and hence more freely, in proportion as he
sees it clearly. [4] He (i.e., man) is never
indifferent except when he does not know which of the
two alternatives is the better or truer, or at least
when he does not see this clearly enough to rule out
any possibility of doubt. [5] Hence the indifference
which belongs to r conveni
t
l human freedom is very
different from that which belongs to divine
freedom.
.
.
[6] Indifference does not belong to the
essence of human freedom f indi f ferent i a non perrinet
essent iam humanae—libertat is ] , since not only are we
free when ignorance of what is right makes us
indifferent, but we are also free - indeed at our
freest - when a clear perception impels us to pursue
some object. (AT VII 431-433/CSM II 291-292)
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Each of the numbered sections in this passage contains
helpful information concerning Descartes' views of freedom,
both human and divine. [3] and [ 6 ], for instance, constitute
strong evidence that Descartes held that indifference (both
c- indifference and s-indif ference) is not essential to human
freedom. That is, there are cases in which a human agent
will be free, in fact freer
,
the less indifferent he or she
is. What is required for the freest human actions is
spontaneity
.
It should be noticed that [5] does state that a type of
indifference, s-indif ference
,
'belongs' to human freedom.
This, in conjunction with Descartes' statement in the 9
February 1645 letter to the Jesuit, Mesland, in which he
states that humans are s-indif ferent
,
and Pr i nri pi pb i §41
in which Descartes seems to identify freedom with s-
indif ference (AT VIII 20; CSM I 206)
,
would seem to indicate
that Descartes, despite [ 6 ] , held that s-indif ference is
essential to human free actions. What should be noticed is
that, in [5] and [ 6 ], Descartes says two very different
things: First, s- indifference 'belongs' r conveni
t
) to human
freedom; second, s-indif ference does not belong [non
pert inet ] to the essence of human freedom. Why the
difference? The answer is that Descartes certainly believes
that there are free human actions in which s-indif ference is
present, and, in this sense, s- indifference may belong to
free human actions; however, what Descartes is denying is
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that s-indifference is essential to free human actions. 20
This should come as no suprise; after all, Descartes, as we
have seen, repeatedly states that the freest human actions
are those in which indifference (of both varieties) is
missing
.
21
More important to the present task of reconciling FI
and F3 are [1]
, [2]
, [4] , and [5]
.
[l] and [5] both clearly
show that Descartes believes that there cannot be a uniform
account of human and divine freedom. There are at least two
obvious reasons why Descartes cannot hold a uniform account.
First, as Descartes states: "no essence can belong
univocally to both God and his creatures." (AT VII 433,
-CSM
II 292) That is, not only does the proposition 'x is free'
mean something different depending on whether we substitute
the name of a creature or of God for 'x', it cannni fail to
mean something different. The predicates of God and
creatures are non-univocal. 22 So, because of the non-
univocity of divine and human predicates, Descartes is
committed to the impossibility of a uniform account of
divine and human freedom. Thus, someth i ng must distinguish
human freedom from divine freedom.
Second, even if we denied the non-univocity of divine
and human predicates, Descartes' model of the structure of
free human actions cannot accomodate divine free acts
because of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS ) . As
Descartes states with respect to human free action: "it is
clear by the natural light that the perception of the
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ermination of the
intellect must [debere] precede the det
will." (AT VII 6 0; CSM II 41) ‘ 3 The priority of the
intellect need not be temporal priority, but perhaps only
'priority of nature' or conceptual priority. However, as
we've seen, Descartes thinks that "in God, willing [and]
understanding.
. .are all the same thing without one being
prior to the other even conceptually fne quidem
;
..
(AT I 153 ; CSMK 25-6); and "there is not even any priority of
order, or nature, or of ratione rat i n<-i as they call
it." (AT VII 432; CSM II 291) Thus, because of Descartes'
commitment to DDS, in which there is no conceptual priority
between God's intellect and will, there simply cannot be a
uniform account of freedom, which would accomodate both
human and divine free actions.
[2] illustrates that God's freedom requires c-
indif ference
. This is a point to which I will return
shortly
.
[4] is the key to understanding why Descartes believes
FI and F3 are both true. Just to clarify, FI and F3 should
be rephrased as follows:
FI* c-indif ference is not essential to human freedom.
F3* c-indif ference is essential to divine freedom.
[4] shows that, in discussing human indifference here,
Descartes intends to be discussing c-indif ference
.
24 This
will be clear when we discuss the necessary and sufficient
conditions for being able to be c- indifferent
. In [4],
Descartes states that humans can be indifferent if (and only
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if) they either lack knowledge or they lack clear
perception. This indicates that a state of not-being-
impelled is being discussed rather than a power of
choosing. 25 That is, Descartes is referring to c-
indifference and not to s-indif ference
We can begin to see why Descartes held that humans need
not be c-indif ferent with respect to an action a in order
to be free with respect to a by noticing that he held that
certain conditions must hold for an agent to be c-
indif ferent. Descartes held the following:
<
^>CI: It:
I
s possible for a finite agent A to be c-indifferent iff
(i) A lacks relevant information concerning a
course of action,
ox
(ii) A 1 s perception is not sufficiently clear and
distinct
,
ox
( iii ) A acts without sufficient reason, (i.e., A
acts with no reason, or with fewer reasons
than ought to suffice for the action.)
Descartes expresses conditions (i) and (ii) in the Fourth
Meditation: "[indifference, i.e., C- indifference] is
evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a
defect in knowledge ... For if I always saw clearly what was
true and good, I should never have to deliberate about the
right judgment or choice." (AT VII 58;CSM II 40) Again in
the Fourth Meditation, he states: "this indifference [i.e.,
c-indif ference] does not merely apply to cases where the
intellect is wholly ignorant, but extends in general to
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every case where the intellect does not have suffirH^. ly
Cl^ar knowledge." (AT VI I 59;CSM II 41, emphasis mine)
Descartes states condition (iii) in the 2 May 1644
letter to Mesland: "I did not say that a person was
indifferent only if he lacked knowledge, but rather, that he
is more indifferent the fewer reasons he knows which impel
him to choose one side rather than another." (AT IV 115;CSMK
This point is slightly altered, but retains the same
spirit, in the 9 February 1645 letter to Mesland:
indifference' in this context seems to me strictly to mean
that state of the will when it is not impelled one way
rather than another by any perception of truth or goodness."
(AT IV 173/CSMK 245, emphasis mine)
Now, for Descartes, (i) - (iii) of Oci are indicative
of a pr ivation or deficiency on the part of an agent.
Descartes uses the term 'privation' frequently in the Fourth
Meditation, and in the 1647 French edition of the
Meditations, he insists that he is using the term according
to its scholastic usage. (AT IX 48) 26 The scholastics
distinguished between a negation Fnegat i o j and a pri vvi on
[privat i o ] . A negation is simply a lack of something; so,
for instance, my lack of wings is a negation. However,
privations have normal. 1 ve import. 'Privation', according to
Descartes' scholastic usage, may be defined as follows:
F is a privation in some thing S = df . F is a lack of a
property P and S is such that it ought to have P. 27
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So, whereas my lack of wings is a mere negation, if i were
to lack feet or reason, I would have a privation. 28
That (i) - (iii) of OCI are indicative of a privation,
according to Decartes, is clear from Descartes' insistence
that the lack of knowledge involved in c- indifference is
described in the Fourth Meditation as ' in rngnit-inn^
defectum '
. That this is the case is also clear from
Descartes' account of error in terms of privation in the
same Meditation: "it is undoubtedly an imperfection in me to
misuse [aonJaene_ULtar] that freedom and make judgements
about matters which I do not fully understand." (AT VII
61; CSM II 42)
As I have argued elsewhere, 29 Descartes believes that
ideas ought to be (in some strong sense) clear and distinct.
If this is true, then an idea which is not clear and
distinct is a privative idea, one which we ought not to
have, or, at the very least, ought not to act upon. As he
states: "If, however, I simply refrain from making a
judgment in cases where I do not percieve the truth with
sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I
am behaving correctly and avoiding error." (AT VII 59; CSM
II 41) 30 It is also indicative of a privation in that we
misuse our faculties (i.e., use them as we ought not to)
when we have an act of will without sufficient reason for
the act of will.
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Thus, if (i) _ (iii) exhaust the ways in which a finite
agent can be c-indif ferent
,
then an agent can be c-
mdifferent only by having a privation. This, I believe, is
why Descartes wrote to Mersenne that "indifference in our
case is rather a defect [defaut ] than a perfection of
freedom." (AT III 360) But Descartes thinks that freedom is
a perfection. it is only ... freedom of choice, which I
experience within me to be so great that the idea of any
greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is
above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to
bear m some way the image and likeness of God." (AT VII 57
,
emphasis mine ) 31 He reiterates this in the Prinripipc . .. it
'*' S a supreme
—
perfect i on in man that he acts voluntarily,
that is, freely." (AT VIII 18, emphasis mine) And in the
Fourth Meditation, it is clear that Descartes thinks that it
ought to be the case that humans act freely.
Take the following three propositions:
(A) Freedom is a perfection.
(B) A finite agent A can be c-indif ferent only if ahas a privation.
(C) C-Indif ference is necessary for human freedom.
If Descartes holds (A) - (C)
,
then he is committed to (D)
:
(D) A finite agent A can have the perfection of
freedom only if A has a privation.
Although Descartes does believe that created agents are
essentially limi ted
,
32 it does not follow that he believes
that we are essentially privative in fact, he explicitly
denies that we are essentially privative
.
33 Because
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Descartes would not hold (D)
,
he must give up one or more of
(A) - (C)
.
But we have already seen that Descartes holds
(A) and (B)
;
so, Descartes must reject (C)
.
That is,
Descartes cannot hold that c- indifference is necessary for
human freedom. But the fact that c- indifference is not
necessary for human freedom entails nothing about whether c-
mdif ference is necessary for divine freedom because, as
we've seen, Descartes believes that human freedom is quite
dissimilar from divine freedom ( [1] and [5]). We must now
see why Descartes believes that c-indif ference is required
for divine freedom.
Why C-indifference is Essential to Divine Freedom
At the start of this section, we should notice not why
Descartes holds that God's freedom requires c-indifference,
but simply that he does. In [2], from the Sixth Replies
passage, Descartes states: "It is self
-contradictory to
suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from
eternity ... for it is impossible to imagine that anything is
thought of in the divine intellect as good or true.
. .prior
to the decision of the divine will to make it so." And later
in the Sixth Replies, Descartes characterizes God
indifference in terms of a lack of reasons for willing. (AT
VII 435; CSM II 294) Thus, Descartes' God satisfies
condition (i) of the criteria for being c- indifferent
;
hence, he is c- indifferent
.
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Moreover, Descartes would hold that God is free iff God
is c-indif ferent
. That Descartes believes that c-
indifference is a necessary condition for divine freedom in
beyond doubt; but it is as clear that he holds that c-
mdif ference is sufficient for divine freedom. This can be
shown if we consider that Descartes holds that divine
freedom is simply a complete lack of determination with
respect to God's will. 34 This can happen only if God is c-
indifferent. But, moreover, if God is c-indif ferent
, there
is a complete lack of determination of God's will; that is,
there will be no. reason for God's willing things. Hence, c-
indifference is necessary and sufficient for divine freedom.
We may now turn to why Descartes holds that God is c-
indif ferent. Remember that Descartes thinks that the
eternal truths are freely created by God. Descartes believes
that God's free creation of the eternal truths requires that
God's choice not be determined or impelled in any way by
anything independent of God's will. Concerning Mersenne
'
s
inquiry, Descartes states: "you ask what necessitated God to
create these [eternal] truths; and I reply that he was free
to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are
equal - just as freed as he was not to create the world."
(AT I 152 ; CSMK 25) Descartes states two important ideas in
this passage: First, that God was not necessitated to create
the eternal truths, i.e., he was free with respect to their
creation. Second, he implicitly explains that this freedom
involves the ability to have done otherwise. This is clear
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from the fact that Descartes thinks that God could have
willed both of the following:
R: That it is false that all the radii of the circle
are equal
.
W. That it is false that the world exists.
But, as we know, God did not will either of these
propositions to be true; in fact, the radii of the circle
are equal, and the world does exist. Because Descartes
believes that the truth of any proposition depends on God's
will, he holds that the truth of the propositions that ail
hhe radii , of the c i rcle are equal and that the world
though differing in modal status, are equally the result of
God's will. So, given that this is true, and that
Descartes believes that God could have willed R and W,
Descartes holds that God's freedom requires the power to
have done other than he has in fact done. That is, God's
freedom requires something like the positive power of s-
indif ference
. Thus,
GF: God is free with respect to a case of willing only
if he could have refrained from willing and he
could have willed something else.
In this respect, Descartes is in agreement with the authors
of the Sixth Objections (AT III 360)) . However, Descartes
believes that an omniscient and perfect being could not have
the power to do otherwise unless some particular condition
is satisfied. I will return to this shortly.
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Remember that I previously listed some necessary and
sufficient conditions for being c- indifferent
. I left out
one condition:
(iv) There is nothing present to A's intellect prior toA's willing.
As we have seen in our discussion of DDS
,
there is nothing
true prior to God's will which could serve as a reason for
divine willing. The reason I previously omitted (iv) is
that in that context we were concerned only with human
freedom, and Descartes holds that humans cannot possibly
satisfy condition (iv). As he states: "As for man, since he
finds that the nature of all goodness and truth is already
determined by God. and his will cannot tend towards anything
else, it is evident that he will embrace what is good and
true all the more willingly, and hence more freely, in
proportion as he sees it more clearly." (AT VII 432)
Clearly, however, Descartes must believe that God
satisfies (iv) ; after all, as we've seen, Descartes holds
that God is c- indifferent
,
but he cannot be
c indifferent in virtue of satisfying (i) or (ii) or (iii)
because they are indications not only of human privation but
also of divine imperfection. Moreover, Descartes is forced
to hold that God satisfies (iv) because Descartes is
committed to GF and to the following:
(v) God can have the power to will otherwise only if
God is c-indif ferent
.
(that is, only if nothing
impels his will)
Because God could not refrain from willing what is true if
truths were present to his intellect prior to his will, he
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must be c-indifferent if (GP) is true; and he can only be c-
mdif ferent in virtue of satifying (iv)
. But, we know that
Descartes believes that
(vi) God has the ability to will otherwise.
Therefore
,
( vii ) God is c-indifferent.
So, we have seen that humans would require a privation
to be c-indifferent. But God would not be free with respect
to creation unless he were c-indifferent. Moreover, it
isn t clear that S-indif ference is required for human
freedom, and it certainly isn't the case that human S-
indifference requires human C- indifference
.
I have shown that Descartes cannot allow c- indifference
to be required for human freedom; that Descartes is
committed to divine freedom requiring c- indifference
; and
that there is no inconsistency involved with (a)
,
(b)
,
and
(c) .
Divine Freedom and the Eternal Truths
Although there is clearly an important relationship
between the eternal truths and divine freedom, there are
only a few texts in which Descartes discusses this
relationship. This, however, should not bother us, given
the scarcity of texts in which Descartes discusses either
the eternal truths or divine freedom and the scarcity of
texts in which Descartes explains why he holds the Creation
Doctrine. In every text in which Descartes discusses the
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reasons why he holds the Creation Doctrine, he mentions,
either implicitly or explictly, the issue of divine freedom.
So, relatively speaking, Descartes discusses the
relationship between the eternal truths and divine freedom
quite frequently.
The texts in which Descartes presents his most
sustained discussion (although not nearly as sustained as
one would like) of divine freedom as a reason for the
Creation Doctrine are found in the Sixth Replies and the 2
May 1644 letter to Mesland. In each of these texts,
Descartes presents an argument, albeit an argument grossly
lacking sufficient detail, that his account of divine
freedom requires that the Creation Doctrine be true. Because
I am confining myself to exegetical history of philosophy, I
will not be concerned with the soundness of Descartes'
arguments, but only in presenting his arguments as
accurately as possible. There will, of course, be those who
think that Descartes' arguments are unsound. I invite them
to take up the matter with Descartes.
I will begin by presenting the relevant texts. I will
then extract Descartes' arguments, supplementing them when
necessary with premises Descartes provides elsewhere.
Finally, I will present Descartes' implicit justification of
the more controversial premises.
It is interesting to note that Descartes actually
provides two arguments for the Creation Doctrine based on
divine freedom. One, found in both the Sixth Replies and the
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2 May 1644 letter to Mesland, argues for the Creation
Doctrine pure ly on the basis of divine freedom. Another,
which I will now briefly discuss before moving to the other
argument, depends also on considertat ion of DDS
. Descartes
states
:
It is self
-contradictory to suppose that the will ofGod was not indifferent from eternity ... because
[quia] it is impossible to imagine that anything isthought of in the divine intellect as good or trueprior to the decision of the divine will to make it so(AT VII 431-32; CSM II 291)
In this passage, Descartes is arguing that God is
indifferent because he is simple. We would not be wrong
then in supposing that DDS is the more fundamental
explanation of the Creation Doctrine for Descartes. Because,
as we have seen in the previous chapter, there can be
nothing in the divine intellect which is not also an object
of the divine will (in virtue of their identity)
,
there can
be nothing in the divine intellect prior to the divine will.
But if there can be nothing in the divine intellect prior to
the divine will, there can be no reason for God's willing
what he wills. Thus, God is c- indifferent with respect to
everything in virtue of satisfying condition (i) of Cl. And
if God is c-indif ferent with respect to everything, then he
is free with respect to everything. But the eternal truths
are something. So, God is free with respect to them.
Therefore, if there are eternal truths, they are freely
willed by God. Therefore, if God is simple and free, the
eternal truths are freely created.
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The previous argument rests heavily on DDS as well as
divine freedom. Descartes' second, and more interesting
argument is based purely on divine freedom. In fact, in
this argument Descartes disregards DDS altogether. He seems
to be arguing against a hypothetical opponent who objects to
Descartes' heavy reliance on DDS. So, Descartes, in order to
defeat even this opponent will argue that even if, per
-imposs ibil e
,
God were not simple and there were truths in
the divine intellect prior to the divine will, God would not
be free. Hence the moderate position earlier attributed to
Aquinas and Leibniz, cannot achieve a truly worthy
conception of God's freedom. Let us now turn to Descartes'
words on the subject:
If anyone will attend to the immeasurable greatness ofGod he will find it manifestly clear that there can be
nothing whatsoever which does not depend on him. This
applies not just to everything that subsists, but to
all order, every law, and every foundation of
something's being true and good. If this were not so,
then.
. .God would not have been completely indifferent'
with respect to the creation of what he did in fact
create. If some reason for something's being good had
existed prior to his preordination, this would have
determined God to prefer those things it was best to
do. (AT VII 435; CSM II 293-94, emphas is mine) 36
In this passage, Descartes begins with a reiteratat ion
of the Dependence Thesis: Everything depends on God. Notice
that Descartes does not mention DDS in this context even
though he could in order to establish once again the
dependence of the eternal truths on God's will without
reference to divine freedom. Descartes wishes to show that
even ignoring DDS, divine freedom entails the Creation
Doctrine
.
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After stating the Dependence Thesis, Descartes presents
a bsduct. i o—ad
—
absurdnm in which the contradiction is
generated by a hypothetical denial of the Dependence Thesis
("If bhi s (i.e., the Dependence Thesis) were not so...").
Descartes argues that God would not have been indifferent
(
c
- indifferent ) if there could be something independent of
his will. Moreover, if God were not c- indifferent
,
then his
will would have been determined to will particular things.
But if God would have been determined to will particular
things, his will would not have been free. "But his will is
free," as Descartes states elsewhere. (AT I 146; CSMK 23)
Hence, the hypothetical denial of the Dependence Thesis is
false. Therefore, the Dependence Thesis is true. But if the
Dependence Thesis is true and God's will is free, then the
Free Creation Thesis (i.e.
,
the eternal truths are freely
created by God) is true.
I realize that a step in this argument requires some
justification. 37 The controversial premise is the following:
If God were not c-indif ferent
,
then his will would
have been determined.
Descartes does not provide any justification for this
premise, but we can speculate about why he believed it was
true. Why would God be determined to will exactly those
things that were true or good prior to his will if there
were such things? Presumably, God could not fail to know
which things were true or good prior to his will in virtue
of his omniscience. Presumably, God could not fail to will
those things which are true or good in virtue of his
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veracity and goodness
.
38 Therefore, if there were eternal
truths prior to God's will, God would have been determined
to will those truths. He would not have had the ability to
will otherwise with respect to those truths.
We have seen in this chapter and the previous chapter
exactly why Descartes holds the Creation Doctrine and
rejects the moderate alternative account. The Creation
Doctrine rests on two important and widely-held theological
assumptions: God is simple, and God's will is free.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CREATION DOCTRINE AND MODALITY
Introduction
Because the Creation Doctrine is a thesis concerning
the eternal truths, and the eternal truths are so-called
’necessary truths', we would expect the Creation Doctrine to
have implications for the modal status of propositions.
This aspect of the Creation Doctrine has received much
scholarly attention. For instance, some philosophers have
taken Creation Doctrine to involve a denial that there are
any necessay truths at all. 1 Others have taken a more
moderate approach to the implications of the Creation
Doctrine for modality: There are necessary truths, but they
are only contingently necessary, i.e., they are not
necessarily necessary. 2
In this chapter, I will make a start toward an adequate
and sympathetic understanding of the Creation Doctrine's
consequences for modality. In particular, I will show how
the following claims, both of which were held by Descartes,
are not inconsistent with one another:
(1) The eternal truths are freely created by God.
(2) The eternal truths are genuinely necessary.
As we have already seen in earlier chapters, Descartes'
acceptance of (1) is uncontroversial ; in fact, it is merely
a concise statement of essence of the Creation Doctrine.
However, his commitment to (2) is more controversial. I
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believe the controversy surrounding (2) arises precisely
because Descartes' acceptance of ( 1 ) is so uncontroversial
.
That is, some have thought that his acceptance of (l)
eliminates any possibility of accepting (2)
.
I will show
that this view is mistaken.
First, a comment on (2) is in order. By 'genuinely
necessary'
,
I intend to make a stronger claim than some
scholars who hold that Descartes' eternal truths are
necessary only in the sense that they are merely ca 1 1 pH
necessary'
,
are only contingently necessary, or are only
necessary in the sense that we cannot conceive otherwise. 3
I mean to make the claim that, for Descartes, modality is a
mind- independent and objective feature of the world, rather
than merely a feature of our minds.
In the first section, I will discuss two prominent
interpretations of the Creation Doctrine and its
consequences for modality: Universal Possibilism [UP] and
Limited Possibilism [LP]
.
4 Both UP and LP have the same
noble motivation: Both try to understand the modal
consequences of a particular statement Descartes makes in
the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland: "God cannot have been
determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be
true together, and therefore that he coni
d
have done the
opposite." (AT IV 118; CSMK 235, emphasis mine) 5 UP and LP
are attempts to understand the sense in which God could have
willed that an eternal truth be false and the implications
this 'could' has for the modal status of propositions. This
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IS not an easy task; in fact, Janet Broughton has stated
that "there is no good sense we can make of this 'could';" 6
Harry Frankfurt has stated "What is troublesome [is]
understanding the 'could';" 7 and Lilli Alanen has stated
"How the 'could' have willed or done otherwise should be
accounted for is not very clear." 8 Although both UP and LP
make strong attempts to understand the implications of the
'could', I reject both on the same ground: Other problems
aside, both UP and LP presuppose something explicitly
disallowed by the Creation Doctrine. Hence they cannot be
correct interpretations of Descartes. In the second
section, I show this by contrasting the Creation Doctrine
with Leibniz's account of the eternal truths. In the third
section, I will present an interpretation in which there is
a sense in which it is true to say that for any eternal
truth P, God could have willed not-P but not to say that
not-P is possible. By doing this, we will see that
Descartes' acceptance of (1) is not inconsistent with his
acceptance of (2)
.
So, my argument in this chapter will
have the relatively weak conclusion that (1) and (2) are not
inconsistent. In the fourth section, I will show how my
interpretation preserves Descartes' idea that conceivability
is a reliable guide to modality, at least in the case of
clear and distinct perceptions. In the next chapter, I will
make the positive case for Descartes acceptance of (1) and
( 2 ) .
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Universal Pos sibil ism
The first interpretation I will examine states that
Descartes is committed to UP. (I will refer to those who
attribute UP to Descartes as 'UPers'.) UP is the strong and
controversial (to say the least) thesis that for any
proposition P, it is possible that P . Essentially, UP is a
denial that there are any necessary truths at all.
UP is correctly (but with qualifications) called 'the
standard interpretation' by Curley
.
9 Although Descartes
scholars are apprehensive about attributing UP to Descartes,
those with less familiarity with Descartes take UP to be
uncontrovers ially true. That is, it is not uncommon find
non-specialists attributing UP to Descartes
.
10
Nevertheless, there have been only a few Descartes scholars
who have been willing to attribute UP to Descartes
.
11
The most prominent UPer is Harry Frankfurt
. In his
seminal article, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal
Truths," Frankfurt argues that Descartes held that the
eternal truths are "inherently as contingent as any other
propositions." His reasoning is based on the important
and troublesome passage from the 2 May 1644 letter to
Me si and quoted earlier that " [God] could have done the
opposite." Moreover, in the 27 May 1630 letter to Mersenne,
Descartes states that God "was free to make it not true that
all the radii of the circle are equal." (AT I 152; CSMK 25)
From these passages it seems that Descartes thinks that a
necessary condition of (1) is (3) :
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(3) For any eternal truth P, God could have willedthat not-P is true.
And because the "assertion that some state of affairs can be
brought about ordinarily entails that that state of affairs
is logically possible," 11 Frankfurt thinks that (3)
(ordinarily) entails (4)
:
(4) For any eternal truth P, it is possible that not-
But Frankfurt argues that if (4) is true, then an eternal
truth, despite all appearances and our inability to conceive
of things otherwise, is not a necessary truth. We can
generalize this result, and we get the UP thesis: For any
proposi t ion P it is possible that P . We may spell out the
reasoning as follows. Take P as representative of eternal
truths such that P is a necessary truth if anything is.
U1 . God could have willed that not-P is true. (3)
U2 . If God could have willed that not-P is true, then
it is possible that God wills that not-P is'
true . 14
U3 . It is possible that God wills that not-P is true,
(from U1 and U2)
U4 . If it is possible that God wills that not-P is
true, then it is possible that not-P is true.
U5 . Therefore, it is possible that not-P is true.
(from U3 and U4
)
Curley recaps the reasoning behind UP: "Take any
contradiction you like, God could have made it true. Hence
is could have been. Hence, it is possible, even if false.
Hence, anything is possible, there are no necessary
truths." 15 Thus, if Descartes really holds UP, then he
cannot consistently hold both (1) and (2)
.
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Epistemic Necessity
Despite this interpretation, which commits Descartes to
UP, Frankfurt does recognize that Descartes at least makes a
distinction between truths such as (i) it is i mpn...^hi 0 e„r
bhe same th ing to bp and not to be at thp samp Mmp and
truths such as (ii) ^have a body However, as we have
seen, if Frankfurt is correct and Descartes' Creation
Doctrine entails UP, then the distinction between (i) and
(n) cannot be one of genuine modality; that is, if UP is
true, then both (i) and (ii) may be true, but neither is
xea l
l
y necessar ,i 1 y true . According to Frankfurt
,
the
eternal truths are merely those truths whose negation we
cannot conceive. This is what distinguishes what we take
to be the modal status of (i) and (ii)
. The necessity of the
eternal truths, for Frankfurt's Descartes, is simply a
characteristic of our finite minds and their inability to
fully understand God's infinite power. As Frankfurt states:
[T] his inability to conceive the truth of a
contradiction is, Descartes suggests, merely a
contingent characteristic of our finite minds... That
our minds cannot conceive such things signifies nothing
beyond itself, however, except that God has freely
chosen to create us like that.
The inconceivability of [an eternal truth's] falsity,
which we demonstrate by the use of innate principles of
reason, is not inherent in them. It is properly to be
understood only as relative to the character of our
minds... So we cannot presume that what we determine to
be logically necessary coincides with the ultimate
conditions of reality or of truth. 17
no
Frankfurt supports this view with alleged textual evidence
from Descartes- 29 July 1648 letter to Arnauld, in which
Descartes states
But I do not think that we should ever say of anythingthat it cannot be brought about by God. For since
every basis of truth and goodness depends on his
omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot
make a mountain without a valley, or bring it aboutthat 1 and 2 are not 3. I merely say that he has given
me such a mind that I cannot conceive a mountain
without a valley, or a sum of 1 and 2 which is not 3;such things involve a contradiction in my conception(AT V 224; CSMK 358-9)
Further alleged evidence for an epistemic or conceptualist
account of modality is found in the Sixth Replies:
Again, there is no need to ask how God could have
brought it about from eternity that it was not true
that twice four make eight, and so on; for I admit
this is unintelligible to us
. . . I also understand that
it would have been easy for God to ordain certain
things such that we men cannot understand the
possibility of their being otherwise than they are (AT
VII 436; CSM II 294)
And even in the 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne, which
contains Descartes' first words on the subject of the
Creation Doctrine, he states: "In general we can assert that
God can do everything that is within our grasp but not that
he cannot do what is beyond our grasp. It would be rash to
think that our imagination reaches as far as his power." (AT
I 146; CSMK 23)
All of this, Frankfurt takes it, supports the idea that
what we call -necessary- is simply what we cannot conceive
to be otherwise; but this inability to conceive its falsity
has no bearing on genuine modality, on what, in fact, is
really possible.
m
s paper was published,Several years after Frankfurt'
Alvin Plant inga loaned his support to the idea that the
Creation Doctrine entails UP. Although he suggests that
Descartes wasn't clear about whether the Creation Doctrine
entails UP or 'limited possibilism' (which will be examined
shortly)
,
Plantinga holds that "there is good reason to
think... that [Descartes] was prepared to bite the bullet and
accept the consequence that there are no necessary
truths." 18 Plantinga also cites the 27 May 1630 letter to
Mersenne, the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland, and the Sixth
Replies as evidence in favor of UP. Unlike Frankfurt who
holds that it is primarily God's omnipotence which requires
UP to be true, Plantinga believes that considerations of
God's ase i ty entails UP: "[Descartes] believes that God is
the sovereign on whom everything depends, including the
eternal truths." 19
Plantinga also supports Frankfurt's view that the
reason why we call so-called eternal truths 'necessary
truths' is due to a limitation in our powers of conception
and not to anything inherent in the proposition.
We are so constructed, by God, that we cannot
entertain [the proposition that God has created
Descartes, but Descarte s has not been created ] or hold
it before our minds without thinking it quite
impossible - not just false but impossible. The fact
is, however, that it is not impossible; and if we want
to know the truth here, we should not hold it before
our minds... To paraphrase Raskolnikov, if God does not
exist everything is possible; according to Descartes,
the same holds if God does exist. 20
This epistemic necessity is required simply to reconcile the
Creation Doctrine (when considered as entailing UP) with the
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fact that there are propositions which we cannot help but
think are necessary or impossible.
What is clear is that UP in conjunction with merely
epistemic necessity would entail, as Frankfurt thinks it
does, that the genuine range of possibilities is
inaccessible to us and that our judgments of necessity and
impossibility are, strictly speaking, false. Take, for
instance, N1
:
N1 : It is necessary that 7 + 9=4
N 1 is fa lse, if it is understood, as we would normally be
inclined to understand it, as Nl* :
Nl* : xt is not possible that 2 + 2=4 is false, (where the
modality in question is taken to be a mind-independent feature of the world)
However, UPers who employ the notion of epistemic necessity
to explain the difference between eternal truths such and
contingent' truths would hold that Nl is true when prnpprl
y
understood as Nl**:
Nl**: One cannot conceive that 2+?=4 is false.
In a recent paper, Johnathan Bennett has gone even
farther and argued that for Descartes all t-herp -i.q t-o
modali ty i s conceivabil i t.y . 21 That is, he argues that the
Creation Doctrine provides the following conceptualist
analyses (CAM) of the metaphysical modalities:
CAM1 : P is possible = df a human can conceive that P . 22
CAM2 : P is necessary = df no human can conceive that
not -P . 23
And so on. Bennett's account differs from UPers like
Frankfurt and Plantinga in so far as Bennett's Descartes
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does not hold that there is an asymmetry between genuine
possibility (i.e., what God could do) and conceivability
;
nor does he hold that the former is somehow inaccessible to
our finite minds. Bennett states that "what we can conceive
provides all the content we are entitled to give to our
modal statements," and "our modal concepts should be
understood or analyzed in terms of what does or does not lie
within the compass of our ways of thinking;" 24 and more
bluntly: "He made it necessarily true that 2+2=4 by making
us unable to to conceive otherwise." 25 Bennett's primary
textual evidence for his conceptualist interpretation of
Descartes comes from the Second Replies:
If by possible' you mean what everyone commonly means,
namely whatever does not conflict with our human
concepts, then it is manifest that the nature of God,
as I have described it, is possible in this
sense.
. . Alternatively, you may well be imagining
[fung i t i s ] " 6 some other kind of possibility which
relates to the object itself; but unless this
matches the first sort of possibility it can never beknown by the human intellect, and so it... will
undermine the whole of human knowledge. (AT VII ISO-
151; CSM II 107)
So, Bennett's conceptualism differs from Frankfurt and
Plant inga
' s UP-plus- epistemic-necessity-approach in that
the former holds that there is some sort of necessity in the
eternal truths albeit only a conceptual necessity based on
our limitation of conception; the latter holds that there is
genuine modality (i.e., everything is possible), but we call
certain propositions - eternal truths - 'necessary' because
our finite minds cannot conceive the possibility of their
being otherwise.
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As I will later argue, the textual evidence for
Bennett's CAM from the Second Replies is consistent with the
falsity of CAM. All Descartes states is that our conceptual
capacities had better 'match up' with or be a reliable
indicator of 'possibility which relates to the object
itself.' This should come as no surprise to anyone with any
familiarity with Descartes. God would be a deceiver if he
were to create our minds in such a way that our (clear and
distinct) perceptions of necessity and possibility did not
provide accurate representations of the truth. But this
does not entail or even make probable the conceptual
analysis. Analogously, we would be reasoning fallaciously
if we took the fact that a good workman can make a
thermometer accurately represent the temperature to entail
that the reading of the thermometer i
s
the temperature
. I
return to this in section IV.
Problems with Universal Possibilism
There are several problems with UP as an interpretation
of Descartes' Creation Doctrine, not the least of which is
the fact that Descartes does hold (2)
.
For instance, in the
Fifth Meditation discussion of true and immutable essences,
Descartes holds that there are propositions about triangles
and God which are necessarily true and which are "not
invented by me or dependent on my mind." (AT VII 64; CSM II
45; cf . AT VII 65- 69; CSM II 45-48) 27 Moreover, in the 2
May 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes writes: "even though
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[.encore qne ] God has willed that some truths should be
necessary..." (AT IV 118; CSMK 235) 28 And in The Wn.lH
written a decade before the Meditations and roughly around
the time of the Creation Doctrine letters to Mersenne,
Descartes characterizes the laws of nature as truths such
that "if God had created many worlds, they would be as true
in each of them as in this one." (AT XI 47; CSM I 97) in the
D iscourse on Method
,
he reiterates this: "I tried to
demonstrate all those laws about which we could have any
doubt, and to show that they are such that, even if God
created many worlds, there could not be any in which they
failed to be observed." (AT VI 43; CSM I 132) 29 Moreover,
Curley points out that the necessity of the laws of nature
is required by Descartes' a priori physics,- 30 and Van den
Brink is quick to remind us that "the initial reason
Descartes gave for [the creation doctrine, in the first
letter of 1630 to Mersenne] was precisely that it formed the
foundation of his physics." 31
Furthermore, Curley points out that systems t i r
considerations alone are sufficient to show at least that
Descartes ought not to have held UP. By systematic
considerations, Curley has in mind constraints on the
interpretation of Descartes' Creation Doctrine imposed by
virtue of the fact that certain fundamental views are
essential to Descartes' philosophical project. Among the
systematic reasons against UP, Curley lists the following:
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IIP Probl em 1 : Even if he is commited to the view that
all of the essences of creatures and the eternal truths
concerning such essences are contingent, Descartes never
entertains, nor would he entertain the idea that the
propositions bhat God exists and God is pnwprfni are
possibly false. 32
UP Problem 2 : I have already alluded to the fact that
Descartes' version of the ontological argument requires the
existence of true and immutable essences that included
properties that "I now clearly recognize whether I want to
or not." (AT VII 64; CSM II 45) Curley takes this to imply,
and I agree, that Descartes thought that the necessity found
in the propositions concerning true and immutable essences
is something that 'forces' itself upon our minds and not
vice versa; and among them is that "it is necessary that
[God] has existed from eternity and will abide for eternity.
(AT VII 68; CSM II 47)
UP
—
Prob l em—3.: If UP is true, then Descartes' 'truth
rule' (i.e., that everything I clearly and distinctly
perceive is true) is false. The reason for this is that
Descartes believes that not only do we sometimes clearly and
distinctly perceive the truth of a certain proposition, but
sometimes we clearly and distinctly perceive the necessary
or possible truth of a proposition. 34 So, Descartes holds
the following:
(A) I clearly and distinctly perceive that it -i a
necessary that a triang l e 's three angles equal two
right angles.
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and, by the truth rule, (A) entails
(B) It is necessary that a triangle's
equal—two ri ght angles
But if UP is true, then (C) is true:
(C) It is possible that a tr i ang le's three analog Ho
not equal two right ^ngiPQ
If (C) is true, then (B) is false; and granting that (A) is
true, the entailment from (A) to (B) is false. But the
entailment from (A) to (B) is simply a substitution instance
of the truth rule. Thus, the truth rule is false, if UP is
true. This should trouble any UPer. After all, the truth
rule is the crucial epistemic principle in the Medi
a work that is primarily epistemological. If the Creation
Doctrine jeopardizes Descartes' truth rule, we must either
reject the truth rule (at too great a cost to Descartes)
,
reject the Creation Doctrine (which we cannot do because
Descartes clearly held it)
,
or reject UP as an
interpretation of the Creation Doctrine. I, of course,
believe that the last choice is the correct one. UP must be
rejected, if not for the systematic reasons Curley states,
for the reason that it does not make sense internal 1
y
IIP Problem 4: 35 The truth rule would be rendered
useless. Descartes actively employs our powers of conception
and their relation to possibility in his Sixth Meditation
argument for the real distinction between mind and body:
I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly
understand is capable of being created by God so as to
correspond exactly with my understanding of it...[0]n
the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of
myself in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended
thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of
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body , in so far as this is simply an extended, non-hinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that Iam really distinct from my body and can exist withoutit. (AT VII 7 8 ; CSM II 54) 36
From a clear and distinct perception of P, we can infer that
P is possible; that is, we have a clear and distinct
perception of our mind existing apart from body, and so we
know that there is a real distinction between them. This
argument is merely an application of the important truth
rule previously discussed. But, as Bennett correctly points
out, Descartes would be seriously understating his position
in the real distinction argument if he in fact held UP. 37
There would be no need for the truth rule in this argument
if UP is true because, if everything is possible, then not
only what I clearly and distinctly perceive is possible, but
also whatever I perceive confusedly and obscurely is
possible. We can formulate this objection as follows:
(a) If Descartes held UP, then the real distinction
argument does not require the truth rule.
(b) The real distinction argument does require the
truth rule.
(c) Therefore, it is not the case that Descartes held
UP. 38
We can see that this objection can be formulated using any
of Descartes' important arguments that rely on the truth
rule
.
Thus, there is a reason why Van den Brink calls UP 'the
extreme reading' of Descartes' Creation Doctrine. If UP is
a correct interpretation of the Creation Doctrine, then it
is a disaster for the cogito, the truth rule, a priori
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physics, the ontological argument, the argument for the real
distmtion of mind and body, and even the argument that God
is not a deceiver (after all, God would be a deceiver if he
has given us minds that are not reliable indicators of modal
truth even when we clearly and distinctly understand
something to be necessary or impossible.) 39 in other words,
almost every positive step made in the Meditations is
undermined by the Creation Doctrine if it entails UP. For
all these reasons, and another to be discussed shortly, we
should reject UP unless we are absolutely forced to it.
Limited Possibilism
The second interpretation of Descartes' Creation
Doctrine and its implications for modality, which attributes
limited possibilism' [LP] to Descartes, is primarily an
attempt to understand (3) in such a way that Descartes can
consistently hold (1) and (2)
.
That is, it acknowledges
that Descartes held that the eternal truths are necessary
even though they are freely created by God. 40 The LP thesis
is the relatively weaker thesis that for any prnposi 1 i nn P
-Lt—
i
s poss ib l e—Lhat—E
—
is possible . LPers, such as Peter
Geach41 and Edwin Curley, 42 attribute LP to Descartes
primarily on the basis of the following important passage
from the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland:
[T] he power of God cannot have any limits, and... our
mind is finite and so created as to be able to conceive
as possible the things which God has wished to be in
fact possible, but not be able to conceive as possible
things which God could have made possible, but which he
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nevertheless wished to make impossible
... And eventhough [encore qne ] God has willed that some truthsbe necessary, this does not mean that he willedem necessarily; for it is one thing to will that thevbe necessary, and quite another to will this
necessarily, or to be necessitated to will it (at tv118- 119; CSMK 235) IV
LPers take Descartes to be making an important scope
distinction here between LP1 and LP2
:
: God wills that necessarily 2+2=4
LP2 : Necessarily, God wills that 2+2=4
LP1, according to Curley (and presumably, Geach)
,
is true,
as is stated in the letter to Mesland quoted above.
However, LP2 is false, as the same passage and our earlier
discussion of divine freedom indicates. We have seen that
avoidance of any determination of God's will is one of the
primary motivations for the Creation Doctrine; so, clearly
Descartes cannot hold LP2
.
LPers take the passage from the Mesland letter to show
that Descartes' eternal truths are necessary, but they are
onlY cont ingent. 1 y necessary because it is not necessary that
God will them. As Geach states:
[the eternal truths] are necessary in our world, and in
giving us our mental endowments God gave us the right
sort of clear and distinct ideas to see the necessity.
But though they are necessary, they are not
necessarily necessary; God could have freely chosen to
make a different sort of world, in which other things
would have been necessary truths. 43
So, LP is not, like UP, a denial that there are any
necessary truths; it is a denial that the necessary eternal
truths are necessarily necessary
. This is the most
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significant advantage of LP over UP. LP interprets (3) as
entailing the relatively more congenial (4*)
:
(4*) For any eternal truth P, it is possible that not-Pis possible.
So, although LPers hold that the eternal truths are not
necessarily necessary, they do hold that they are necessary.
Thus, if Descartes' Creation Doctrine entails only LP, then
he can consistently hold both (1) and (2)
.
As Curley
states, "Descartes wants to allow that there are some
propositions which are in fact impossible, but which might
have been possible, and that others are in fact necessary,
but might, nevertheless, not have been necessary," 44 and
[TP] is consistent with holding that there are some
necessary truths, whereas [UP] denies this." 45
Although Geach was the first to suggest that Descartes'
Creation Doctrine involves LP
,
Curley is responsible for the
development of the idea and he has formulated an argument to
show that Descartes is an LPer. Curley wishes to show how
even a contingent act of willing can have a necessary truth
as its object. Let 'W' denote the two-place relation '
wills that
_', 'a' and ' p
' are variables ranging over
agents and propositions respectively, and ' g
' is a constant
referring to God. Curley's argument is as follows:
Cl
.
VaVp (Wap —
>
0~Wap)
C2 . Vp (p <-» Wgp)
C3 . P assumption
C4 . p —
>
WgDp from C2
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from ClC5 . WgDp -> O'Wgdp
C6
. O WgDp from C3
,
C4
,
C5
C? ' O Dp from principle that (p -> q)^ ( o~q
-> O-p)
C8 . Vp (Dp —» 0~Dp) from C3-C7
C9. Vp ~DOp (or equivalently, Vp OOp) fromcs.
Cl is the crucial premise in this argument. It simply
states a pxima facie commonsense view that in any genuinely
contingent act of willing it is possible that the agent
refrains from willing what they in fact willed. And C2 is
simply a statement of God's omnipotence. The rest of the
argument basically follows from those two premises. Curley
took this to show that even in the realm of contingent acts
of will, necessary truths may be the objects of those acts.
But their necessity is only contingent precisely because of
the contingency of what God in fact wills.
Before I examine the problems that plague LP as an
interpretation of Descartes' Creation Doctrine, it is
interesting to note, as both Plantinga and Curley do, that
LP is independently more plausible than UP as a general
thesis about modality regardless of whether it is correct as
an interpretation of Descartes. There are some systems of
modal logic in which ( P & 00~P) can be true. Take the
actual world @, and two other possible worlds wl and w2
. In
systems in which there is some limitation on the
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accessibility relation among worlds, Dp is true iff p i s
true at all worlds accessible to @, the actual world.
Suppose that Dp is true at @, but that only wl and itself
are accessible to @. This means that P is true at @ and wl
.
But suppose that w2 is accessible to wl but not to @. if ~p
is true at w2
,
then 0~P is true at wl; and because <X>~P
simply means that there is some world accessible to @ in
which 0~P is true and wl is accessible to @, 00~P is true
at @ even though DP is also true at @. So, as long as the
accessibility relation is intran si five
,
(dp & OO'P) can
both be true; that is, in systems like K, D, T, and B it
will work. 6 But as Curley notes, attributing this type of
reasoning to Descartes would be ridiculous and
anachronistic. Descartes did not have our notion of possible
worlds; fortiori he did not have the notion of
accessibility relations. But simply taken on its own LP has
the advantage of relative plausibility over UP.
Problems with Limited Possibilism
LP Prob lem 1 : LP seems to place unwarranted and, quite
frankly, absurd constraints on God's power. It is
reasonable to suppose that Descartes held a Thomistic view
of God's omnipotence, at least with respect to mere
necessary conditions for omnipotence.
T: God is omnipotent only if God can bring about any
broadly logically possible state of affairs.
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Evidence that Descartes held T can be found in ^
ElQctramma qnodH^rry
We should note that even though the rule 'Whatever wecan conceive of can exist ', is my own, it is true onlyso long as we are dealing with a conception which isclear and distinct, a conception which embraces thepossibility of the thing in question, since God canbring about whatever we clearly perceive to bepossible. (AT VIII 351-352; CSM I 299)
This is reiterated in the 31 December 1640 letter t o
Mersenne: "[Pjossible existence is contained in everything
which we clearly understand, because from the fact that we
clearly understand something it follows that it can be
created by God." (AT III 274; CSMK 166) If God could not
bring about a possible state of affairs, then he would not
be omnipotent. This seems to be a very plausible condition
on God's omnipotence. But if LP is true, then God would not
be omnipotent, that is, if T provides a necessary condition
for his omnipotence. Here is the reason: Take any eternal
truth P. According to LP, it—is not possible that nof-P
although it is possible that not-p is possihlp Without
looking too far beneath the surface, we may see that LP
already places restrictions on God ' s power, i . e
.
,
He cannot
will that not-P is true. However, prima facie
,
Descartes
does not think that this is an unreasonable contraint, as
the quotation from the letter to More above makes clear.
The implication of LP that there are some necessary eternal
truths makes it the case that God cannot bring about the
negation of P, despite his ability to bring about the
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So, an LPer would hold
posfi i b i 1 1 t~, y of the negation of p.
the following proposition:
LP3: For any eternal truth P, God could have made t-W
-iL—l-S
—
possible that nnt -P true
.
And God is omnipotent, so, let's suppose that He chooses to
will that ih i s poss ib l e t. h^f nor-P is true. So, according
to LP, God can perform the incredibly difficult task of
willing a necessary truth to be possibly false, but (and
here is the rub) he cannot perform the relatively simple
task of willing a possibly false proposition to be actually
false. This, of course, violates T; and it is agreed on all
hands that T is a weak condition for omnipotence. 47
LP Probl em 2 : LP also makes the Creation Doctrine
something much weaker than the doctrine Descartes actually
held. Descartes, as we have seen, held that there are no
limitations on which eternal truths God could have created.
God is responsible not only for the modal status of a
proposition but also for its actual truth value. It is LP 1 s
neglect of this consideration that leads to another
objection. Recently, James Van Cleve has argued
(successfully, according to Curley48 ) that from quite
similar reasoning and the idea that not just the modal
status but also the truth of any proposition is willed by
God, we can show that LP is reducible to UP; hence, LP is
not a genuine alternative to the extreme and implausible UP.
Van Cleve asks us to consider the following argument, which
is quite similar to Curley's LP Argument with the main
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difference being that Van Cleve substitutes V2 for Curley's
C2 :
VI
. VaVp (Wap —
>
0~Wap)
V2
. Vp (Dp 3 [p -> Wgp] )
V3
. p Assumption
V4
. p —
>
Wgp from C2 and V3
V5
. Wgp —> <0~Wgp from VI
V6 . O ~Wgp from V3-V5
V7
. o~p from V4
,
V6
V8
. Vp (Dp 3 0~p) from V3-V7
V9 . Vp ~Dp (or equivalently, Vp Op) from V8
Van Cleve strangely provides a passage from the 6 May 1630
letter to Mersenne as textual evidence for V2 : "As for the
eternal truths, I say once more that they are true or
possible only because he knows them as true or possible ... In
God willing and knowing are a single thing..." (AT I 149;
CSMK 24)
.
Although Descartes would certainly accept V2
,
this passage does not seem to suggest V2 but rather V2* and
V2 * * :
V2*: Vp (p —» Wgp)
V2**: Vp(Op —» WgOp)
So, the textual evidence for V2 is weak, what's more, V2 is
not necessary for Van Cleve
'
s
argument. He can use the more
textually-supported V2* in conjunction with an
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uncontroverial principle stating that Dp
-> p . i n any
case. Van Cleve
' s argument makes its point: the Creation
Doctrine entails UP if Curley 's Cl is true and God is the
cause of the truth of any proposition.
The Real Problem with Possibilisms
Unfortunately for LPers, LP (as an interpretation of
Descartes's Creation Doctrine), even if it can be defended
against the problems raised in the previous section, is
still plagued by the same major problem as UP (as an
interpretation of Descartes' Creation Doctrine) : Both
understand (3) to entail the possibi 1 i ty of the eternal
truths being otherwise. But the thrust of the Creation
Doctrine is that noth ing is possible prior to God's willing
it to be so. 49
Although Descartes' Creation Doctrine, as we have seen
in Chapter One, may be seen as a reaction to the late
medieval and early-modern scholastic debate concerning the
eternal truths and whether they are true independently of
God, 50 the real problem with LP and UP can be illustrated
most effectively by contrasting Descartes' Creation Doctrine
with Leibniz's view of the eternal truths and their relation
to God. Leibniz holds, just as strongly as Descartes, that
the eternal truths and the essences of creatures depend on
God. In fact, in section 44 of the Monadologv
f Leibniz goes
so far as to give an argument for the existence of God based
on the fact that the eternal truths depend on Him. However,
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an important point on which they disagree is the nature of
this dependence. Both believe in the relatively weak thesis
that the eternal truths would not be true if, pPr
impossi hi le
,
God did not exist. But Leibniz believes that
the eternal truths exist in and depend on God's
understanding but not God's will. 51
God's understanding is the realm of eternal
truths.
. .without him there would be nothing real inpossibles, and not only would nothing exist, but also
nothing would be possible.
. .However, we should notimagine, as some do, that since the eternal truthsdepend on God, they are arbitrary and depend on his
will, as Descartes appears to have held
. .
.
[N] ecessarytruths depend soley on his understanding, and are itsinternal object. 52
And in the Theodicy
,
he states
One must not say with some Scotists, that the eternal
truths would exist even though there were no
understanding, not even that of God. For it is, in myjudgment, the divine understanding which gives reality
to the eternal truths, albeit God will have no part
therein. (§184)
These very truths can have no existence without an
understanding to take cognizance of them; for they
would not exist if there were no divine understanding
wherein they are realized, so to speak. (§ 189)
As we have seen, Descartes, despite holding that the eternal
truths depend on God, cannot accept that they depend on his
understanding but not his will. The reason, as we have seen,
is that Descartes holds a version of the Doctrine of Divine
Simplicity; and hence the divine understanding and the
divine will are identical though conceptually distinct.,. So,
holding that the eternal truths are the object of God's
understanding but not his will is not an option open to
Descartes
.
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Furthermore, and more importantly for the present
discussion, Descartes, unlike Leibniz, does not allow that
anything is true prior to God's decision to make it true. 53
Take any eternal truth P willed by God to be (necessarily)
true. Descartes thinks that God could have willed not-P to
be true; that is, he does hold that (3) is true. However,
we cannot infer from (3) that not-P is possible
,
and here is
why: A prominent feature (indeed the characteristic
feature) of the Creation Doctrine is that a pmpneiMnn i G
^
—
God wi 1 1 s—i_L
—
to be—true ; and Descartes believes
that this holds equally for modal propositions (i.e.,
propositions with a modal operator)
. As he states in the 2
May 1644 letter to Mesland, we can "conceive as possible the
things which God has wished to be in fact possible,
" (AT IV
118; CSMK 235); and more explicitly in Principles I §24, he
states: "God alone is the true cause of everything which is
or. can be . " (AT VIII 14; CSM I 201, emphasis mine) God is
the cause of everything that actually or possibly exists and
of everything that is actually or possibly true. But it is
not the case that God ever willed that it is possible that
QQt-P or that i t is possible that not-P is possible . We
know Descartes believes this because he believed that the
eternal truths are willed to be (necessarily) true from
eternity, i.e., there is no time at which they are not
true. 54 So, because God never willed that it is possi bl
p
that not-P or that it .is possible that not-P is possible
,
those propositions are not true, nor were they ever true. 55
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nor LP
Thus, Descartes' Creation Doctrine entails neither UP
because to do so would require that there be true modal
propositions prior to God's creative will; and that is
clearly not allowed by the Creation Doctrine. Thus, we must
look for a way to understand (3) within the confines of the
Creation Doctrine, that is, in a way that doesn't presuppose
possibilities independent of God's will, as Leibniz does.
We can also now see that Cl in Curley's LP Argument, VI
in Van Cleve
' s Argument are false. These premises may be
true only if the domain of the quantifier is restricted to
finite created agents. But Descartes is explicit about one
of his personal motivations concerning the Creation
Doctrine: "I want people to get used to speaking of God in
a manner worthier, I think, than the common and almost
universal way of imagining him as a finite being." (AT I
146; CSMK 23 ) 56 Although finite agents may require
possibilities in order to have freedom of volition, God,
being infinite and absolutely independent of all things,
does not require this.
Understanding the 'Could' in Terms of Indifference
I understand that there may be some confusion, and it
is warranted. After all it is not obvious how we are
supposed to understand (3) without presupposing
possibilities, and yet we must have an adequate grasp of the
sense of the 'could' in (3) in order to make sense of the
Creation Doctrine. We usually think that the fact that an
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agent could have willed a states of affairs a entails that
there are possible alternatives among which is a. I admit
that this is ordinarily the case
,
57 but we cannot forget
that we are talking about God here; and as we have already
seen, divine freedom is different from human freedom for
Descartes. Descartes states the difference in a familiar
passage from the Sixth Replies:
As for the freedom of the will, the way in which it
exists in God is quite different from the way in whichit exists in us. It is self
-contradictory to suppose
that the will of God was not indifferent from eternity
with respect to everything which has happened or will
ever happen; for it is impossible to imagine that
anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good
or true
,
or worthy of belief or action or omission,
prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so.
I am not speaking here of temporal priority: I mean
that there is not even any priority of order, or
nature, or of 'rationally determined reason' f rat -j nnp
rat i oci nata ] as they call it, such that God's idea of
the good impe ll ed him to choose one thing rather than
another. For example, God did not will... that the three
angles of a triangle should be equal to two right
angles because he recognized that it could not be
otherwise, and so on. On the contrary,
. . .it is because
he willed that the three angles of a triangle should
necessarily equal two right angles that this is true
and cannot be otherwise.
. .Thus, the supreme
indifference to be found in God is the supreme
indication of his omnipotence
.
(AT VII 431-2; CSM II
291, my emphasis)
Absolute indifference (i.e., c- indifference ) is a necessary
condition of divine freedom. According to Descartes, unless
God was c- indifferent in his willing, he would have been
impe ll ed or determined (by virtue of his omniscience and
simplicity) to will exactly those things that are true
(and/or good) . 58 But Descartes thinks that the only way
God's will could be c- indifferent is if there can be nothing
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true prior to his decision to make it true. Because God, by
his very nature, would know what is true if there were
anything true independent of his will, his will would not be
c-indif ferent and hence not (divinely) free.
If we concentrate on the fact that Descartes' Creation
Doctrine is not a thesis about modality, as UPers and LPers
have thought, but rather a thesis about the dependence of
the eternal truths on God's independent and indifferent
will, we can finally see how to understand (3) in such a way
that Descartes can consistently hold (1) and (2)
.
I propose
that the following is the way that Descartes intended (3) to
be understood:
(3*) For any eternal truth P, it is not the case that
there were any independent factors preventing Godfrom willing not-P or impelling him to will p.
(3*)
,
as we have seen in the previous chapter, will be
trivially true in virtue of the fact that there is nothing
prior to or independent of God's will; a fnrHnri there is
nothing independent of God's will which would prevent or
impel him.
(3*) has the advantage that it doesn't entail anything
about the possibility (or possible possibility) of not-P.
Thus, it satisfies the Creation Doctrine constraint that
even possibilities require God's willing them to be so. But
this advantage is worthless if (3*) is not something that
Descartes actually believed. Fortunately, (3*) is supported
by strong textual evidence. In the long quotation from the
Sixth Replies above, I emphasized Descartes' statement that
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God's will cannot be impelled or determined by something
independent of his will; and it is in this lack of
determination that God's indifferent freedom consists.
Evidence for (3*) is also found in the 1630 letters to
Mersenne and the 1644 letter to Mesland, where Descartes
states that God was not necessitated nor was he determined
to will what he in fact willed. 59 Even the passages
(incorrectly) used by Frankfurt to support the UP
interpretation of the Creation Doctrine support (3*)
. For
example: " [T] he power of God cannot have any limits... God
cannot have been determi ned to make it true that
contradictories cannot be true together..." (AT IV 118; CSMK
235, my emphasis)
.
It is also clear that Descartes is concerned with
independent limits on God's willing. 60 in the Fifth
Replies, Descartes states that God can have limits sel f-
imposed by his willing certain propositions to be
necessarily true: "But just as the poets suppose that the
Fates were originally established by Jupiter, but that after
they were established he bound himself to abide by them, so
I do not think that the essences of things, and the
mathematical truths which we can know concerning them, are
independent of God." (AT VII 3 80 ; CSM II 261) Prima
this passage is in stark contrast with what Descartes states
in the 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne, and as such it may
appear to some that Descartes is being inconsistent with his
metaphors. The passage is as follows: "Indeed to say that
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these [eternal] truths are independent of God is to talk of
him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him to
the Styx and the Fates." (AT I 145; CSMK 23) In this
passage, Descartes explicitly contrasts the fact that God is
independent of all things with the fact that the gods of the
ancients were subject to independent factors. Descartes
seems to be stating that God is radically dissimilar from
Jupiter and Saturn. But what he is actually doing in these
two passages is stating that they are dissimilar in so far
as the gods of the ancients are constrained by ('subject
to') things externa ]—and independent of them; whereas in the
Fifth Replies passage quoted above, Descartes is stating
that God is similar to Jupiter in that both act in
accordance with self - imposed restrictions. This is
consistent with God's creation being absolutely indifferent,
and with the Creation Doctrine.
In addition to the textual evidence for (3*)
,
the
restrictions that the Creation Doctrine imposes on an
interpretation of (3) (e.g., that we cannot employ unwilled
possibilities in our interpretation) means that there is an
extreme scarcity of interpretive options. Because (3*) has
so much in its favor (i.e., it allows Descartes to hold both
(1) and (2), and it is well-supported by the text), and
there is no clear alternative interpretation of (3) to which
we can help ourselves, we would be wise to accept (3*) as
the correct interpretation of (3)
.
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Brief Remarks on Descartes' Modal Epis temoloov
and the Conceptual Analysis of Modality
Some people may still be confused. Descartes is saying
that there are things that God could have willed even though
these things are not possible; and this strikes us as
incomprehensible. 61 After all, we may wonder how any agent,
human or divine, could have willed something that was not-
possible
. But Descartes is quick to point out that our
inability to conceive the lack of any external limitations
on God's will should come as no surprise. In many passages,
Descartes emphasizes the incomprehensibility of God's will.
For instance, in the Sixth Replies, he states: "There is no
need to ask how God could have brought it about from
eternity that it was not true that twice four make eight,
and so on; for I admit that this is unintelligible to us.
(AT VII 436; CSM II 294) And in the 2 May 1644 letter to
Mesland, he states: " [E] ven if this be true [i.e., that God
could have willed otherwise]
,
we should not try to
comprehend it, since our nature is incapable of doing so.
"
(AT IV 118; CSMK 235) It is precisely the fact that God
created everyth i ng (except himself, of course) with absolute
indifference and without preexisting possibilities that
makes him "a being who is infinite and beyond our
grasp.
. .whose power surpasses the bounds of human
understanding." (AT I 150; CSMK 24-5) 62
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But how then does Descartes account for the fact that
we do not have epistemic access to what God could have
willed without making God out to be a deceiver? A problem
with UP is that it entails an asymmetry between what is
conceivable and what is possible; i.e.
; the range of
possibilities is much broader than the range of what is
conceivable by our finite minds. As Wilson states "[the
Creation Doctrine] seems to lead to the conclusion that God
C(“>uld have made true what we cannot comprehend as
possible." 63 This poses problems for UP because Descartes
does seem to think that (clear and distinct) conceivability
is a reliable guide to modality. 64 This is a problem for UP
but not for my interpretation of the Creation Doctrine. On
my interpretation, Descartes can certainly hold that
whatever is possible is, in principle, conceivable and vice
versa despite the truth of each of the following:
(5) God could have willed that i s true. 65
(6) Humans cannot conceive that ? + ? = i s true.
(7) Humans cannot conceive that 2+2=5 is possibly
true
.
If UP or LP is true then we encounter the problem that
conceivability ife not a reliable guide to modality because
of (6) and (7) and the fact that Upers take (5) to entail
that it is possible that 2+2=5
f and LPers take (5) to entail
that—Li—
i
s poss ible—that—2+2 = 5 is possible . However, on my
interpretation, even though (5) is true, (8) is also true:
(8) It is not possible that 2+2=5 is true.
(8) is true for the reason previously stated that (9)
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(9) It is possible that ?+?=r
was never willed by God to be true; and that is a necessary
condition for the truth of any proposition according to the
Creation Doctrine. Thus, the truth of (8) accounts for the
reason why (6) and (7) are true, despite the truth of (5)
I now return to consideration of Bennett's CAM.
According to this view, conceivability is not merely a
reliable guide to modality, as I believe Descartes held,
rather conceivability exhausts all there is to modality.
Bennett thinks that the following passage clearly shows that
Descartes held CAM:
If by possible 1 you mean what everyone commonly means,
namely 'whatever does not conflict with our human
concepts', then it is manifest that the nature of God,
as I have described it, is possible in this
sense .. .Alternatively, you may well be imagining
[ f ingi t i s ] some other kind of possibility which relates
to the object itself; but unless this matches the first
sort of possibility it can never be known by the human
intellect ... (AT VII 150; CSM II 107)
In this passage, Bennett thinks that "Descartes is treating
the 'possibility which relates to the object itself as a
contrivance, something faked up for the purposes of
argument." 66 In fact Bennett thinks that the use of
1 fingitis 1 ought to be translated, not as 'imagining' but
rather as 'inventing'. This translation does not seem
warranted without begging the question.
CAM Problem 1
:
There is a lack of strong textual
evidence. Bennett surely has the burden of proof on his
shoulders in this case. So, he has to show us that CAM is a
correct interpretation of the Creation Doctrine. But does
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this text, which Bennett claims to be the best piece of
evidence in favor of CAM, show that CAM is a correct
interpretation of the Creation Doctrine? The answer is 'no'
.
Nowhere in this text does Descartes say that all there is to
modality is conceivability or that modality simply concerns
human concepts. He merely states that this is what
everyone commonly understands
' fut vulgo omnas
.
ints ll
i
g i 1. 1 s ] by 'possible' . But there is no reason to
think that Descartes has become a champion of the vulgar
man's understanding of deep metaphysical theses.
Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, Descartes is
stating only that this vulgar notion of possibility in terms
of conceivability must be a reliable indicator of modal
truths or we would constantly be deceived in our perceptions
of modal truths. So, Bennett does not establish his
position through any strong textual evidence. 67
CAM—Problem—
2
_i If CAM is true, then modality is mind-
dependent. But Descartes explicitly denies, in the Fifth
Meditation, that it depends on his mind. (AT VII 64; CSM II
45) Bennett could reply that Descartes certainly does not
think that the necessary truth of 2 + 2=4 depends on hi s mind;
but Descartes does think that it depends on soma mind.q nr
other . Bennett's response does not help his cause. To see
this, imagine the following situation: In 1641 everyone in
the universe is annihilated by God except Descartes. (After
all, God would only to have willed (from eternity) that in
1641 his conserving power would be removed in order to
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annihilate everyone.) That is, we are stipulating that
Descartes is the only finite mind in existence. In this
case, CAM would be committed to one of the following:
CAMa: The eternal truths depend on Descartes' mind.
CAMb: There are no eternal truths.
Clearly, CAMb is ail—bon; there simply is no reason for a
CAM-supporter to assert CAMb simply on the basis that the
majority of the population is annihilated. But then we are
left with CAMa. Despite its oddness, CAMa does not directly
contradict Descartes' statement from the Fifth Meditation
(i.e.
,
that the eternal truths do not depend on his mind)
because that passage is embedded in a context quite
different from the imaginary one we are presently
considering. However, notice the absurd consequences of
CAMa: If Descartes is annihilated, then there will be no
eternal truths. That the eternal truths would be true at one
moment and not only not true at another but also non-
existent in any way simply because Descartes is annihilated,
strikes me as too great an absurdity to attribute to
Descartes. But I believe that CAM is committed to this
absurdity. Therefore, CAM, as an interpretation of
Descartes, is absurd, especially given my alternative
interpretation which makes sense of the CAM-texts without
these absurd consequences.
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CAM Prob lem 3 : Descartes believes that the eternal
truths are eternally true , but our minds are not eternal.
Excluding his use of
' eternal
' in
' eternal truths
'
Descartes has two different senses of 'eternal'. 68
x is eternal, =df x is outside of time or timeless. 69
x is eternal., =df x exists at all times. 70
Although Descartes is vague about whether the eternal truths
are eternal,, he certainly believes that they are eternal.. 71
(refs?) On the other hand, the human mind is clearly not
eternal, Nor is the human mind eternal 2 . Even supposing,
as Descartes seems to have, that a mind, once created,
exists at every time afterward, a mind has not existed since
the beginning of time. Thus, if CAM is a correct
interpretation of Descartes, he is committed to the
following: Something eternal., depends on something non-
eternal 2 . But, when we consider what 'dependence' is, the
previous statement is contradictory. Remember that
Descartes' concept of dependence is the following:
x depends on y =df . it is not possible for x to exist
without y and it is possible for y to exist without x.
But if the eternal truths are eternal.,, then there is no
time at which they are not true. But the human mind in not
eternal 2 ; hence, there is a time at which it did not exist.
So, there is a time at which the eternal truths are true end
there is no human mind. But, if the eternal truths depend on
a human mind, then there cannot be a time at which the
eternal truths are true but no human mind exists.
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Contradiction. I don't see a way out of this problem for
CAM . 72
We have seen that the fact that Descartes 1 God could
have willed otherwise with respect to the eternal truths
does not entail that the eternal truths are possibly false
or that there are other possible eternal truths. This
^li^ir^stes UP and LP from consideration as correct
interpretations of Descartes' Creation Doctrine and its
implications for modality. My interpretation of the 'could'
allows Descartes to hold two important theses, which he in
fact held; and my interpretation pays close attention to the
consideration of divine freedom as a reason for the Creation
Doctrine. Moreover, my interpretation allows Descartes to
maintain that conceivability is a reliable guide to
modality, and that God is not a deceiver, despite the fact
that we cannot conceive some of the things God could have
done. We cannot conceive them precisely because they are
not possible.
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explicitly denies that the eternal truths are 'attached toGod's essence'
,
.
(iv) so, the eternal truths cannot be ideasin the divine mind. Fine, but we get the same problem with
other things then. For instance, God wills tables and chair
and by the identity of his will and intellect, God
understands tables and chair. But this does not mean that
tables and chairs are 'attached to God's essence'
. So, the
divine-objective-being take is open to Descartes.
6faCf
. Chappell (1997) p. 113, 126-27.
69See AT VII 432; CSM II 291, AT V 193; CSMK 355, AT V
193; CSMK 355.
70See AT VII 381; CSM II 262.
71AT VII 381; CSM II 262.
72Chappell (1997) recognizes this worry. His solution
is to deny that the eternal truths are eternal 2 . Although Idisagree with Chappell on this issue, arguing against him
satisfactorily would require a detailed excursion into
Descartes' ontology, something which I don't have time to
pursue here
.
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CHAPTER 5
THE NECESSITY OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that Descartes is not
inconsistent in holding that the eternal truths are both
freely created and genuinely necessary; hence Descartes'
Creation Doctrine does not entail bizarre modal theses.
Because Descartes did hold that the eternal truths are
necessarily true, what is now needed is an account of the
necess i ty of the eternal truths; that is, Descartes needs to
provide an explanation of how an eternal truth P could be
both freely created (so, in some sense, P could have been
false) and necessarily true (so, not-possibly-false)
. Does
Descartes provide such an account? I believe that he does,
although he doesn't spend a significant amount of time
explaining the necessity of the eternal truths. As a result,
Descartes' account, as it is explici tlv stated in his
writings
,
is grossly underdeveloped and requires some
piecing together. 1 To make matters worse, scholars have
likewise been vague and brief in their treatment of the
problem
.
2
Despite the absence of a satisfactory treatment, two
interpretations of Descartes' justification or explanation
of the necessity of the eternal truths have been prominent
in the secondary literature:
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(a) The PQtent. i^ de i absolu te et
Interpretation 3 (henceforth, 'the Pnfpnt -i a
Interpretation'
)
(b) The Immutability Interpretation 4
Although I find both of these interpretations to be
admirable attempts to deal with a particularly sticky issue,
I will argue that neither is correct as an interpretation of
Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the eternal
truths
.
In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss
the Potent
.i a Interpretation. I begin with a short history
of the distinction between potent ia dei absolute pt nrdinata
(henceforth 'the distinction'). I then look at a
seventeenth-century account of the distinction found in
Spinoza's "Cogitata Metaphysica" (appendices to his Renat j
Des Cartes Pri nci
p
iorum Philosophise ) , and the manner in
which his account differs from the medieval accounts. The
reason I look at Spinoza's writings on the distinction is
that a recent commentator 5 has claimed that Spinoza is
giving a correct account of Descartes' usage of the
distinction to explain the necessity of the eternal truths.
I then discuss Descartes' alleged understanding of the
distinction and its alleged use in his explanation of the
necessity of the eternal truths. I will argue that the
Potent i a Interpretation is incorrect as an interpretation of
Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the eternal
truths for two reasons: First, there is simply no evidence
that Descartes was employing the distinction. Second, the
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Potent
. i a Interpretation is not interestingly different from
the better-supported Immutability Interpretation; as such,
it will be susceptible to the same objection I will consider
with respect to the latter. I then examine the Immutability
Interpretation, and I argue that it is not sufficient to
explain the necess i ty of the eternal truths; it merely
explains their immutability, and immutability is neither
identical with, nor does it entail, necessity. Furthermore,
if we supplement the Immutability Interpretation in such a
way that would enable it to account for the necessity of the
eternal truths, we commit Descartes to necessitarianism.
Because Descartes is not a necessitarian, the supplemented
version cannot be correct. Thus, the Immutability
Interpretation is either too weak to sufficiently and
satisfactorily account for the necessity of the eternal
truths or it is too strong insofar as it commits Descartes
to conclusions he did not hold and should not shold.
Potentia dei absoluta et ordinata
In recent years, there have been several attempts to
explain the necessity of the eternal truths in Descartes by
consideration of the well-known medieval distinction between
two ways of understanding and speaking of God's power
(henceforth, 'the distinction '). 6 The first, potentia dpi
absoluta, is God's power considered as absolute; and the
second, potentia dei ordinata f is God's power considered
with respect to the order he has established by his decree . 7
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This is the most general way of understanding the
distinction and one on which all parties will agree.
However, as we'll see, there are more specific ways of
understanding the content of the distinction, ways on which
there is some disagreement.
Those who appeal to this distinction in their
interpretation of Descartes argue that in the texts in which
Descartes states that God could have created other eternal
truths than he actual did or made the eternal truths false,
Descartes is referring to potent i a del absolute However,
in the texts in which Descartes states that the created
eternal truths are nonetheless necessary in such a way that
even God cannot falsify them, Descartes is referring to
PQ.tentia dei ordinats .
In this section, I will examine this interpretation in
detail. I will first give a brief history of the
distinction and its development and applications in the 11th
through 14th-centuries
. I will attempt to clarify the
content of the distinction and the relevant issues to which
it was applied. I will then examine Descartes' alleged use
of the distinction as an explanation of the necessity of the
eternal truths.
A Short History of the Distinction
The history I present is short, and there are many
philosophers and theologians excluded from discussion.
There are two reasons for this: First, a detailed history of
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the distinction would constitute a book by itself. 8 i
simply do not have the time or the required expertise to
write such a history. Secondly, and more importantly, I am
interested almost exclusively in the philosophical and
theological content of the distinction; that is, what the
distinction amounts to and which types of issues it is
intended to address. Thus, I will concentrate on some of
the most important philosophical and theological figures of
the eleventh century through the fourteenth century: Peter
Damian, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus
. Each of these
philosophers played a pivotal role in the development or
refinement of the distinction.
An Eleventh-Century Antecedent: Peter Damian
Although the terminology of 1 potent i a absolute Pt-
crdinata ' was not in use until the early thirteenth
century, 9 the groundwork for the distinction was
established in the eleventh century. In 1067, Peter Damian
wrote a letter to Abbot Desiderius concerning their
discussion at the Abbey of Monte Cassino. The topic of
their discussion was St. Jerome's statement that although
God is omnipotent, there are certain things that he cannot
do, for instance, restore a virgin after her fall r rnm nmnG
Peas possit, sus.citare virginem non potest post ruinam l
.
10
Damian states:
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This view... has never been able to satisfy me. For Ipay attention to what is said not to by whom it is
s
f*
ld
-
,
It: seems to° much a dishonor that an inability
should be ascribed to him who can do all things. 11
Desiderius shared Damian's concern about attributing an
inability to God, and thus attempted to understand the fact
that there are things God cannot do without attributing an
inability to God. Desiderius thus held that we should
understand God's power only as the ability to do what he
wills. That is:
PI: God is able to F = df God wills to F.
and
P2 : God is unable to F = df God does not will to F
In this way, Desiderius can say that there are things that
God cannot do but not because of an inability in God. So,
any statement, in which an apparent inability is predicated
of God, should be understood as predicating a lack of
volition on God's part, not an inability.
Damian's response to Desiderius is the foundation of
the distinction which would later be more fully developed
concerning potentia absoluta et ordinal
. He agrees with
Desiderius that an attribution of any i nahi 1 i ty to God is
false. However, he objects to Desiderius' characterization
of God's power as co-extensive with his volition. Surely,
Damian points out, God's volition does not exhaust his
capacity, ability, or power; there are many things which
though, God does not will them, God could have willed
them. 12 As Damian states:
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To this [i.e., P2 ] I say, if God can do nothing he doesnot want to, but he does nothing except what he wantstherefore he can do nothing at all that he does notdo. .. It
_ follows therefore, that whatever God does notdo, he is altogether incapable of doing. r segni tnr-
ergo ut qujcqu i d D.eus non facit,—facere omnino nnn
possit.]
According to Damian, if Desiderius' position, as expressed
by PI and P2 is true, then it follows that P3 is true:
P3 : God cannot do anything except what he wills to do.
Damian found P3 to be absurd and blasphemous. Surely, there
are alternatives possible to God, even if they are not
actualized. 14 As Courtenay states: "God can do more than he
actually wills to do; divine capacity exceeds divine
volition." 15 So, the lesson to be learned from Damian's
discussion of divine power is that there are possibilities
open to God's power despite the fact that God chooses not to
will them. God can do more than he does, and he can do other
than he does.
In Damian's letter, we see an early sketch of one of
the fundamental features of the distinction as it is
developed and used in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries: We can consider God's power in abstraction from
his will (or his actual willing), in itself, and considered
this way, there are things which God could do though he does
not will to do them. That is, there are other ways God
could have created the world and the truths concerning it
.
The distinction will later be employed to explain the
contingency of the created order; and we get more than a
hint of this in Damian: God's creative will is not
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determined to will what it does will. Thus, as early as the
eleventh century, philosophers were laying the foundation
for the yet unnamed distinction in order to address the
lssue utrum Peus nos,sit facsr-e qi:ae non fanh 16
The Distinc tion in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
:
Aquinas and Scotus " " ~
The thirteenth century saw the increasing development
and refinement of the distinction
.
17 In the latter half of
the century, the distinction found a fully developed
formulation in St. Thomas Aquinas. In an article in the
Summa Theologian
,
not suprisingly titled, " TJtrnm Hpur
£acere—
—
non—f ac i t
,
"
8 Aquinas addresses the same issue
that concerned Damian and Desiderius two centuries earlier:
Can God do what he does not actually do? And, if there is a
sense in which he cannot, what is this sense? Aquinas
states
What is attributed to his power considered in itself
[secundum cons i rieratae se ] , God is said to be able to
do with his potentia absol nta
. And this
covers ... everything in which an aspect of being can be
salvaged [cmne illud in quo potest salvari ratio
ent i s ] . As for what lies within his power as
carrying out the command of his just will, he is said
to be able to do it by his potentia ordinate
. (ST la
25.5, res )
From this passage, we can see that there are several factors
involved in Aquinas' account of the distinction. The first
concerns the manner in which potentia absolute is to be
understood, namely as God's power considered in itself, in
abstraction from other 'features' of his nature and his
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actual decrees. Thus, we can attribute the following to
Aquinas :
A1
''
i^itself
^ 1 abS°luta =« God ' s P™er considered
However, we may also understand the distinction in terms of
the oaope of patent i a absolute and potent^ nHinv,
Potent
. i a de
.i absolute
, according to Aquinas, extends to
'everything in which an aspect of being can be salvaged',
i.e., it extends to everything possible, where "something is
judged to be possible ... from the implication of the terms
Chab i tudine terminornm ]
:
possible when the predicate is
compatible with the subject." (ST la 25.3) 19 Thus
A2 : God can do x de potent i a iff x i spossible
.
Thus, Aquinas' use of the distinction also emphasizes non-
necessity of the created order: it was initially open to God
to will any possible order.
Aquinas' understanding of potent i a orriinata
,
on the
other hand, emphasizes both God's actual decrees and his
nature. The feature of God's nature that is most relevant,
though it goes unmentioned in the passage from ST 25.5, is
God’s immutability. As Aquinas states elsewhere: " [0]
n
the
supposition that he does will a thing it cannot be unwilled,
since his will cannot be changed." (ST la 19.3. res ) 20 if
God were not immutable, then there would be nothing
preventing him from acting contrary to his decrees; and
hence the scope of his potentia ordinata would be the same
as the scope of his potentia absolute
. But I take it that
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the point of the distinction, as it is employed by Aquinas
m ST 25.5, is to allow a sense in which there are some
things that God could do de potentia but not de
potentia ordineta . That is, the scope of the former is
greater than the scope of the latter. Thus,
A3: God does x da potentia ordinal iff (f) x is
consistent with God's actual decrees and (ii) x is
consistent with God's nature. 21
For instance, initially it was open to God to will any
possible state of affairs da patent i a absolute And he
atill could will any possible state of affairs de P nt- PnH^
abso luta . However, suppose that God has willed that state
affairs S obtains (and thus that a proposition P is
true)
. On the supposition that God wills S (and that P)
,
and that God is immutable, he cannot de potentia ordinate
will that S does not obtain (and that P is false)
. As
Aquinas states:
[W] hatever God could [do] he can [do], for his power is
not decreased, as neither is his essence. But he
cannot now not will what he is posited as having
willed, because his will cannot be changed. (SCG I 83)
Thus, we can see that Aquinas
' use of the distinction
emphasizes two important things: First, there is almost a
total lack of determination of God's potentia absnlnfa - God
could have willed anything possible, and as such, there is a
sense in which God could have willed other than he in fact
has. Second, there is a sense in which God cannot will
anything other than he in fact has, when we consider his
potentia ordinata, which takes into consideration his
immutability
.
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Although Scotus uses the distinction to address some of the
same issues as Aquinas, his understanding_of the distinction
differs from Aquinas' in at least four ways. The first is
that Scotus explicitly applies the distinction to any moral
agent - divine or human. 22 The second difference is that
Scotus employs analogies from the law and the legal terms
de facto ' and ' de jure ' to describe potent i a absnlnt-a and
potent ia ordinate
., respectively. He states:
In every agent that acts by intellect and will and is
able to act in conformity with the right law and
nevertheless does not necessarily act in conformity
with the right law, potentia ordinate must be
distinguished from potentia absolute The reason is
that it can act in conformity with the right law, and
then it acts according to its potentia ordinatn (for itis ordered insofar as it is a principle of carrying out
some things in conformity with the right law) and it
can act outside that law or contrary to it, and in this
there is potent, i a—absol u ta that exceeds potent i n
ordinata . Therefore, not only in God but in every free
agent which can act according to the dictates of the
right law and outside such a law or contrary to it -
potent l a—ord inata—e_t
—
absol n ta must be distinguished.
Therefore, the jurists say that someone can to this de
daoLto -i.e., with respect to potentia absolute - or da
~ i.e., with respect to power ordered according to
the law. 23
Like Aquinas, he holds that God's potentia absolute is
simply his ability to will anything short of a
contradiction. As Scotus states: "For God can do anything
that does not include a contradiction or act in any way that
does not include a contradiction...; and then he is said to
be acting according to his potentia absolute .
"
24 Thus,
Scotus also holds A2 . That is, potentia absolute extends to
everything in which there is non, repugnantia terminorum .
The third difference is that, unlike Aquinas, who holds
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that God, by his potentia absolute, can will any possible
state of affairs or set of states of affairs, Scotus states
that God's potent .i a ord inata is his power to do whatever is
consistent with the genera] laws instituted by divine
decree. As such, this power extends to acts directly
prescribed by the laws and also to acts not contrary to the
laws . 25
The fourth and most glaring difference between Aquinas
and Scotus on the distinction is the role played by God's
immutability. Aquinas thinks that God's immutability
guarantees that God's actual decrees will never be violated,
not even by God; thus, immutability restricts the scope of
God's potent i a ordinata . However, Scotus does not seem to
consider God's immutability to be important with respect to
his laws/decrees. In fact, for Scotus there is a sense in
which God's potentia absolute is the same as his potent i
a
ordinata
.
26 The potentia absolute of a finite agent, who is
not a lawgiver, is her ability to act contrary to the law;
as such there are inordinate acts available to such an agent
de potentia absoluta but not de potentia ordinata . However,
Scotus believes that in the case of a lawgiver, especially
the divine lawgiver, the scope of his potentia absoluta is
the same as his potentia ordinata at a time. He believes
this because it is impossible for a lawgiver to act contrary
to the laws. As Marilyn Adams states, "Scotus has in mind
the principle of Roman law according to which illegal action
is impossible for the absolute ruler ." 27 By 'acting
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contrary to the law-, the lawgiver would thereby establish a
new law. That is, the lawgiver can change the laws so that
any action they perform is in accordance with the law.
This might seem strange to someone like Aquinas for
whom the scope of God's potent i a absoluta is not the same as
the scope of his pot ent i a ord i nata because God is immutable
and cannot change his decrees ex post fartn But, for
Scotus, God never anta de potent ia absoln^ but not da
potent i a ordinata because he can change the laws so that his
actions are in accordance with them. 28 So, for any possible
action a, if God were to do a, a would be done de pnfpnt-ia
ordinata . The following texts from Scotus illustrate this
line of thought:
For example, [God] established that no one should be
glorified unless he first receives grace. When [God's]
action is ordered according to this law, he acts
according to his potent i a—ordinata
. And he cannot act
otherwise except by ordaining and establishing another
l aw - wh i ch he—can do, since he contingently willed
that every sinner should be damned. Thus by doing the
contrary, he establishes another law, according to
which he acts in an orderly fashion
.
29
[W] hen the law and the rightness of the law are within
the power of the agent is such a way that it is right
only because it is established; then the agent can, by
its liberty, ordain otherwise than the right law says.
Nevertheless it is consistent with this that it acts in
an orderly fashion, since it can establish another
right law according to which it acts in an orderly
fashion
.
30
And in that case its potentia absoluta does not
absolutely exceed its potentia ordinata
. since it would
be ordered according to another law, just as according
to the earlier law. Nevertheless, it exceeds the
potentia ordinata precisely according to the earlier
law, against which or outside which it produces . 31
Thus, according to Scotus,
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The scope of God's potent
, i a absolute would exceed thescope of his potent i a ordinate iff (i) there is a time
t at which there is a right law L and an action a
which is not in accordance with L, (ii) there is
another time t* at which there is a right law L* (where
L^L*) and an action a which is in accordance with L*
,
( iii ) does a at t*, and (iv) God's doing a is
considered relative to L and t.
Only with respect to a different law would God's pnfpnti,
abso lute exceed his potentia ordinate. What is clear is that
immutability does not play a role in differentiating between
potent i a dei—absoluta et ordinata
.
32
We must be careful to remember, as Ockham has warned,
that the distinction is not between two distinct powers in
God (that would be to deny his simplicity)
,
but rather
between two different ways of considering God's power. As
Ockham states:
This distinction should not be understood to mean that
in God there are really two powers, one of which is
ordained and the other of which is absolute. For with
respect to things outside himself there is in God a
single power, which in every way is God himself
.
33
So, when we say that the scope of God's potentia absoluta is
greater than that of his potentia ordinata we are saying
something like the following: if there were a being as
powerful as God but who lacked the other 'features' of God's
nature (for instance, his immutability)
,
the scope of his
potentia absolute could be the same as the scope of his
potentia ordinata . However, when we consider God's nature
and not merely his power in abstraction, we see that even
though God has the power or capacity to change a truth, he
162
cannot because of his immutability. God cannot do these
things because they are incompatible with his essential
perfection
.
Distinction in the Seventeenth Century; Spinoza
Four centuries later, Spinoza discussed the distinction
in his Cog i tata—Metaphysics . 34 He states:
We thus divide God's power into ordinate and ab.gnliva
We speak of abso l ut. a
—potent i a de 1 when we consider his
omnipotence without attending to his decree; his
[potent i a l ondina t
a
,
when we regard his decrees. (CM II
9 )
first glance, Spinoza's understanding of the distinction
is not interestingly different from Aquinas' and Scotus
'
understanding. However, Spinoza is quick to point out in
another passage that his take on the distinction is
different from the philosophers of the middle ages, and that
"although we want to retain the same distinction in God's
power as is commonly adopted by philosophers, we are
nevertheless constrained to expound it in a different way."
(CM II 9) Where Aquinas and Scotus restrict potential Hpi
abso luta to what is absolutely possible, Spinoza claims that
this account is false and impious:
[F] or many speak of [God's power] without proper piety
and not according to truth. They say that ... some things
are possible, some things impossible, and some things
necessary, and that God's omnipotence [i.e., his
potentia absol uta l is concerned only with the possible
[Deique omnipotentiam tantum circa possibilia locum
habere 1 . We, however, who have already shown that all
things depend absolutely on God's decree, say that
God is omnipotent. (CM II 9)
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On the version of the distinction presented by Spinoza,
patent i a de i absolute is not restricted to the realm of the
absolute possibles; but rather, because even the essences of
things (and hence, the necessary truths concerning them)
depend on his decree, there is nothing God cannot do do
potent ia ahsnln^ 36
Despite this difference between Spinoza and the
medievals, Spinoza's presentation of the distinction shares
several features with some medieval accounts. First,
Spinoza joins Aquinas in holding that potentia dei ahaoln^
is God's power considered in abstraction from his decrees
and other features of his nature, in particular, his
immutability. This is clear in the following passage:
But having understood that he has decreed some thingsfrom the mere freedom of his will [i.e., de potent -i
^
abso l nt. a ] , and then that he is immutable, we say now
that he cannot act against his own decrees, and that
this is impossible simply because it is opposed to theperfection of God. (CM II 9, my gloss)
That is, potent
.i a—de i—absolute is God's power considered
apart from his immutability, and in this sense, there is
nothing that God cannot will. However, on the
supposition, 37 that God wills certain things to obtain, he
cannot de potentia ordinate act contrary to his will or
change his will; hence there are things that God can do de
potent ia absoluta which he cannot do de potent-is ordinste
However, as I have already mentioned, it is not that this is
true because there are two distinct powers in God; nor is it
true because God's potentia ordinate is a diminished version
of his potentia absolute. Rather, it is because of our
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consideration of his power with respect to other essential
features of his nature, such as his immutability.
Once again, we see that the same issues are addressed
in Spinoza *s presentation of the distinction: (i) There is a
lack of any determination of God's potent i a a h«ni„i- a
. God
could have willed anything, so, a. fortiori
r
God could have
willed other than he in fact has. (ii) But there is a
sense in which God cannot will anything other than he in
fact has, when we consider his potentia nrdinata 36
Descartes' Alleged Use of the Distinction
Descartes
' Creation Doctrine may be seen as a response
to two different, though closely related, questions
inherited from his medieval predecessors: 'What is the
relationship between God and the eternal truths?' and 'Could
God have willed things other than those he actually
willed?'. We have already seen Descartes' answer to the
first inherited question: The relationship is one of causal
dependence of the eternal truths on God's indifferent will.
The answer to the second question, according to those who
hold the Potentia Interpretation, is 'yes and no' : 'Yes,
'
if we consider potentia dei absolute
; 'no', if we consider
potent i a de i—ordinata • What is of particular interest to
Descartes is the question whether God could have willed that
the eternal truths are false, even though they are
necessarily true.
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Although an important issue to be addressed is whether
Descartes in fact
, employs the distinction at all in his
explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths, it is
quite likely that he would have been familiar with the
distinction. The author (s) of the Second Objections and the
authors of the Sixth Objections brought the distinction to
Descartes' attention. 39 The Jesuit Coimbrans wrote of the
distinction in a traditional manner, and Descartes was
familiar with their commentaries. 40 Moreover, Suarez, with
whom we know Descartes was familiar, 41 wrote of the
i nct ion in Di sputat ion—XXX and in Tract at ns de T.pg-ihiip
—dao—
l
egislators (1612) , 42 Moreover, in one text,
Descartes makes reference to potentia absolnta (at VII 154;
CSM II 109) So, there is reason to think that Descartes was
familiar with the distinction.
In a recent article, James Petrik has given the most
fully developed interpretation of Descartes' explanation of
the necessity of the eternal truths in terms of the
distinction. 43 Petrik understandably notices that the
tension in Descartes' Creation Doctrine concerns whether God
could have created a world in which the eternal truths that
actually obtain do not obtain. More precisely, he attempts
to understand how Descartes reconciles the following two
theses
:
Thesis of the Transworld Validity of the Eternal Truths
[TTV]
:
The eternal truths would obtain in any world
that God created.
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Thesis of Divine Indifference [TDI ] : God could have
created different eternal truths than the ones he infact created.
In effect, he has the same concern that I do; that is, how
can Descartes hold both that the eternal truths are freely
created and yet genuinely necessary; and what is Descartes'
explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths given
that they are freely created. Petrik claims that TTV and
TDI can be reconciled with one another if one approaches
them with Descartes' version of the Medieval distinction
between potentia ordinal-, a and potentia ahsnlm-a " 44
Petrik 's interpretation, he claims, has its source in
Spinoza's Coaitata Metaphysics
,
texts we've already
discussed. The issue of whether Spinoza is actually
interpreting Descartes, stating his own theses, or doing
something else in the texts on which Petrik 's interpretation
relies will be discussed shortly.
One thing is clear, however. If Descartes is employing
the distinction, he does so with a different understanding
of what the distinction amounts to from Aquinas and Scotus
.
These philosophers, as we have seen, held A2
:
A2 : God can do x by his potentia absoluta iff x is
possible
.
However, as we've seen in earlier chapters, Descartes holds
that even something's modal status depends on God's will.
Thus, there are no possibles independent of God's will. 45
So, Descartes would have to understand the scope of potent i
a
dei absoluta as Spinoza has stated:
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DP. There is nothing that God cannot do de nntent-ia
absolute . h ^
Despite the differences between DP and A1
, Descartes' DP
follows the scholastic tradition insofar as it emphasizes
the lack of determination in God's will. This is crucial to
the Creation Doctrine, as we've seen previous chapters. It
goes even further, however, in not restricting notPut-i* Hoj
absolute to what is possible. 46
However, there is every reason to think that if
Descartes is implicitly using the distinction, he does so
with a partly-thomistic understanding of pntpnt-is Hp-i
ordinata
, emphasizing God's actual decrees and immutability,
as given by A3; and with a partly- scot istic understanding,
emphasizing God's role as lawgiver/king. As Descartes
states
:
It will be said that if God had established these
truths he could change them as a king changes his laws.
To this the answer is: Yes he can, if his will can
change. 'But I understand them [i.e., the eternal
truths] to be eternal and immutable. ' - I make the samejudgement about God. (AT I 145-146; CSMK 23)
And in the Conversation with Burman
,
he states:
Concerning the decrees of God which have already been
enacted, it is clear that God is immutable with regard
to these, and, from the metaphysical point of view, it
is impossible to conceive of the matter otherwise. (AT
V 166; CSMK 348)
So, although initially there is nothing God cannot do de
potent i a—absoluta
,
given that he makes certain decrees and
that he is immutable, he cannot change his decrees de
potentia ordinata .
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So, how is the distinction put to use by Descartes in
order to reconcile TTV and TDI ? Petrik believes that the
way to reconcile TTV and TDI is by noticing that in the
passages in which Descartes is presenting TTV and
emphasizing the necessity of the eternal truths, Descartes
is considering potent i a de i ordinata . And in the passages
in which he is presenting TDI and emphasizing the lack of
determination in God's indifferent will, Descartes is
considering potentia dei absolute Thus, our (1) and (2)
would be understood as follows:
(1*) The eternal truths are freely created by God de
potentia absoluta .
(2*) The eternal truths are necessary via God's
potentia ordinata .
As Petrik states
:
When we attend to the fact that the eternal truths are
dependent upon God's indifferent will, and we set aside
the actual decrees that God has enacted, we are
considering God's power absolutely. From this
standpoint we can say that God was not necessitated to
create our eternal truths and that he could have done
otherwise. When we attend, on the other hand, to the
order that God has in fact decreed, and we attend to
the that God is immutable, then we are considering
God's power as ordained. From this standpoint we can
say that the eternal truths will never be violated,
even by God. 47
Margaret Osier reiterates this line of thought:
Descartes' argument reflects the traditional discourse
about the absolute and ordained power of God. By his
absolute power, God freely created the eternal truths,
just as he freely created the other creatures... [but]
his own nature prevents him from changing what he once
created freely. 48
Blake Dutton also argues along these lines:
[A] lthough God's will is free and indifferent, it is
also immutable and cannot change with respect to that
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which it has ordained ... And so, even though it was not
within God's power when considered in rplvinn t-n hie
ordinat i on to have created world in which the truths
which hold in this world do not hold, it was perfectly
1 1 within that power to have done so when rnnsi
H
ptpH
in itself . 49
Thus, if Petrik's Potent ia Interpretation is correct,
Descartes can have his freely-created necessary truths.
Problems with the Potentia Interpretation
In order to see what is wrong with the Potent i
e
Interpretation, let us review what it has in its favor.
First, it is reasonable to think that Descartes was familiar
with the distinction. Second, There are texts (AT I 145-146;
CSMK 23, AT V 166; CSMK 348) in which Descartes seems to
discuss something like the distinction, despite not
mentioning the distinction explicitly. Third, a very smart
person, Spinoza, presents the Potentia Interpretation as the
correct way to understand Descartes' explanation of the
necessity of the eternal truths.
Now that we have the 'evidence' in favor of the
Potentia Interpretation laid out in front of us, we can see
just how weak the case for this interpretation really is.
Against the first considertation, we must notice that the
fact that Descartes was familiar with the distinction does
not entail anything about whether he employed the
distinction. After all, there are many things with which
Descartes was familiar, which he did not employ in any
capacity (final causes in physics, for instance).
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The second consideration is rather weak as well, if
Descartes were employing the distinction, why doesn't he
state that he is? In fact, the only text in which Descartes
mentions potent. i a—abso lute is not a text concerning the
eternal truths (AT VII 154; CSM II 109). So, there is no
direct textual evidence for the Potent i a Interpretation.
Petrik anticipates this objection, and answers that the
reason Descartes does not explicitly mention the distinction
in his explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths is
that he understood the distinction in a different manner
from his scholastic predecessors; hence, any mention of the
terminology of distinction would be liable to mislead his
contemporary readers. Petrik 's reply would perhaps be
convincing if we did not know that Descartes was not bashful
about borrowing other scholastic terminology and putting his
own spin on them. Moreover, given that Descartes actively
sought the approval of the seventeenth-century Schoolmen, it
is particularly strange that he did not employ their
language, especially when such an opportunity presented
itself. The bottom line is that Petrik' s reply is not
convincing
.
The third consideration, is perhaps the weakest of the
three. If the reason to attribute the distinction to
Descartes is that Spinoza discusses the distinction in the
Cogitata Metaphysics , then we should not feel confident
about attributing it to Descartes. It simply is not clear
that Spinoza is stating or interpreting Descartes' positions
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ln the CoglLaLa. Met. aphyaica . Although there are places in
this work in which Spinoza presents ideas which are clearly
not his own and which may properly be attributed to
Descartes, there are just as many passages in which Spinoza
presents clearly Spinozistic and decidedly un-cartesian
ideas. In fact, in the paragraph preceeding Spinoza's
discussion of potent i a dei absolut a et ordinate
, Spinoza
states a paradigmat ically Spinozistic thesis about modality:
For if men clearly understood the whole order of nature
[totem ord i nem naturae ] , they would find all things to
be equally necessary as are the things treated in
mathematics. But because this is beyond the reach of
human knowledge, certain things are judged by us as
possible and not as necessary. (CM II 9) 50
So, we should not put much weight in the idea that Spinoza's
Cog i tata Metaphys i ca are interpretations of Descartes. 51
Even granting that Spinoza is interpretating Descartes does
not guarantee that his interpretation is correct. Yes,
Spinoza is smart, but he is not infallible.
Now that we have seen the lack of evidence in favor of
the Potentia Interpretation, we can consider the uselessness
of this interpretation. The Potentia Interpretation
'reduces' to, what I call, 'the Immutability
Interpretation'
. To see this, we simply need to ask whether
there is anything in the Potentia Interpretation with
explanatory value concerning the necessity of the eternal
truths, besides consideration of God's immutability. The
answer is 'no'. The reason why God cannot change the truths
he has established is not something 'in' the truths. It is
only God's immutability that prevents any change in his
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s cannot be
decrees; and it is the fact that God's decree
changed (even by God)
,
that gives support to the Pnt-pnf j a
Interpretation as an interpretation of Descartes on the
necessity of the eternal truths
.
52 Moreover, as I have just
mentioned the texts that allegedly support the Pnfpnt- -i a
Interpretation never mention the distinction; they appeal
exclusively to God's immutability.
Therefore, because of the lack of any compelling
evidence in favor of the Potent i a Interpretation, and the
fact that it is God's immutability that does all the work in
the Potent i a Interpretation and the fact that the
Immutability Interpretation is much simpler than the
Potent i a—Interpretation (as we'll see)
,
we should see what
can be said in favor of the Immutability Interpretation.
The Immutability Interpretation
According to the Immutability Interpretation, the
eternal truths are necessarily true because they are willed
by God's immutable will. Before we examine the role
,
if
any, that God's immutability actually plays in Descartes'
explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths, it will
be helpful to have a working account of what God's
immutability is. To be immutable is not merely to be
unchanging, but rather to be unable to change. That is:
II: x is immutable iff x is essentially unchanging 53
We must, however, recognize that there are irrelevant
extrinsic and relational properties that a thing may acquire
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or lose without any rea l change in the thing; that is, there
are so-called 'Cambridge changes' that something may undergo
without thereby being mutable. For example if x is five
feet tall at t and x is five foot five at some later time
t', then x has really changed; but if x is not an uncle at t
and x is an uncle at some later time t', then x has not
really changed in virtue of acquiring this property. The
idea is that there are some properties which are, to use
Edward Wierenga
' s and Nicholas Wolterstorf f
' s term, 'change-
^ ^van t , and others which are not
.
54 According to
Wierenga, this distinction has roots in Anselm, and there is
an intuitive sense of which properties are change-relevant
and which are not
. As Anselm states
:
Suppose that there are some accidents which, when taken
on by a substance, do not entail any change in that
substance. Being subject to such accidents would not
negate the immutability of a nature. We may indeed
divide all accidents into two kinds. There are those
whose presence or absence implies some change in the
subject: e.g. all colors. Others cause no change in
that of which they are predicated: e.g. some relations.
Take someone who is going to be born next year. At the
moment I am not taller than him, or smaller than him;
nor the same height as, or lose, all these relations,
without my changing at all, insofar as he grows and
changes through different qualities. Some accidents,
then, bring mutability with them in some respect. And
other accidents do not take away immutability in any
respect whatsoever
.
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Despite the difficulty in providing a precise, non-question-
begging definition of a change-relevant property, we have a
good enough intuitive sense of what it is. For example,
intrinsic properties such as being red and be i ng s i x feet
ball are change - relevant ; and relational properties such as
being an uncle and being worshipped by Saint Paul are
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change- irrelevant. “ with an intuitive sense of the
distinction between change-relevant and change-irrelevant
properties, Wierenga proposes the following analysis of
be ing unchanging
:
12: X is unchanging iff there are no times t, and tand change-relevant property P such that x has "p
at t
x
and x lacks P at t 2 . 57
And immutability, according to II, is the property of being
essential] y unchanging.
Although Descartes does not give an account of
immutability, there is no reason to think that he held a
different account of immutability from that given by 11
. in
fact, Descartes' God would trivially satisfy 12 in virtue of
being either simple or eternal (in Boethius' and Aquinas'
sense of
' eternal
'
) . Descartes
' God is eternal in the
relevant sense, and he is simple. Hence he would satisfy
Those who hold the Immutability Interpretation do so
ly on the basis of one passage from Descartes'
correspondence, and to a lesser degree, passages from the
Conversat ion with Burman
,
the same texts used to support the
t ent i a Interpretation. I quote them again to refresh our
memories
:
It will be said that if God had established these
truths
_
[i.e., the eternal truths] he could change them
as a king changes his laws
. To this the answer is
:
Yes, he can, if his will can change. 'But I understand
them to be eternal and immutable . ' - I make the same
judgement about God. 'But his will is free.' Yes, but
his power is incomprehensible. (AT I 145-146; CSMK 23)
Concerning the decrees of God which have already been
enacted, it is clear that God is immutable with respect
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to these, and from the metaphysical point of view it
V
S
166 ;°?!mK 348)
°°nCeiVe “tter °th«wise. (AT
On the basis of these passages, Edwin Curley has stated that
"[God's] creation of them [i.e., the eternal truths] is a
genuine act of will (not necessitated)
,
and yet it does
provide a foundation of their necessity, because his will is
immutable." 59 That is, God is free with respect to the
creation of the eternal truths, but, given that he creates
them, the immutability of his will explains why they are
necessary. This line of thought has been reiterated by
Stephen Menn, Steven Nadler, 61 and Margaret Osier. 62
Additional evidence for the Immutability Interpretation
is given by those scholars who understand Descartes' laws of
nature, discussed in the Principles ^nd The Wnrl
H
to be
eternal truths. After all, Descartes' foundation for these
laws is God's immutability; 63 as he states: "it is that
these two rules [i.e., laws of nature] follow manifestly
from the mere fact that God is immutable and that, acting
always in the same way, he always produces the same effect."
(AT XI 43; CSM I 96) So, if the laws of nature are eternal
truths, and laws of nature are explained by God's
immutability, then it is prima facie reasonable to think
that God's immutability is sufficient to explain the
necessity of the eternal truths.
Although few scholars attempt to offer a real argument
for the Immutability Interpretation based on the passages
from the 15 April 1630 letter to Mersenne and the
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CQversat
. iQn with Burman
,
64
we can attempt one here. I offer
Argument 1 as a first
-shot.
Argument 1
1. God wills the eternal truths.
2. God's will is immutable.
3. Therefore, the eternal truths are immutable.
As it stands, it isn't clear that the conclusion of Argument
1 follows from the premises. What is needed is a principle,
not exp li c i tl
y
stated by Descartes, establishing that there
is a transfer of immutability from God's will to its effect.
Transfer of Immutability Principle: For any x, if x is
willed by an omnipotent and immutable will, then x is
immutable
.
65
Descartes seems to advocate the Transfer of Immutability
Principle in The World: "God is immutable and always acting
in the same way, he always produces the same effect." (AT XI
43/ CSM I 96 ) 66 And in the Principl es
,
he states: "For we
understand that God's perfection involves not only his being
immutable in himself, but also his operating in a manner
that is always utterly constant and immutable." (AT VIII 61)
I grant that this textual evidence is not particularly
compelling. However, because the Immutability
Interpretation requires the Transfer of Immutability
Principle to get off the ground, we should grant it simply
to see how far it can take the interpretation.
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Inserting the Transfer of Immutability Principle into
Argument 1, we get Argument 1*:
Argument 1*
1. God wills the eternal truths.
2. God's will is immutable.
3. For any x, if x is willed by an omnipotent and
immutable will, then x is immutable.
4. Therefore, the eternal truths are immutable.
Descartes, as the passages quoted above make clear, held
premise 2. Likewise, Premise 1 is something that Descartes
held; in fact it is merely a concise statement of the
Creation Doctrine. 67 So far, we have a very cartesian
argument grounded firmly in Descartes' texts. However, we
should notice that Argument 1* doesn't establish the
necessity of the eternal truths; it only establishes their
immutability . 68 And, by Descartes' time, several
philosophers, including Robert Grosseteste, Ockham, and Duns
Scotus, had established that something can be immutable
without also being necessary (although whatever is necessary
is also immutable)
. So, if supporters of the Immutability
Interpretation wish to establish their conclusion (i.e.,
that God's immutability explains the necessity of the
eternal truths)
,
Argument 1* needs to be supplemented by
another principle.
Immutability-Necessity Principle: For any x, if x is
immutable, then x is necessary.
Adding the Immutability-Necessity Principle to Argument 1*,
we get the desired conclusion that the eternal truths are
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necessary. However, we should be apprehensive about
attributing the Immutability-Necessity Principle to
Descartes
.
Providence and Contingency: A Problem for the
Immutability Interpretation
If Descartes did hold the Immutability-Necessity
Principle and the Transfer of Immutability Principle, he
would be committed to disastrous consequences. One of the
things that a theory of modality should provide is an
account of the difference between necessary truths and
contingent truths. Despite the fact that Descartes rarely
uses the term 'contingent', 69 it is clear that he believed
that there are some propositions that, while true, are not
necessarily so, i.e., they are contingent. For example, the
propositions that Descartes had a body, that the wax smells
like flowers, etc., are contingent for Descartes. But
Descartes holds that not only eternal truths, but ail
things
,
including contingent truths, are the effect of God's
immutable will. As Descartes states: "if God exists, it is a
contradiction that anything else should exist which was not
created by him." (AT VII 188; CSM II 132) 70 And in the 6
October 1645 letter to Elizabeth, he states:
[A] 11 the reasons that prove that God exists and is the
first and immutable cause of all effects that do not
depend on human free will prove similarly, I think,
that he is also the cause of all the effects that do so
depend. . .and he would not be supremely perfect if
anything could happen in the world without coming
entirely from him. (AT IV 314) 71
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Thus, from a premise stating that God wills contingent
truths, we get, via the Transfer of Immutability Principle,
the conclusion that contingent truths are immutable. And via
the Immutability-Necessity Principle, we get the further
conclusion that contingent truths are necessary. This
should strike us as problematic because Descartes clearly
wishes to distinguish eternal truths from contingent truths.
Descartes' discussion of providence and petitionary
prayer is relevant here. In the 6 October 1645 letter to
Elizabeth, Descartes states
When your highness speaks of the particular providence
°f .God as being the foundation of theology, I do notthink that you have in mind some change in God'sdecrees occasioned by actions that depend on our free
will. No such change is theologically tenable; and
when we are told to pray to God, that is not so that we
should inform him of our needs, or that we should try
to get him to change anything in the order established
from
_
al 1—
e
tern i ty bv his provident
. .but simply to
obtain whatever he has,—from all eternity, willed to
obta ined—by our—prayers . (AT IV 315-16, my emphasis)
In the Conversat i on—with—Burman
,
he reiterates this line of
thought
:
[W]
e
have to say that God is indeed quite immutable,
and that he has decreed from eternity either to grant
me a particular request or not to grant it. Coupled
with this decree, however, he has made a similtaneous
decree that the granting of my request shall be in
virtue of my prayers fner meas preces l
f and at a time
when, in addition, I am leading an upright life. (AT V
166, my emphasis)
As these passages show, Descartes held that even contingent
propositions made true by virtue of 'prayer-response' are
willed from eternity by God's immutable will. For instance,
let's say that I am starving to death, I am leading an
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upright life, and I pray for a sandwich which I then receive
from God. Thus, (a) is true.
(a) Dan receives a sandwich.
absurd to think that Descartes held that (a) is
immutably true, despite the fact that it is willed from all
eternity by an immutable will. After all, before my prayer,
(a) was false and after my prayer, (a) was true. So,
Descartes does think that there are genuine changes in the
world; as Descartes states, "there are some changes whose
occurence is guaranteed either by our own plain experience
or by divine revelation, and either our perception or our
faith shows us that these take place without any change in
the creator." (AT VIII 61)How can he hold this, if he holds
the Transfer of Immutability Principle? Notice in the
Burman passage quoted above, there is reference made to a
time at which my prayer is answered; and in the letter to
Elizabeth, there is an implicit assumption that we receive
an answer to our prayers at a certain time. 72 We can
reasonably assume that God immutably wills from eternity
that, at a certain time, (a) is true. Thus, what is
immutably true is (a*)
:
(a*) Dan receives a sandwich at t.
So, the Transfer of Immutability Principle will be true only
if we either restrict the scope of the quantifier to certain
types of willed- things
,
or we restrict God's willing to
temporally- indexed propositions. The former alternative will
have undesirable consequences; if we restrict the scope of
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the quantifier, then we need some reasonable way of
specifying which objects of the divine immutable will are
immutable. Descartes does not provide any indication of how
to do this. The latter alternative seems reasonable. The
Transfer of Immutability Principle is required for the
Immutability Interpretation. But clearly propositions like
(a) can change with respect to their truth value. It seems
that propositions like (a*) are the most plausible
candidates for the objects of God's will, ±± the
Immutability Interpretation is true.
This account so far allows that there can be genuine
changes in the world without any alteration in God's will.
This allowance is quite important because Descartes'
foundation for the laws governing natural change is God's
immutability
.
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But does this help Descartes explain the difference
between eternal truths and contingent truths? Even though
(a) is not immutable, it seems that Descartes is committed
to the immutability of (a*); and if he held the
Immutability-Necessity Principle, (a*) and other so-called
'contingent truths', when indexed to a time, turn out to be
necessary. So, we have not greatly improved the situation
concerning the difference between necessary and contingent
propositions for Descartes. 74
To sum up the problem thus far: An unsupplemented
Immutability Interpretation (Argument 1) is not sufficient
to explain the necessity of the eternal truths. On the
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other hand, a supplemented version (Argument 1*) is too
strong, insofar as it would commit Descartes to
necessitarianism. Furthermore, if God's providence consists
of a set of non- temporally- indexed propositions like (a)
then the Transfer of Immutability Principle is false;
because the Transfer of Immutability Principle is required
for the Immutability Interpretation, the interpretation
would be false if the Transfer of Immutability Principle
were false. On the other hand, if God's providence consists
of temporally- indexed propositions like (a*)
,
then, if the
Immutability-Necessity Principle is true, then Descartes is
committed to the necessity of all temporally- indexed
propositions. That is:
(1) The Transfer of Immutability Principle is required
for the Immutability Interpretation.
(2) The Immutability-Necessity Principle is required
for the Immutability Interpretation.
(3) The view of providence consisting of a series of
temporally- indexed propositions is required for
the Transfer of Immutability Principle.
So, in order for the Immutability Interpretation to have a
chance of being correct, the Transfer of Immutability
Principle, the Immutability-Necessity Principle, and the
temporally- indexed view of providence must be attributable
to Descartes. However, we have seen that Descartes is
committed to disastrous consequences if these are attributed
to him.
Clearly, Descartes cannot accept both principles and
the temporally- indexed view of providence. However, as we
have seen, there is textual evidence supporting an
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attribution of the Transfer of Immutability Principle and
the temporally- indexed view of providence to Descartes. The
textual evidence for the Transfer of Immutability Principle
is stronger than the evidence for the temporally- indexed
view of providence. However, because the Transfer of
Immutability Principle requires the temporally-indexed view
of providence, the latter, we might say, 'inherits' the
evidence for the former. So, the trouble-maker seems to be
the Immutability-Necessity Principle. As the 6 October 1645
letter to Elizabeth and the Burma n passages show, Descartes
is willing to live with the immutability of things. What he
cannot systematically live with is the necessity of all
things. Moreover, unlike the Transfer of Immutability
Principle and the temporally- indexed view of providence,
there is a total lack of textual evidence to support the
Immutability-Necessity Principle. 75 So, the way to go about
interpreting Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the
eternal truths is to start by rejecting the Immutability-
Necessity Principle.
Before we reject the Immutability Interpretation in its
supplemented form, we should look at some suggestions on how
to salvage the Immutability Interpretation.
Suggestion 1 : It has been suggested by Edwin Curley,
that although immutability is not identical with nor
sufficient for necessity for the most part, immutability
plus eternality is sufficient for necessity. 76 To bring out
this point, let us consider Thomas Morris' suggestion that
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immutability doesn't entail necessity
.
77 The reason why
this is true is that it is conceivable that some thing x may
never be able to change (and hence is immutable)
,
but x
could have failed to exist altogether. The view we have
is that x comes into existence at t and at no time t 1
after t, can x change. Curley agress that, in cases like
this, immutability doesn't entail necessity. But the case
of the eternal truths is different. Descartes not only
thinks that God is immutable and eternal, but also that he
has willed the eternal truths from eternity. Now, as we
have seen, Descartes uses the term 'eternal' in two
different ways:
x is eternal
1 = df x is outside of time or is timeless.
x is eternal., =df x exists at all times.
The eternal truths are, at least, eternal.,. Given that the
eternal truths are true at all times and they are willed by
God's immutable will, then by the Transfer of Immutability
Principle, there is no time at which they can fail to be
true. So, unlike the case in which something comes to exist
immutably but not necessarily, in the case of the eternal
truths, they cannot change and there was no time at which
they were not true. Hence, according to Curley, they are
true at all times and cannot be false at any time; that is,
they are necessarily true
There is also some apparent textual evidence for
Curley's reading, although he doesn't sufficiently exploit
it. Descartes states that the eternal truths and the
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(AT VIIessences they concern "are immutable and eternal."
380) I will consider this textual evidence in the next
section
.
I have some sympathy for such an interpretation.
However, this solution merely leads directly back to the
problem of contingency already discussed. For certainly,
temporally-indexed contingent propositions are willed from
all eternity by God's immutable will, in fact, Descartes
states the there is always a single identical and perfectly
simple act by means of which he [i.e., God] simultaneously
understands, wills and accomplishes everythi ng .
" (AT VIII
14; CSM I 201, emphasis mine)
. Do we then want to say that
they are necessary because they are true at all times and
cannot be false at any time? We would be forced to this if
there were not another way in which Descartes explains the
necessity of the eternal truths. Fortunately for Descartes
and the sympathetic commentator, Descartes does provide
another explanation.
In fact, there is an important but overlooked point: We
should not think of the immutability as explaining the
necessity of the eternal truths for Descartes. A careful
look at the texts used to support the Immutability
Interpretation 78 reveals that Descartes appeals to
immutability not to explain the necessity of the eternal
truths, but to answer the different, though related, issue
of whether God can change the eternal truths he has in fact
willed. The answer that consideration of God's immutability
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provides is that he can change them only if his will can
change. And because his will is immutable, he cannot change
the eternal truths. Thus, although immutability explains
this issue, it does not (and should not, for reasons already
mentioned) explain the issue at hand, namely why the eternal
truths are necessary.
Suggestion 2 : Because Descartes' account of prayer is
nearly identical to the account given by Aquinas, perhaps
Aquinas' solution to the problem is open to Descartes. In
ST Ila I Iae 83.2, Aquinas addresses the same kind of problem
concerning prayer, contingency, and the immutability of
providence that has been bothering us. In particular,
Aquinas is concerned with whether prayer is useful
[conven i ens ] , i.e., whether is makes a difference given that
God's providential plan is willed immutably from eternity.
He reviews three common mistakes concerning this issue and
rejects them. 79 Aquinas sees that the real problem for an
account of providence and prayer is to reconcile the
immutability of divine providence with prayer and the
contingency of some things governed by providence. He then
gives an account nearly identical to Descartes' account:
[W]
e
do not pray in order to change the decree of
divine providence, rather we pray in order to impetrate
r impetremus l those things which God has determined
would be obtained only through our prayers. (ST Ila
Ilae 83.2)
Thomas' solution for reconciling this view of prayer with
the the contingency of 'prayer-responses' is as follows:
When considering the usefulness of prayer, one must
remember that divine providence not only disposes
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which effects will take place, but also the manner in
which they will take place, and which actions will
cause them. Human acts are true causes, and therefore
men must perform certain actions, not in order to
change the divine providence, but in order to obtain
certain effects in the manner determined bv God (ST
I la Ilae 83.2)
Thus, Aquinas believes that the immutability of providence
takes nothing away from the contingency of 'prayer-
responses' in virtue of the fact that God will that certain
things come about contingently and some necessarily; and the
way God does this is by arranging certain types of causes
(necessary or contingent) which will either bring about an
event necessarily or bring it about contingently. Thus,
something is contingent (or necessary) depending on the
nature of a secondary cause
.
It would be nice if Descartes could help himself to
this kind of explanation. However, this explanation is not
available to Descartes. Descartes is much less willing than
Aquinas to allow causes other than God. As he states: "God
alone is the true cause of everything which is or can be"
(AT VIII 14; CSM I 201); and in the 27 May 1630, Descartes
states that, with respect to all of creation, including
eternal truths, God is their "efficient and total cause."
(AT I 152; CSMK 25)
.
And in the 6 October 1645 letter to
Elizabeth, he states: "God is the universal cause of
everything in such a way as to be also the total cause of
everything." (AT IV 314; CSMK 272) Because the truth and
modal status of a proposition is something that depends
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compl etel
y
on God, as does everything, Descartes cannot help
himself to Aquinas solution. 80
We have so far seen that the Immutability
Interpretation cannot be a correct interpretation of
Descartes explanation of the necessity of the eternal
truths. This would be disheartening if it were not for the
fact that Descartes actually presents a better explanation,
one which does not employ the notion of immutability and
which avoids the problem of contingency. We now turn to
this explanation.
An Alternative Explanation
As Edwin Curley has noticed, in several texts,
Descartes appears to be giving a different explanation of
the necessity of the eternal truths, one that doesn't make
reference to immutability. 81 For instance, in the Fifth
Replies, Descartes states:
I do not think that the essences of things, and the
mathematical truths [i.e., eternal truths] which we can
know concerning them, are independent of God.
Nevertheless I do think that they are immutable and
eternal , since the will and decree of God willed and
decreed that they ^should be so
. (AT VII 380; CSM II
261, my emphasis) 82
And in the Sixth Replies, he states:
God did not will the creation of the world in time
because he saw that it would be better this way than if
he had created it from eternity; nor did he will that
the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two
right angles because he recognized that it could not be
otherwise, and so on. On the contrary, it is because
he willed to create the world in time that it is better
this way than if he had created it from eternity; and
it is because he willed that the three angles of a
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tr iangle should npnps sarily pqnal t- w^
thi s if? true and r^nnot hp nthprwicjo
II 291, my emphasis)
xight. flmle.g ^h,^
(AT VII 432; CSM
And in the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland, Descartes states
that "even though [encore qne ] God has willed that some
truths should be necessary, this does not mean that he
willed them necessarily." (AT IV 118; CSMK 235) In these
passages, Descartes is presenting his real explanation of
the necessity of the eternal truths: the eternal truths are
necessary precisely because God willed that they are
necessary
.
This is exactly what Descartes needs to say to avoid
the problem of contingency that plagues the Immutability
Interpretation. That is, even though God immutably wills
both necessary eternal truths and merely contingent truths,
the fact that he wills the former to be necessary accounts
for the distinction between eternal truths and contingent
truths. And any account of necessity should be able to
account for the difference between necessary and contingent
truths. On Descartes' account, this desideratum is
satisfied. The eternal truths are necessary because God
wills that they be so; and temporally- indexed contingent
truths are contingent, though immutable, because God wills
them to be contingent.
This account is exactly the type of explanation we
should expect from Descartes. After all, it is a central
feature of the Creation Doctrine that a proposition is true
190
iff God will it to be true; and the same is true for modal
propositions
.
Some readers may be unsatisfied with Descartes'
explanation of the necessity of the eternal truths. A reader
may object that Descartes presents his account too quickly
and without any explanation of its details. I am very
sympathetic to this criticism. However, I am willing to
allow Descartes some leniency here because, despite the
frustrating lack of detail, he has given an account that
distinguishes between necessary and contingent truths; thus,
it avoids the pitfalls of the Immutability Interpretation.
Also, this account provides a firm foundation for modal
truths. To see this, let us go back in time to Augustine.
In his ^ libero arbit
. rio
,
Augustine addresses the problem
of whether God's foreknowledge is compatible with human free
actions. Part of his solution consists in holding that God
doesn't merely know that an agent A will do an action a,
God knows that, in many cases, A will do a free
1
y
Because
God is omniscient and infallible, the fact that he know that
A will do a freely absolutely guarantees that A will do a
freely. The same type of divine guarantee is provided by
Descartes, but in this case it is truths and modalities that
are guaranteed by God's will. After all, nothing could
guarantee that Dp more effectively than the fact that God
wills that DP. So, in spite of its lack of detail,
Descartes' explanation of the necessity of the eternal
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truths both distinguishes necessary from contingent truths
and guarantees the modal status of a proposition.
In this dissertation, I have tried to make some sense
and to give a sympathetic interpretation of Descartes'
Creation Doctrine. The interpretation I have given
accomplishes several goals: (i) it shows that the Creation
Doctrine rests on quite traditional theological assumptions
concerning God's simplicity and his freedom, (ii) it shows
that the Creation Doctrine does not commit Descartes to
bizarre modal theses. (iii) It shows that Descartes has a
sufficiently robust, though underdeveloped, account of the
necessity of the eternal truths. Of course, there is much
more to be said about the Creation Doctrine. However, this
must wait for another occasion.
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Endnotes
Although medieval philosophers (especially Scotus) hsdrigorous and well
-developed accounts of modality in theirteenth century, m the seventeenth century we don't find
Leibniz°
f m°dallty given the attention they deserve until
2Curley (1984)
, (1988)
(1998), LaCroix (1984).
1998), Geach (1973), Petrik
3Held by Petrik (1998)
. Dutton (1996) says merely thatthere is "something akin" to the distinction at work inescartes. Dutton has admitted to me in conversation thathe does not think that the distinction explains the
necessity of the eternal truths. Richard LaCroix holdssomething similar to this interpretation: God binds himselfto whatever he wills. See LaCroix (1984) p. 467. Textual
evidence for LaCroix's view can be found at AT VII 380Osier (1994) and (1995) seems to inadvertently waiverbetween the
.
Immutability Interpretation and the Pntpni- i a
Interpretation. Perhaps this is because, as we'll see thelatter is not interestingly different from the former.'
4Held
,
in varying degrees, by Curley (1984), LaCroix(1984)
,
Menn (1998)
,
Osier (1995)
,
Van den Brink (1993)
5Petrik (1998)
6Osler (1994)
, (1995)
,
Dutton (1996)
,
Petrik (1998)
.
7As Oakely states, concerns about omnipotence "led
theologians [in the twelfth century] to distinguish
increasingly between capacity and volition; to tease apart,
that is,
.
the consideration of what God could do
hypothetically and in—abst racto
,
given the very absoluteness
of his power, and the consideration of what he had chosen
and willed to do in actuality. During the first three
quarters of the thirteenth century, the period that proved
to be formative for the distinction, the familiar terms
potent i a—dei—absdut a came to be used of the former and
PQtenti a dei ordinata of the latter." (1998) p. 441.
In fact, there are at least two book-length treatments
of the history of the distinction: William Courtenay's
Capac i ty and Vo li tion (1990) and Lawrence Moonan ' s Pi vi np
Power (1994)
.
According to Moonan, "one of the earliest undeniably
recognisable uses of the power distinction" is found in
Geoffrey of Poitiers' (fl. 1215) Summa theologian
. (1994)
p. 57-61. According to Courtenay, however, an earlier use
of the distinction is found in an anonymous commentary on
193
the Pauline epistles circa 1200
See Oakley (1998) p. 441 .
Courtenay (1985) p. 247
(1990)
S
ch °i
kl
ThP
(1984) Ch ‘ 2 and ^urtenay (1985) and1
. 1. e same example is used by others even
154?) in
9/ 0 thS sif^nth-century Lutheran , JohA !ck (d3 m a series of letters on the first book of Lombard'sSentences . See Oakley (1998) p. 452 . a s
“Peter Damian (1972) section II.
12 -
_
Afs Courtenay states: "God can do more than heactuaily wills to do; divine capacity exceeds divine
volition." (1985) p. 244.
13Peter Damian (1972) section II.
In fact, Damian believes that unactualized
alternatives are a necessary condition for both divine andcreaturely freedom and power: " [Desiderius
'
position] seemsso absurd and so ridiculous that not only is the assertionincompatible with the omnipotent God, it cannot even be
applied to fragile mankind. There are many things, after
all, that we do not do and yet are able to do " (1972)
section II.
“Courtenay (1985) p. 244
16Cf. Anselm Cur deus homo II. 5, 10 , 17 in Anselm(1998) and Courtenay (1990) p. 34-5.
17William_ Courtenay states that the distinction hadbecome established "by the early 13th-century and had become
commonplace scholastic terminology by mid-century.
" (1985)
p. 243. According to Moonan (1994), among those developing
and
. employing the distinction in the thirteenth centurybesides Aquinas were Roland of Cremona (d. 1259)
,
Hugh of
St . Cher (d. 1263), Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), and
Aquinas' teacher, Albertus Magnus (d. 1280).
18ST la 25.5.
19See ST la 19.3, res .
2
°See ST la 19.7, res; 19. 8. ad 4.
21 It is interesting to note that even some 17th-century
Calvinist theologians understood the distinction in this
Thomistic fashion. For instance, Samuel Willard (d. 1707),
in his work, A Comp leaf. Body of Divinity
,
states: "Divines'
do from Scripture observe a two-fold Power ascribed to God,
viz. 1. An unlimited and absolute power, by vertue of which
he can do all possible things, even such things as he never
actually doth... 2. An ordinate power, which is not a Power
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dif fe rent from the former, but the former considered as Godpleased to set limits or bounds to it by the Decree wi t-hrespect to his exerting of it is his works of
Wl
lciency Not that his Arm was shortened in these
has
P
tied'h
bUt:
h
be
S
aUS
K’
hiS
-
PUrpOSe
'
and somet iwes his promise^ is ands; his Will was otherwise and he pursuesthat m all he doth.- p. 70 Quoted in Oakley (1998) p
, . .
A^uinas is silent on whether we can apply thedistinction to agents other than God. It would seem to bepermissible to do so. D
^Ord i nal i
n
1.44, in Woler (1986) p. 255.
24Qrd i nat i
o
1.44, in Wolter (1986) p. 257.
25cf * Ordinal
, i o 1.44, in Wolter (1986) p 257-259Adams (1987) p. 1190. P ' ' and
. ,
2
.
6
° f course there is a trivial sense in which they areidentical in God: God is simple, and as such, his power isnot composed of two different powers. Rather, as Ockham
states, the distinction is one concerning ways of
understand ing—and—speaking of God
' s power
.
"Adams (1987) p. 1192
2 8See Korolec (1982
58-60
.
p. 639-640, and Cross (1999) p.
^Ordinal, i o 1.44. Quoted in Adams (1987) p. 1195 .
30Qrd inat i
o
1.44, in Wolter (1986) p. 257.
31Ibid
.
In contemporary discussions of God's omnipotence,
many scholars have gone to great lengths to give an account
of the omnipotence of God in light of the fact that God
seems to be unable to do many things. For instance, God is
not able to make a four-sided triangle; he cannot make it
true that (x exists at t and x does not exist at t)
Furthermore, Anselm and others argue that God cannot make
himself impotent, to sin, to change, to be evil, to lack
some relevant propositional knowledge, etc. 1 They attempt
to give an account of God's power such that it is consistent
with God's seeming inability to do the impossible and his
inability to do a variety of other things that are possible.
Some find it strange to say that there are things that
finite creatures are able to do but that God cannot do
(i.e., sin or make something too heavy to lift). But, as
Anselm rightly argues, it is not because of some lack of
power that God cannot sin or change; rather it is precisely
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because God's nature is essentially perfect and qinninr,
changing are imperfection. As Anselm states: "Again how
3"
are you omnipotent if you cannot do all things? Iut?'hSw cany°u ° a
-^
things if you cannot be corrupted, or tell lies
been^do ^
tr
^
e int ° the false (such as to undo what hasne)
,
and many similar things? Or is the ability to do
A^selm^ U998n
0t ^ imp°tenCe? (£^logion VII, in
33William of Ockham (199i; 491 (Question I, article
In Spinoza
299-346
.
1925) pp. 233-281 and Spinoza (1985; PP
35
I have taken liberty with the translation of thispassge. Because all of the occurrences of 1 potent i
^
1
ord inata 1
,
and 1 absol ut
a
1 are in the accusative, the Latinactually says ' potentiam 1
, 'ordinat.am 1 and ' ahsnl nt-am • n,,«-
for the sake of consistency, I have left the^in Latin^butleft out the accusative endings.
36 It is interesting to note that in CM II 9, Spinoza
states that, were God to create creatures with essences
other than the ones they in fact have, God would have togive us different powers of conceivaility so that we wouldhave epistemic access to certain truths. As Spinoza states:
"it would follow that if God had created things in adifferent way, he would likewise have also constituted our
nature that we could understand things as they had been
created by God." (CM II 9) That Spinoza even discusses the
'possibility' of God creating an order different from the
actual order seems to be in direct opposition to his claims
made in Proposition 33 of the Ethics
. I'm not sure how to
reconcile these views.
A-ll of the temporal language employed by philosophers
concerning the distinction cannot be taken literally. When
they write of 'what God has already done' and 'what God
cannot now do', we should understand this to mean that on
the supposition that God does p, God cannot do not-p.
In fact, Spinoza states that from his discussion of
potent i a de j—absoluta et ordinata, questions such as
"whether [God] can do better than he does, whether he can do
more than he has done" can be "very easily answered." (CM II
9)
See AT VII 125; CSM II 90, AT VII 415; CSM II 280.
40The commentators at Coimbra, however, distinguished
potentia absoluta from potentia ordinaria . The former is
God's power do anything that does not involve a
contradiction; the latter extends only to what is consistent
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with "the common and habitual course or order nut into
^
hlng®
,
^"M^nrari Co l lecno rnnLrir...^
T^n
.
lT^ P^ iror"m7, 16, 1. Quoted m Oakley (1998) p. 454 . ' 11
41See AT VII 235; CSM II 164.
Tad Schmaltz points out, however, that there is nocompelling evidence that Descartes was familiar with thislatter work. (1991) p. 138. Cf
. Cronin 1966) p. 32-33
43Petrik (1998)
44Petrik (1998)p. 418.
45Descartes would
potent i a absolute if
,
however, hold that God can do x dp(but not only if) x is possible.
46 Cf. Dutton (1996) p. 205 n.22.
47Petrik (1998) p. 423.
480sler (1994) p. 130-131.
49Dut ton (1996) p. 205.
50Cf. Ethi cs I, Proposition 29; Proposition 33Scholium 1.
In conversation and correspondence, Michael DellaRocca has
. told me that CM is a hodge-podge of cartesian and
spmozistic ideas, and it is very difficult to tell whenSpinoza is interpreting Descartes and when he is presentinghis own ideas.
52Cf . Lennon (1998) p. 338-9.
53Wierenga (1989) p. 170.
54Wierenga (1989)
,
Wolterstorff (1975)
55MQnQ l ogi on XXV, in Anselm (1998)
.
Quoted in Wierenga
(1989) p. 171.
“Examples are from Wierenga (1989) p. 172.
“Wierenga (1989) p. 172.
Aquinas thinks this is case as well. For instance, in
ST la 9.1, Aquinas argues that God is immutable in virtue of
his simplicity. In ST la 10.3, he argues that God is
eternal because he is immutable. So, in the latter case,
God's immutability is conceptually prior to his eternality.
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This, however, does not affect the
eternal, then he is immutable.
point that if God is
Curley (1984) p. 588. Cf
. Curley (1988), p 41-2-
•
[De
f
c
^
rt e s] professes to deduce them from God'simmutability, which would confirm their necessity "
T'
" Because
i_
these truths proceed from Godf they areeternal and
_
immutable ... because God's will is such as^oproduce an immutable effect." p. 351
“Nadler (1987) p. 176.
.
”?sl
f
r (1995) : "divine immutability provides Descartes
God
f
°^
thS necessity of the eternal truths thatcreated freely." p. 152. Cf
. Osier (1994) p. 131 .
n Q Q ^r
See
r1
CUrley (1984
'
Van den Brink (1993), Nadler(1987) Even some who hold that the laws of nature are noteternal truths hold that they are necessary truths. Forin a Recent and interesting paper, Blake Dutton(1396) argues that Descartes' laws of nature are not eternaltruths because eternal truths are such that God was free tocreate them or not to create them and he could have createdthem any way he wished; but the laws of nature are such that
S C\ W? S/ r?e t0 create them or not to create them, but giventhat God chooses to create them, his immutability restrictshis choice to only those laws compatible with hisimmutability.
64Margaret Osier has provided an actual argument forthe Immutability Interpretation. Her argument can be
reconstructed as follows:
1. God's will is identical with God's understanding.
2- If 1, then a change in God's will entails a change
in God's understanding.
3. A change in God's will entails a change in God's
understanding
.
4. There cannot be a change in God's understanding
(because this would indicate some imperfection in
God's understanding).
5. Therefore, there cannot be a change in God's will
Osier (1994) p. 131.
65Cf. Dutton (1996) p. 206. Robert Sleigh has pointed
out to me that there must be some mention of omnipotence (or
of ' sufficient power') in the Transfer of Immutability
Principle because it is possible that there be a being with
an immutable but insufficiently powerful will. In that
case, although the will is immutable, it is not sufficiently
powerful to secure the obtaining of its object, let alone
the immutability of its object.
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Cf
. AT XI 38; CSM I 93, and Menn (1998) p. 351 .
67
,See AT 1 149-50; CSMK 24, AT I 151-3; CSMK 25-26118-19; CSMK 235, AT V 166-7; CSMK 348, AT V 223-24-358-59, AT VII 435-36; CSM II 293-94, AT VII 380; CSM II
z 6 1 .
AT
CSMK
68
,Curley blurs the distinction between necessity andimmutability: "More problematic is the reason he here
assigns for the immutabi 1 i ty of the eternal truths. in theletter to Mersenne, it was the immutabi 1 i ty of God's will.Here it is the fact that God wills them to be i mnmtabi
^
jfDescartes is not now inclined to explain the nece.g.g-i i- v Q fnecessary truths by the rmmutabi 1
i
ty of God's will, if he'sprepared to concede that God's will might change, then thefact that God has once willed the eternal truths to be
immutab l e does not seem to provide much security for thefuture." (1998) p. 10, my emphasis.
69 ,Descartes uses the term 'contingent' in the Regular
(AT X 422; CSM I 46)
,
and in the Princi pi p<=i he states: "Inthis one idea [of God] the mind recognizes existence - not
merely the possible and contingent [existence which belongs
to the ideas of all the other things which it distinctly
perceives, but utterly necessary and eternal existence " (AT
VIII 10; CSM I 197)
It is important to notice that Descartes thinks thatGod wills all things that exist or are real; God does not
will the privations involved in sinful actions and erroneousjudgments. Privations, strictly speaking, are nothing.
They don't require God's causal input. See the Fourth
Meditation (AT VII 54-61; CSM II 37-42)
71Cf . AT VII 191, 436; CSM II 134, 294, AT VIII 14-15;
CSM I 201-2, AT V 166-7; CSMK 348, AT IV 332, 354; CSMK 277
282, AT XI 438; CSM I 380.
72While we receive answer at a certain time, God
doesn't answer our prayers at a certain time but from all
eternity
.
73See Garber (1992) p. 282
74This problem is not peculiar to Descartes. For
instance, any philosopher who held, what Knuuttila and
Hintikka (following Lovejoy) call, the 'principle of
plenitude', will face the problem of contingent temporally-
indexed truths. According to this principle, which Knuuttila
and Hintikka argue was held by Aristotle, Boethius, and
Maimonides among others, no genuine possibility will remain
forever unactualized. Knuuttila (1982)
,
Hintikka (1973)
.
So, on this view, to say that P is possible is to say that,
at some time, P is actual; to say that P is necessary is to
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say that P is true at all times; and to say that P isimpossible is to say that there is no time at which P isactual.. Thus if a truth is immutable, it is necessary AsTerence Irwin has stated, Aristotle "treats 'always' asinterchangeable with 'necessary'." Irwin, (1988) p. 523. AndHmtikka (1973) argues that Aristotles' real 'Sea-BattleProblem' concerns
' omnitemporal truth' and not 'past truth'.
.
There is a pr ima—
f
ac i e strange passage in thePass i ons is which Descartes states: "we should reflect uponhe fact that nothing can possibly happen other than asProvidence has determined from all eternity. Providence isso to speak, a fate or immutable necessity rune
mmmuabl
e
] . .
.
" (AT XI 438; CSM I 380, emphasis mine) On onereading of this, Descartes seems to be advocating theImmutability-Necessity Principle. However, because much ofthe material in the Passions was first developed in lettersto Elizabeth, starting in 1643, we should read this letter
as being consistent with the 6 October 1645 letter to
Elizabeth; that is, as saying simply that providence isimmutable (adding 'necessity' for emphasis)
. Cf
. Gaukroqer(1995) ch. 10. a
This suggestion was made by Curley when he served as
commentator on my paper, "Immutability and Necessity in
Descartes," at the Central Division APA, April 2000.
77Morris (1984)
7 fiAT I 145-6; CSMK 23, AT V 166; CSMK 348.
79See ST la 22.2&4; 23.8; 115.6; 116.3
80
I do think that this means that Descartes is really
an occasionalist
,
but I realize that this is an incredibly
controversial topic. I do not have the time to argue for
this here.
81Curley (1998) .
82 i •In the previous section, I stated that this passage
could be used by Curley to support his suggestion that
immutability plus eternality entails necessity. In don't
think that his constitutes very strong evidence in favor of
Curley's suggestion to help the Immutability Interpretation,
because, if the Immutability Interpretation is correct,
Descartes cannot mean that the eternal truths are immutable
and eternal because God willed them to be so. After all, on
the Immutability Interpretation, God does not need to will
that the eternal truths are immutable and eternal in order
for them to be immutable and eternal. On the Immutability
Interpretation, God merely needs to will them (from
eternity)
,
and by the Transfer of Immutability Principle,
they will be immutable (and eternal) . I think that, in this
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passage, Descartes is using 'immutable and eternal' to stanHf°r 'Hecessary
•
# although he does not believe thatimmutability plus eternality entail necessitv rL v-
432
SU
?SM
r
£l
d
291)
thS Pa
f
Sa
^
S fr°m the Sixth Replies (a/v^911
'
ln which Descartes states that the eternaltruths are necessary because God wills them to be so
1
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